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Abstract 
The majority of social studies of science and religion have been conducted in the 
USA, and tend to focus on perceived ‘problematic groups’ such as Evangelical creationists, 
potentially skewing our perception of how science and religion may relate in other societies. 
Furthermore, Catholicism is a religion held in a paradoxical position, with scholarly discourse 
not deeming it a ‘problematic group’ regarding evolution, yet the Church is often 
represented as particularly anti-science in public discourse. Accordingly, this thesis aims to 
empirically investigate the relationship between Catholicism and evolution in England. It 
achieves this in two ways. Firstly, through an ethnographic content analysis of public 
discourse, exploring how large-circulation English newspapers have represented recent 
papal statements on evolution by John Paul II, Benedict XVI, and Francis (1996-2017). I find 
some contradictory media interpretations of popes’ statements on evolution, highlighting 
the contingent nature of representations of science and religion in public discourse. 
Secondly, through analysing public attitudes, via a thematic analysis of 31 semi-structured 
interviews with Catholics in England. While the majority had ‘no problem’ with evolution, 5 
expressed opposition to evolution, this however was not based on Biblical literalism. The 
implications are discussed, particularly regarding the use of evolution-related survey 
measures. 
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 1 
Introduction 
The majority of research investigating the contemporary relationship between 
religion and evolutionary science has focussed on the Protestant religious context of the 
United States (US) (e.g. Hill, 2014a; Guhin, 2016; Ecklund and Scheitle, 2018). This is 
understandable, given the longstanding history of debates around religion and evolution in 
the US (Numbers, 2006). However, without empirically investigating the relationship 
between religion and evolution in other locations, and other religious contexts, we risk 
perceiving the relationship between religion and science through a US Protestant template. 
This thesis investigates the contemporary relationship between Catholicism and evolution in 
England, and is therefore one of the first empirical and social studies investigating non-US, 
non-Protestant Christian views of evolution. Given the dearth of contemporary social studies 
of Catholic attitudes to evolution, and in seeking to give as comprehensive view as possible, I 
have situated Catholic public attitudes in both historical and contemporary media contexts. 
This is a somewhat tumultuous time for the Catholic Church, with factions seemingly 
coalescing around one of the ‘two popes’—progressives around Francis and conservatives 
around Benedict (Stanford, 2019). There have been recent attempts by high-profile 
conservative Catholics, including President Trump’s former Chief Strategist, Steve Bannon, 
to publicly question Francis’s authority to represent the ‘Catholic view’ on topics such as the 
refugee crisis, the environment, and global political cooperation (Engel and Warner, 2019). 
Yet, who gets to decide the true ‘Catholic view’ on these topics? Similarly, with regard to 
evolution, we may ask: what is the ‘Catholic view'? To whom do we look to find it? Do we 
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look to official pronouncements by popes and the Vatican? Or to the media producers who 
communicate papal views to us? Or, indeed, do we look to Catholic individuals themselves?  
Accordingly, in this thesis, Chapter 1 first outlines the conceptual issues in 
contemporary social studies of religion and science, and explores the extant research on 
religious attitudes towards evolution. Next, Chapter 2 charts the historical relations between 
Catholicism and evolution after the publication of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species 
in 1859. Chapter 3 discusses the methodology of the study. In Chapter 4, I analyse an 
instance of public discourse on Catholicism and evolution, namely English newspaper 
representations of recent papal statements on evolution. Finally, in Chapters 5 and 6, I 
explore the results of an in-depth, qualitative study of Catholic publics’ attitudes towards 
evolution. In this way, I seek to produce a contextual analysis of the contemporary 
relationship between Catholicism and evolution in England. 
Aims and research questions 
This thesis aims to empirically investigate the relationship between Catholicism and 
evolution in England. It achieves this in two ways: 
• Through analysing public discourse1, by exploring how English newspapers 
have represented popes’ recent statements on evolution; 
 
1 I follow Kaden et al. (2017; 2019: 75) by denoting public discourse relating to science and religion as: 
“popular media coverage of issues relating to science and belief and the publications of […] ‘professionals’ 
in the field of science and religion whose vocation it is to develop, distribute, defend and critique systems 
of explanation that relate science to different forms of ultimate belief.” 
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• Through analysing public attitudes, by exploring individual Catholics’ 
perceptions and attitudes towards evolution, and the relationship between 
evolution and their faith. 
The study has two specific research questions, one for the analysis of public 
discourse and one for the analysis of public attitudes: 
1) How have papal statements on evolution been represented in large-
circulation English newspapers? 
2) In what ways do Catholic individuals in England perceive evolutionary science 
in relation to their faith and worldview? 
A number of research objectives relate to these research questions: 
1) Public discourse 
1.1 To map the historical context leading to contemporary papal 
statements on evolution; 
1.2 To analyse initial news coverage for each of John Paul’s, Benedict’s, 
and Francis’ evolution comments; 
1.3 To analyse subsequent coverage to see how subsequent references to 
these papal comments are used. 
2) Public attitudes 
2.1 To analyse Catholic individuals’ perceptions and attitudes towards 
evolution; 
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2.2 To analyse how Catholic individuals conceptualise evolution; 
2.3 To situate these understanding in the larger literature on religious 
attitudes towards evolution, especially quantitative measures; 
2.4 To explore how, if at all, dominant media coverage/narratives are 
informing or interacting with individual perceptions. 
Both analyses of public discourse and individual attitudes are informed by the review 
of historical literature on Catholicism and evolution, which helps to situate the study in its 
proper historical context. Combining these approaches, I build historical context, media 
representations, and individuals’ perceptions into an integrated view of the relationship 
between evolutionary science and Catholicism in England. However, in so doing we must 
first take note of various conceptual issues which may hinder investigations of science and 
religion in society. 
 
Science and religion in society 
How do religion and science relate to one another? That is a question which has 
preoccupied thinkers for centuries. Philosophy and theology would seem to be the proper 
homes for answers, and indeed, various professional and popular authors have expounded 
their views from these disciplines. Depending on ideological presuppositions, answers range 
from proclamations of conflict to compatibility (e.g. Dawkins, 2006; Collins, 2008; Dennett 
and Plantinga, 2011), with some authors delineating other possible relationships, such as 
independence and dialogue (e.g. Gould, 1999; Barbour, 2000).  
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Over the last decade, however, a small but growing field has attempted to explore 
the relationship between science and religion socially. These new efforts do not focus solely 
on the epistemological truth claims of both science and religion, instead investigating their 
relationship as it manifests in the lived experience of different members of society (Evans 
and Evans, 2008; Baker, 2012). The first task when investigating science and religion from a 
social perspective must be to ask a further question: what do we mean by ‘science’ and 
what do we mean by ‘religion’? These two concepts are not easy to define. Indeed, in their 
respective fields of study, both sociologists of religion and sociologists of science have been 
reluctant to offer all-encompassing definitions of these categories (Gülker, 2019: 106). So, if 
simply defining religion and science is problematic, what hope do we have in determining 
their relation? I argue the first step in clarification must be a distancing from abstract 
conceptions of ‘science’ and ‘religion’, to more specific objects of study. Taking ‘religion’ as 
an example, we may choose a specific religious practice, a belief, or indeed an affiliation. If 
we choose a specific religious belief or identity which is opposed to a specific aspect of 
science, such as Young Earth Creationism2 (YEC), then conflict is embedded in the study from 
the outset, thus representing a limited and potentially problematic framing of the research. 
This is not to say studying YEC is not worthwhile, on the contrary it, is necessary, however 
the issue is solely focussing on these anti-evolution groups and extrapolating to other 
 
2 Young earth creationists reject the scientific view that life on earth evolved over billions of years, and 
instead believe life was created instantaneously by God generally within the last 6,000 years (Ruse, 2018). 
The debate is somewhat confused by the use of the term ‘creationism’ by those who do actually agree 
with evolution, such as Pope Benedict XVI’s (2007) comments that an antithesis between creationism and 
evolutionism is absurd. In this sense, ‘creationism’ is used to denote that the universe has a creator, not 
to deny evolution has happened. However, in this thesis, unless otherwise caveated, I use ‘creationism’ to 
refer to a broad class of beliefs which reject evolutionary explanations, in favour of specific acts of 
creation, with young earth creationism meaning special creation within the last ~6000 years. 
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religious groups more generally. Therefore, in this move from the abstract to the concrete, 
we must remain aware that the choices of the researcher can influence the type of 
relationship between science and religion we find. If we choose religious affiliation to a 
particular denomination instead of ‘religion’ in the abstract, then which denomination 
should we investigate? If we only focus on areas of known conflict and controversy, then 
studies will largely find conflict and controversy. This could potentially then skew our view of 
the complex and myriad relationships science and religion may have across different 
societies. 
In previous social studies of science and religion, there has been a tendency to focus 
on controversies and groups that are viewed as problematic. This is most manifest in the 
more extensive literature on creationist movements in the USA (e.g. Barker, 1979; Toumey, 
1994). While undoubtedly a necessary endeavour, if the main terrain illuminated in 
academic research is the culturally specific topography of the USA, does this not skew our 
views of how science and religion may relate in other societies and other religious contexts? 
More recent work has begun to explore societal relations between religion and science 
beyond specific anti-science groups, and beyond the US context, however the literature is 
still in its infancy.3 
Thus, we arrive at my decision to investigate the contemporary relationship between 
Catholicism and evolution in England. While in popular media, the Catholic Church is often 
presented as having an antipathetic relationship with science (e.g. Stanford, 1996; Moss, 
 
3 See Jones et al. (2019) for a notable move in this direction. 
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2006; Withnall, 2014), in academic literature on religious attitudes towards evolution, 
Catholics are not generally held to be a problematic group. For example, in one of the most 
cited articles on religious attitudes towards evolution, Miller et al. assert that while the 
evolution of humans is unacceptable to biblical literalists: “Catholics and mainstream 
Protestants generally accept variations of a theological view known as theistic evolution 
which views evolution as the means by which God brought about humans, as well as other 
organisms” (Miller et al., 2006: 765). However, in order to fully illuminate the types of 
interactions between science and religion in various societies, it is as important to 
investigate these perceived non-problematic groups as it is to examine the contrary. If we do 
not investigate a wide range of science-religion interactions, we run the risk of employing a 
conflict framing from the outset. Furthermore, without investigating these perceived non-
problem groups, we cannot answer many necessary questions. For example, while the 
majority of Catholics may accept some form of theistic evolution, how do these individuals 
see this evolution interacting with their religious beliefs? Demonstrating the variety of views 
found in a single Christian denomination also helps resist essentialism, and treating a 
denomination as a monolithic group. What of those Catholics who do not accept evolution, 
is their evolution opposition similar or different to other religious groups in other national 
contexts? Are those English Catholics who might be opposed to evolution doing so for 
similar reasons as US Evangelical Protestants? Without studies into diverse religious groups, 
in various national contexts, we cannot answer such questions. 
The above issues are discussed in more detail in Chapter 1 – Studying Religious 
Attitudes towards Evolution, where I first outline the conceptual issues involved in studying 
 8 
religious attitudes towards evolution. I begin by addressing one of the key narratives in the 
study of science and religion – the conflict thesis, which originated in the 19th century and 
has been for some time the predominate historiographical position in the study of science 
and religion (Draper, 1874; White, 1896). Proponents of the conflict thesis suggest that 
science and religion have been locked in inevitable battle throughout the history of human 
thought. Contemporary historians have roundly debunked this idea, rejecting any meta-
narrative of past relations between these two domains (Brooke 1991; Numbers, 2009; 
Harrison, 2015). These more recent and more nuanced historical analyses stress the 
complexity of past science-religion relations, and advocate a contextual approach to 
scholarship.  
This thesis is situated in the area of the public understanding of science, and 
therefore in Chapter 1 I detail the discipline’s trajectory from deficit to contextualist 
approaches. The chapter concludes by critically reviewing both quantitative and qualitative 
studies of religious attitudes towards evolution, highlighting potential methodological issues 
and exploring the implications for this thesis. Most notable of these is the problematic 
(mis)use of surveys to investigate public attitudes towards evolution. Given that most 
research into religious attitudes towards evolution has been conducted in the US, it is 
unsurprising that most surveys, which seek to analyse the attitudes towards evolution 
elsewhere, employ terms, such as YEC that originated in US public discourse. However, are 
the terms of US public discourse the most appropriate to categorise the English population, 
or indeed publics elsewhere? Scholars such as Elsdon-Baker (2015a) have critiqued the 
restrictive nature of these survey categories, and argue that through them conflict is 
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sometimes embedded into the survey design itself. Accordingly, in this thesis, I employ an 
exploratory, qualitative approach to generate new insights into how a non-US, non-
Protestant religious group views evolution. 
 
Catholics and evolution in England 
As introduced above, Catholicism is a religious tradition that is regarded in a rather 
paradoxical way. On the one hand, in academic literature, Catholics are not seen to be 
problematic regarding attitudes towards evolution or science in general; but on the other 
hand, in public discourse, the Catholic Church is often described as being anti-science. 
Indeed, the Catholic Church was the main target of Draper’s (1874) foundational text 
forwarding the historical conflict thesis. As will be discussed in Chapter 2 - Historical 
Perspectives on Catholicism and Evolution the Church’s treatment of Galileo is often held 
up as an exemplar of the conflict between science and religion at large. In this chapter, I 
explore historical scholarship on past relations between Catholicism and evolutionary 
science. I first set out a brief history of evolution itself, before exploring elite Catholic 
responses to evolution from 1859-1950. Finally, I explore and contextualise popes’ recent 
public comments on evolution. This context is essential for understanding the subsequent 
media analysis. 
A clear example of a conflict perception in public discourse is around Pope Francis’ 
positive statements about evolution in 2014. Addressing the Pontifical Academy of Sciences 
on 27th October, Francis affirmed his belief in biological evolution and its compatibility with 
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the doctrine of creation. His comments sparked media reaction around the world. In the US, 
journalists at MSNBC claimed the Pope’s remarks were a “significant rhetorical break with 
Catholic tradition” and NBC News claimed Francis made a “theological break from his 
predecessor Benedict XVI, a strong exponent of creationism” (Berger, 2014; Jamieson et al., 
2014). In England, a writer at The Independent newspaper declared that “the Pope made 
comments which experts said put an end to the ‘pseudo theories’ of creationism and 
intelligent design4 that some argue were encouraged by his predecessor, Benedict XVI.” 
Again, highlighting the image of the Church as anti-science, the article claimed the Church 
“has long had a reputation for being anti-science – most famously when Galileo faced the 
inquisition and was forced to retract his ‘heretic’ theory that the Earth revolved around the 
Sun” (Withnall, 2014). Conversely, other journalists at the time remarked that the Pope’s 
position was not new for the Church, and criticised the general media response, observing 
how publications had “ramped up the Pope’s words and took them out of context” (Dias, 
2014). The content of this widespread media coverage suggests that some media producers 
held a perception of the Catholic Church as being anti-science or anti-evolution. What had 
led to these media perceptions? Had previous popes’ statements influenced their 
formation?  
 
4 Intelligent design was developed in the 1990s, predominantly in the US. It was intended as a non-
religious refutation of evolution by natural selection, mainly through the claim that some biological 
systems (such as the eye) were too complex to have evolved in stages, an argument known as irreducible 
complexity. Intelligent design proponents argued that as evolution cannot account for the complexity of 
biological systems, an Intelligent Designer (not necessarily a God) must have instead created organisms 
more or less in their present form. In a 2005 trial, Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, a US federal 
court ruled that intelligent design was indistinguishable from other forms of religious creationism, and 
therefore could not be taught in science classrooms (Glick, 2017). 
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Regarding its stance on evolution, the Church has a complicated history. Although 
the Church has never denounced nor condemned evolutionary science, sceptical attitudes 
have existed in the Vatican. After Charles Darwin published On the Origin of Species in 1859 
it took nearly 100 years for the Church to publicly comment on the issue. In a 1950 
encyclical, Humani Generis, Pope Pius XII explained that the Catholic Church did not forbid 
research and discussion to take place with regard to evolution, but warned against those 
who “rashly transgress this liberty of discussion, when they act as if the origin of the human 
body from pre-existing and living matter were already completely certain and proved by the 
facts” (Pius XII, 1950: 36). Between Pius in 1950 and Francis in 2014, two more popes 
publicly commented on the topic. In 1996 John Paul II remarked that evolution was “more 
than a hypothesis.” He also recognised a plurality of philosophical foundations on which 
evolution is based—materialistic, spiritualistic, etc.—and argued that some of these 
positions are incompatible with the truth of ‘man’. For John Paul, there was an “ontological 
leap” for humans, notably the injection of the immortal soul. His remarks also sparked 
significant reaction, with The Quarterly Review of Biology dedicating a special issue in 1997, 
inviting scientists, ethicists, and philosophers to reflect on John Paul’s remarks. Among the 
commentators was evolutionary biologist and prominent atheist, Richard Dawkins, who 
claimed: “The sudden injection of an immortal soul in the timeline is an antievolutionary 
intrusion into the domain of science” (Dawkins, 1997: 398). 
Benedict XVI’s comments on evolution are the most difficult to unpack, but also the 
most important to. The above reactions to Francis’ comments refer to Benedict being a 
supporter of intelligent design or creationism. However, did Benedict in fact reject 
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evolutionary science? Thus, were his views in opposition to those of John Paul and Francis? 
The only way to understand this issue is to analyse both the nature of Benedict’s comments 
themselves, and the media coverage surrounding them. I lay out my exploration of this 
episode of Catholicism and evolution in public discourse in Chapter 4 – English Newspaper 
Representations of Papal Statements on Evolution (1996-2017). Here I explore the results 
of a media analysis of newspapers representations of popes’ statements on evolution. I 
investigate each of John Paul II, Benedict XVI, and Francis’ statements in turn, 
contextualising the newspaper representations with events outside the corpus analysed. 
Despite these papal pronouncements, the Church has never set a prescriptive 
position on evolution for its followers. Furthermore, we cannot assume that Vatican 
attitudes towards evolution are shared amongst the laity. As no qualitative studies 
specifically assessing contemporary Catholic attitudes toward evolution exist, whether 
Catholic individuals’ attitudes diverge or correspond with contemporary papal statements 
remains unanswered. Chapter 5 – Catholic Publics’ (Non-)Opposition to Evolution is the first 
of two interview analysis chapters in this thesis. Here I outline the two broad groups of 
Catholic orientations towards evolution, which I term: opposition and non-opposition 
toward evolution. After exploring the views of these two groups I proceed to look at how 
these Catholics are conceptualising evolution, and their knowledge of evolutionary science. I 
discuss the view that evolution is ‘just a theory’, anthropocentric views of evolution, and the 
conflation of biological evolution with the Big Bang. Chapter 6 – God, Genes and Genesis is 
the second of the two interview analysis chapters. Here I investigate the relationship 
between Catholic participants’ views on evolution and their religious beliefs. I look at how 
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participants’ views of Genesis are related (or indeed are not related) to their views on 
evolution. I also explore participants’ views of God’s role in relation to the process of 
evolution, and reflect on implications of the findings for the study of religious attitudes 
towards evolution, especially the use of surveys. 
 
Research design 
As introduced, this thesis has two main research aims: analysing newspaper 
representation of papal statements on evolution; and investigating Catholic publics’ 
attitudes on evolution. While the entire thesis is situated in the qualitative research 
paradigm (Silverman, 2000; Braun and Clarke, 2013), I employ two research methods, one 
for the analysis of public discourse and one for the analysis of public attitudes: 
Ethnographic content analysis (ECA) of newspaper coverage 
To study English newspapers’ representations of recent papal comments on 
evolution, I first developed search terms (“pope w/100 evolution!”) which would allow me 
to identify the appropriate articles from the LexisNexis database, which discuss John Paul, 
Benedict, and Francis’ views on evolution (1996-2017). I chose to include only high-
circulation publication, thus omitted local newspaper reporting, as the national newspapers 
were deemed to be more influential than smaller publications. To analyse the articles, I first 
uploaded them into NVivo qualitative analysis software, and then employed a version of 
qualitative media analysis, Ethnographic Content Analysis (ECA). ECA, developed by Altheide 
and Schneider (2013), differs from a quantitative content analysis in its use of textual, 
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contextual, and narrative data and analysis, as well as (some) numerical data. The main aim 
of an ECA is capturing themes, definitions, meanings, processes, and types. Here, detailed 
readings and an inductive coding approach utilising constant comparison is used to 
construct themes from the data which have relevance to the research question (Altheide 
and Schneider, 2013: 44-45). 
Thematic analysis of semi-structured interviews 
To investigate Catholic individuals’ attitudes towards evolution, I conducted 31 semi-
structured interviews with Catholics in England. In the interviews, I used a schedule—a set of 
questions I had developed after reviewing the relevant literature—however the interview’s 
semi-structured nature allowed other relevant topics to be discussed if they emerged. These 
interviews were then transcribed verbatim and uploaded into NVivo qualitative analysis 
software. I then conducted a thematic analysis as described by Braun and Clarke (2006). The 
inductive approach to thematic analysis I employed involved thoroughly familiarising myself 
with the data and coding relevant themes. The recursive process developed more themes 
over time, seeking to identify patterned content in the data, which related to my research 
questions.   
A full description of the methods, and underpinning research philosophy, can be 
found in Chapter 3 – Methodology. Here I discuss the research design and development, 
including a reflexive section where I consider my own positioning in relation to the research. 
I discuss in more depth the procedures of both the media analysis and the interview 
analysis, explaining the qualitative, thematic approaches used for both. These are situated in 
a broader reflection on my philosophical positions regarding the research. 
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Summary 
When investigating religious attitudes towards evolution, which religious 
denomination we choose is an important consideration. With most extant research 
focussing on the US Protestant context, the picture in the academic literature is skewed. The 
present thesis presents one of the first studies of non-US, non-Protestant Christian attitudes 
towards evolution—Catholics in England. Beyond which religion we look to, how we collect 
our data is also important. Traditionally, much research into religious attitudes towards 
evolution has employed a quantitative methodology. The survey measures often employed 
force individuals into pre-defined belief positions, which may not match the actual beliefs of 
the populations being studied. The present thesis employs an inductive, qualitative 
methodology, to better assess the lived experience of Catholic individuals. Finally, 
investigating religious publics’ attitudes towards evolution cannot be conducted without 
attention being paid to the historical and contemporary contexts of these attitudes. 
Therefore, not only must we pay close attention to the historical relations between the 
religion and the science we seek to study, we must also investigate both contemporary 
public attitudes and public discourse on the matter. Without analysing public discourse 
surrounding the area of science and the denomination of religion in question, we omit the 
crucial cultural milieu in which these attitudes are situated.
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Chapter 1: Studying religious attitudes towards evolution 
1.1 Introduction 
The social study of science and religion (SSSR) is a relatively new and complex area of 
study.1 SSSR scholars must draw on diverse academic disciplines and areas of research to 
answer questions surrounding the relations between science and religion in societies. The 
most relevant academic subjects for this thesis are the history of science and religion, the 
sociology of science and religion, and the public understanding of science. Therefore, in this 
chapter, I critically review these literatures, noting the theoretical, conceptual, and 
substantive contributions gleaned from each. To illustrate the complex and conceptually 
beset nature of SSSR research, and the need to draw upon various academic disciplines and 
areas, I begin by introducing a short exploration of the perceived danger of the rise of the 
Intelligent Design movement in the United States of America (USA) in the mid-2000s.  
On 19th November, 2004, the Dover Area School District Board of Education, in 
Pennsylvania, USA, announced that teachers were required to read a statement to ninth-
grade biology students. The statement questioned the veracity of evolution, stating “the 
Theory is not a fact”, and proposed that “Intelligent Design is an explanation of the origin of 
life that differs from Darwin’s view.” (Kitzmiller v. Dover, 2005). Eleven parents, so shocked 
by the policy, took the school board to court. The ensuing trial was an inversion of the 
 
1 I use the term SSSR whilst acknowledging others, such as Jones et al. (2019), are talking of a similar and 
overlapping area when describing “science, belief and society”. 
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famous 1925 Scopes Monkey Trial, where Tennessean biology teacher John Scopes was 
taken to court for teaching evolution. Now, however, the plaintiffs were the parents, who 
sought to overturn the forced promotion of Intelligent Design to their children. 
On 20th December, 2005, after a well-publicised trial, the United States District Judge 
John E. Jones III ruled against the school board, deciding Intelligent Design (ID) was a 
religious view, a mere relabelling of creationism, and not a scientific theory (Kitzmiller v. 
Dover, 2005). Furthermore, the inability for ID to be uncoupled from its creationist and 
religious roots meant that its promotion in a science classroom violated the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.2 Judge Jones III concluded 
his ruling by stressing the potential compatibility between evolution and religious belief: 
Both Defendants and many of the leading proponents of ID make a bedrock assumption which is 
utterly false. Their presupposition is that evolutionary theory is antithetical to a belief in the 
existence of a supreme being and to religion in general. Repeatedly in this trial, Plaintiffs’ 
scientific experts testified that the theory of evolution represents good science, is 
overwhelmingly accepted by the scientific community, and that it in no way conflicts with, nor 
does it deny, the existence of a divine creator. (Kitzmiller v. Dover, 2005: 136). 
This ruling nods to a previous creationist trial, McLean v. Arkansas (1982), in which 
the judge ruled against the balanced treatment of “Creation-Science” and “Evolution-
Science” in the classroom. In that ruling, Judge William Overton noted the “contrived 
dualism” of the creationist approach: that one must either accept the literal interpretation 
of Genesis or else believe in the godless system of evolution. Such binary thinking about 
science and religion has historical precedent. As will be discussed in this chapter, the conflict 
thesis, the notion that science and religion have been, and are, necessarily contradictory 
 
2 The Establishment Clause reads: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion...” 
(U.S. Const. amend. I, cl. 1.). 
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ways of viewing the world, first became widespread in the 19th-century. Today, this dualistic 
framing has been embedded into some methodologies of SSSR. Scholars such as Elsdon-
Baker (2015a; 2018) have critiqued these approaches, arguing that this binary, conflict 
framing of public opinion polls—such as the necessary linkage of evolution and atheism—
has generated problematic results on public attitudes towards evolution. 
Reflecting the important cultural influence the USA has on the United Kingdom (UK), 
within a month of the Kitzmiller v. Dover (2005) trial the national public service broadcaster, 
the BBC aired a documentary on the rise of the ID movement. In Horizon: A War on Science, 
a host of experts, mainly scientists, indignantly explain the facts of the matter, and decry the 
dangerous non-science of ID. Central among the voices was prominent atheist and scientist, 
Richard Dawkins,  then the University of Oxford’s Professor for the Public Understanding of 
Science. The documentary also featured the Catholic Church. As a night-time shot of the 
Vatican appears on screen the narrator, referring to a controversial The New York Times op-
ed promoting ID written by a prominent Catholic cardinal, ominously states: “The stakes 
couldn’t be higher. The conflict has spread to the world’s largest Christian congregation, the 
Roman Catholic Church.” According to the documentary, Cardinal Schönborn, a close friend 
to future Pope Benedict, had been prompted to write the piece by a member of the US 
proponents of ID, the Discovery Institute. Based in Seattle, Washington, the Discovery 
Institute were the organisation that originally laid out the intellectual basis for ID, and had 
also been in contact with members of the Dover school board in the years before the 2005 
trial.3 
 
3 For more on Schönborn’s The New York Times op-ed see Chapter 4. 
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Alongside the documentary, the BBC commissioned Ipsos MORI to conduct a poll on 
attitudes towards evolution, Creationism, and ID in the UK. The results were met with shock 
and reprehension by journalists and commentators alike. The BBC published the results in an 
article on their website entitled: “Britons unconvinced on Evolution”, which went on to 
explain “just under half of Britons accept the theory of evolution as the best description for 
the development of life,” and “more than 40% believe that creationism or [ID] should be 
taught in school science lessons” (BBC, 2006). The Guardian also reported on the poll, 
claiming: “[f]our out of 10 say science classes should include intelligent design.” The author 
quoted Richard Dawkins’s analysis of the situation: “If somebody professes disbelief in 
evolution, it is highly probable that they know nothing about it,” he added “[t]hese ignorant 
people would probably welcome enlightenment. It is up to scientists to get out of their labs, 
from time to time, and enlighten.” Here then, in Dawkins’ view, attitudes are a problem of 
understanding, and the remedy to understanding is to give people more knowledge 
(Randerson, 2006). 
However, how the public’s attitudes towards evolution had been measured in the UK 
poll was problematic. Participants were offered three exclusive options by the polling 
company Ipsos MORI: 
• The ‘evolution theory’ says that humankind has developed over millions of years from 
less advanced forms of life. God had no part in this process; 
• The ‘creationism theory’ says that God created humankind pretty much in his/her 
present form at one time within the last 10,000 years; 
• And the ‘intelligent design’ theory says that certain features of living things are best 
explained by the intervention of a supernatural being, e.g. God. (From Elsdon-Baker, 2015a: 426) 
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You may note the conspicuous absence of a “theistic evolution”4 option which would 
allow people of faith to also hold a pro-evolutionary position. For one to accept 
“evolutionary theory” in the War on Science poll, one must admit that “God had no part in 
this process”. While that may be an acceptable position for some theists, it is likely an 
unacceptable box to tick for others. The problematic framing and construction of survey 
realities, critiqued by scholars such as Elsdon-Baker (2015a), will be discussed in more detail 
later in this chapter. 
We may be tempted to dismiss the Ipsos MORI poll as a marketing exercise, 
produced simply to promote the War on Science documentary. Likewise, we may be 
tempted to attribute Dawkins’ suggested recommendation of getting scientists to ‘enlighten’ 
the public to his unfamiliarity with the academic area of public understanding of science. As 
will be discussed below, scholars researching the public understanding of science have long 
debunked this “deficit model”—the belief that increasing public science knowledge will 
improve public attitudes towards science (e.g. Wynne, 1995; Bauer et al., 2007). However, 
this problematic approach to polling and the associated deficit model recommendations 
continued to be used by some within the academy. The year after Judge Jones III’s ruling, 
Miller et al. (2006) published a comparative cross-national study of public acceptance of 
evolution in the esteemed journal Science, which, with over 800 Google Scholar citations to 
date, is one of the most cited studies on this subject. In the paper the authors display a table 
 
4 In this thesis I use Davis’ (2018) definition of “theistic evolution”: “the belief that God used the process 
of evolution to create living things, including humans.” This is a broad definition, which encapsulates 
other more specific belief positions, such as God-guided evolution and God-initiated evolution. 
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showing the apparent differing acceptance of evolution across 34 countries (Figure 1.1), with 
the USA ranking second to bottom. 
Figure 1.1 Public acceptance of evolution in 34 countries, 2005. From Miller et al. (2006) 
Although the authors present their results as the “public acceptance of evolution”, 
the question they used was: “Human beings, as we know them, developed from earlier 
species of animals.” As will be discussed in this chapter, empirical studies show that using 
questions specifically about human evolution and then drawing conclusions about evolution 
in general can be problematic. Human evolution does seem to be a contentious area, among 
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religious and non-religious publics alike (Elsdon-Baker et al., 2017). Miller et al. (2006: 765) 
further lamented that: “Only Turkish adults were less likely to accept the concept of 
evolution than American adults.” As Carlisle et al. (2019: 153-154) have argued, Miller et al. 
(2006) did not sufficiently place their findings in their political and social context, went on to 
promote religious stereotypes in the press, and made sweeping generalisations claiming that 
both Protestantism in the US and Islam in Turkey were fundamentalist faiths. 
Like Dawkins, Miller et al. (2006: 766) also saw the problem as one of education, a 
knowledge gap that needed to be filled, claiming: “substantial numbers of American adults 
are confused about some of the core ideas related to 20th- and 21st- century biology” and 
arguing that “[b]asic concepts of evolution should be taught in middle school, high school, 
and college life sciences courses and the growing number of adults who are uncertain about 
these ideas suggests that current science instruction is not effective.” (Miller et al., 2006: 
776). This raises another contentious issue covered in this thesis, the link between 
knowledge and attitudes towards science. For Miller et al. (2006), the solution to perceived 
negative attitudes is to educate. However, as will be discussed, developments in research on 
the public understanding of science over the past 30 years have led scholars to view this 
deficit model of science-public interaction with caution.   
It is vital to understand the context of how debates in the USA  influence and frame 
UK public discourse, as is highlighted by this case study drawing on a North America school 
dispute, a UK documentary, and a poll into ID/creationism. Here, a dispute in a different 
societal context was  picked up by UK media, and resulted in subsequent surveys, which 
went on to inform the public discourse on the topic in the UK. If the surveys present a static 
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and purportedly complete picture, which is then taken as fact, that baseline becomes the 
basis for subsequent cultural dialogue. Intriguingly, SSSR scholars themselves can feedback 
into public discourse on science and religion, thus influencing our very object of study. This 
further suggests that we must be both reflexive and rigorous when constructing polling of 
public attitudes towards evolution.  
The cultural and socio-political influence that the USA has in the world not only 
influences the news agenda in different countries, but also the social scientific research 
agenda and accompanying methodologies. The Kitzmiller vs. Dover (2005) trial had 
repercussions here in the UK, with subsequent news reporting noting that “Creationism 
debate moves to Britain” (Walker, 2006). The relationship between science and religion in 
the USA influences what we study about the relationship between science and religion in the 
UK, and I argue this has led to a narrowed focus on perceived ‘problematic groups’. This 
means that the academic investigation of science and religion in society has itself often 
contained a skew towards conflict. When considering questions about science and religion 
we must also remember other dimensions that go beyond the epistemic, such as political 
influences or concerns (e.g. Myrick and Comfort, forthcoming). Furthermore, the lack of 
clear demarcation between ID, creationism, and even evolution, must be noted. How do we 
define these concepts, or indeed how are they defined and perceived by religious publics? 
With inevitable blurred boundaries to such concepts, can we construct survey measures 
which properly distinguish them? In any case, do publics themselves simply identify with 
such labels of public discourse? Recent academic work which has explored what UK and 
Canadian publics think about labels such as ‘creationism’, ‘intelligent design’, ‘Darwinism’, 
suggests otherwise (see Kaden et al. 2019). 
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As our brief examination of the Miller et al. (2006) study highlights, sometimes 
researchers are too ready to propose a simplistic connection between knowledge and 
attitudes towards science. If the problem is defined as ignorance of evolution leading to 
negative attitudes, then the solution is simply to tell publics more about it. As will be 
explored in this chapter, studies in science communication and the public understanding of 
science have shown this approach to be naïve, nonetheless Miller et al.’s (2006) call for this 
response is in and of itself instructive. As will be discussed, the popularisation and 
communication of science has always been linked to political and institutional agendas. 
Finally, the phraseology of “contrived dualism”, or the necessary conflict between science 
and religion, is an important consideration for this thesis. This simplistic notion of how 
religion and science can interrelate not only has historical roots, but has also been 
embedded into some social science research methodologies, resulting in an overly simplistic 
conception of the relationship between science and religion. I expand on these points over 
the course of this chapter, beginning by exploring the historical conflict thesis and showing 
how more recent scholarship has revised models of past interactions between science and 
religion. I will also explore how the conflict narrative was embedded at the birth of 
sociology, and the implications for how we study science and religion today. I then turn to 
the birth of studies on the popularisation of science, and the movements and developments 
which led to the formation of the field of the public understanding of science. Finally, I will 
explore studies that seek to ascertain religious attitudes towards evolution, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. 
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1.2 Science and religion: A conceptual morass 
Studying science and religion requires the navigation of problematic conceptual 
issues. Both historical and sociological investigations have been, and in some cases, continue 
to be, plagued by long-standing assumptions embedded in their respective traditions. In 
historical work the main issue has been the conflict thesis, a historiographic approach, which 
takes as axiomatic that science and religion have been locked in conflict since their distinct 
conceptions. Only in the last few decades have historians began to unpick this 
presupposition and display the complexity of interactions that science and religion have 
shared in the past. For sociology, the epistemological conflict narrative, like the historical 
conflict thesis, either views science and religion as epistemologically incompatible, or that 
science leads to the decline of religion through modernisation and secularisation. Like the 
re-evaluation of the conflict thesis by historians, sociologists have recently begun to re-visit 
and revise the epistemological conflict narrative, not assuming conflicts between science 
and religion necessarily have epistemic causes. Both the historical conflict thesis and 
sociological conflict narrative are intertwined and it could be argued that they are essentially 
the same thing, both born from common historical cultural discourses and intellectual 
antecedents. Nevertheless, the presupposition of conflict between science and religion 
presents issues for scholars working in SSSR today. Accordingly, in this section I detail the 
conceptual morass of studying science and religion in society. 
1.2.1 Historical ‘conflict thesis’ and complexity 
The ‘conflict thesis’ was popularised in the late 19th century with the publication of 
the English-born American scientist John W. Draper’s A History of the Conflict between 
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Religion and Science (1874), and American historian Andrew D. White’s A History of the 
Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom (1896). Both authors presented historical 
studies on the conflict between religion and science. The ‘military metaphor’ they employed 
became the de facto historiographic method for studies of science and religion until the 
1970s (Lightman, 2012: 157).  
Both works, however, emerged from a very specific context of social shifts in 
intellectual power, authority and prestige, in Victorian Britain (Turner, 1978). Furthermore, 
the growth of professionalising scientific specialisms during this period was also 
accompanied by an almost complete disappearance of clerical presence in the sciences. This 
shift is demonstrated by the changing governance of the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science, where the number of Anglican clergy presiding over areas of 
science fell from 41 between 1831 and 1865, to just 3 between 1866 and 1900 (Brooke, 
1990: 764). It was in this context that T.H. Huxley made his famous and much quoted 
statement about science and religion, in an anonymous review of Darwin’s On the Origin of 
Species for the Westminster Review in 1860: 
It is true that if philosophers have suffered their cause has been amply avenged. Extinguished 
theologians lie about the cradle of every science as the strangled snakes beside that of Hercules; 
and history records that whenever science and orthodoxy have been fairly opposed, the latter 
has been forced to retire from the lists, bleeding and crushed if not annihilated; scotched, if not 
slain. (Quoted in Huxley, 1896: 52) 
 
 Draper and White’s works crystallised this social context and rhetorical style in 
historical analyses of the relationship between science and religion, and projected the 
concept of conflict onto historical (even pre-Christian) events. White, for example, projected 
the conflict back to Ancient Greece, using the Stoic Cleanthes’ rejection of the impious 
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heliostatic astronomy of Aristarchus as an exemplar of the conflict thesis’s historical roots 
(White, 1896: 120-121). As Brooke (1990: 764-765) points out, though, it may well have 
been because of the exceptional nature of this case, rather than it being an exemplar of a 
science-religion interaction, that it was recorded in the first place.  
In the preface to his work, Draper gives a particularly succinct formulation of the 
conflict thesis, stating that the history of science is: “not a mere record of isolated 
discoveries; it is a narrative of the conflict of two contending powers, the expansive force of 
the human intellect on one side, and the compression arising from traditionary faith and 
human interests on the other” (Draper, 1875: vi). Draper’s main objection, however, was not 
to the “moderate” Greek or Protestant strands of Christianity, but the “extremists” within 
the Catholic Church (Elsdon-Baker and Mason-Wilkes, 2019: 5). Draper asserted that 
“Roman Christianity and Science are recognized by their respective adherents as being 
absolutely incompatible; they cannot exist together” (Draper, 1874: 363). Like Lightman 
(2012), historians of science Freiburger and Numbers (2009: 637) observe that this view 
dominated the historiography of science and religion for almost a century and has only seen 
a decline since the 1990s. 
To understand how conflict has dominated historical narratives on the relationship 
between Catholicism and science, we need look no further than discussions of Galileo’s 
treatment by the Church in both academic and popular histories.5 In contrast to the conflict 
perspective of the relationship between the Catholic Church and science, scholars such as 
 
5 The Galileo affair will be discussed in Chapter 2, but for a detailed historiography of the Galileo affair 
also see Finocchiaro (2001). 
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Heilbron has commented how the Church “gave more financial and social support to the 
study of astronomy for over six centuries, from the recovery of ancient learning during the 
late Middle Ages into the Enlightenment, than any other, and, probably, all other, 
institutions” (Heilbron, 1999: 3). Highlighting that the Church has not been anti-science in all 
places, and at all times, throughout history.  
Historian of science and religion Geoffrey Cantor refers to Draper and White’s 
conception of the conflict thesis as the ‘strong version’, where science and religion have 
been embroiled in necessary conflict due to their essential differences (Cantor, 2010: 285). 
Further, Russell suggests that there are four distinct issues of contention between science 
and religion around which the real or imagined conflict generally focuses: epistemological, 
methodological, ethical, and social power (Russell, 2002: 4-7). When critiquing the conflict 
thesis, however, historians of science and religion generally do not dispute that science and 
religion, or at least proponents of these spheres, have indeed and not infrequently been 
locked in confrontation, particularly in educational contexts. However, rather than denying 
conflicts have occurred, the contention is that presupposing warfare inadequately explains 
the complex historical interactions between religion and science (Brooke, 1990: 765). Thus, 
the conflict thesis is an inadequate framework to understand the historiography of Western 
science. It ignores other possible and evident relationships between religion and science, 
such as instances of harmony, and it obscures the diversity of opinions within both religion 
and science. 
In opposition to the conflict thesis is the harmony thesis, whereby science and 
religion are said to have co-existed peacefully, or that religion directly contributes to science. 
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A well-known proponent of this second contrasting view was the sociologist Robert K. 
Merton, who argued that Puritanism directly contributed to the founding of modern science 
by providing a useful system of values (Merton 1936; 1938). As Lindberg and Numbers  point 
out, Merton’s broad definition of ‘Puritanism’ included the common attitude and mode of 
life of Anglicans, Calvinists, Independents, Anabaptists, Quakers, and millenarians in 17th 
century England—essentially everybody but Catholics (Lindberg and Numbers, 1986: 5). It 
would seem that even for a proponent of partial harmony between science and religion the 
Catholic Church did not qualify. 
Finocchiaro (2001: 114) suggests that both the conflict and harmony theses are hasty 
generalizations, while others such as Cantor (2010: 286), argue that the conflict thesis 
represents a Whig history,6 where present day categories are projected onto the past, in an 
inappropriate attempt to understand it. Historians of science and religion have distanced 
themselves from the presentism of Whig history, instead favouring a contextualist approach, 
which seeks to understand historical actors embedded in their own historical milieus 
(Wilson, 2002: 17). 
Historian of science John Hedley Brooke formalised this more nuanced approach in 
his influential book Science and Religion: Some Historical Perspectives, where he argued 
grand traditional narratives in the history of science and religion are not sustained by 
historical evidence (Brooke, 1991). This approach was subsequently coined the ‘complexity 
thesis’ by Ronald Numbers (2010: 262). The complexity thesis allows historians to widen 
 
6 The term “Whig history” was first coined by historian Herbert Butterfield in The Whig Interpretation of 
History (1931). Butterfield criticised Whig historians for reading into the past a teleological procession of 
stages, through which the goal of the present is realised.   
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their investigations of science and religion, unrestrained by simplistic master narratives. Its 
focus on detailed contextual accounts, and avoidance of presentism, enables the actions and 
opinions of historical actors to be understood in the contexts of their time. However, 
Brooke’s approach does leave an interesting issue for historians of science and religion: how 
to understand the vast complexities of the past relationship between these two worldviews 
in any meaningful sense? Here, Numbers  argues we can use “mid-scale patterns” to simplify 
historical complexity (Numbers, 2010: 262). This approach is adopted by Blancke in his 
investigation of the Catholic Church’s responses to evolution. The mid-scale pattern that 
emerges from the historical evidence, according to Blancke, is that: “in the end and 
somewhat hesitantly and conditionally, the Vatican gradually became more receptive of 
evolutionary sciences” (Blancke, 2013:3). This claim will be explored in the next chapter. 
In The Territories of Science and Religion, historian Peter Harrison shows further the 
need to understand the historical relationship between religion and science in the 
appropriate historical context, and warns of projecting our contemporary conceptions 
backwards through time. According to Harrison, our modern conceptions of religion and 
science only arose in the 17th and 19th centuries respectively. While this approach at first 
seems to provide further evidence for the complexity thesis, it also presents an interesting 
divergence from the historiographic methods of the last 25 years (Harrison, 2015: 141). 
In a paper given to the Canadian Society for the History and Philosophy of Science, 
Lightman raised the interesting question of whether Harrison’s shifting territories argument 
represents a reversion back to the master narratives warned of by Brooke (Cantor and 
Brooke, 1998: 22), and asked whether Harrison sees his argument as aligning with the now 
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regnant complexity thesis (Lightman, 2016). Whether we conceive Harrison’s Territories as 
presenting a master narrative or not, the implications of his analysis introduce more 
complexity to past relationships between science and religion. If their respective territories 
have shifted substantially over time, and our conceptions of these terms are relatively 
recent constructions, even though the premise is simple, the conclusions when followed 
would lead to an even more complex study of the relationship between science and religion 
through various historical eras. In response to Lightman, Harrison stated that his thesis 
attempts to provide an explanation for historical complexity, which arises, in part, from the 
projection of our contemporary categories onto past events (Harrison, 2016).  
Harrison also writes in defence of master narratives in his response; noting how even 
though the conflict thesis is deeply problematic, it has fuelled the work of historians of 
science and religion for the past three decades. Harrison’s hope is that the conflict thesis, 
and the work of debunking it, might now come to an end, and a new phase of historical 
science and religion research may begin (Harrison, 2016). Perhaps the obvious pathway 
forward is in the further investigation of how these territories of science and religion have 
shifted over time, why they were constructed this way, and how these boundary movements 
lead to a multiplicity of relationships between religion and science across different contexts. 
The present thesis aims to utilise the perspectives of Brooke and Harrison, leaving behind 
simplistic notions of necessary conflict and harmony, moving toward a more nuanced 
investigation of the contingent relationships between religion and science, specifically in this 
instance Catholicism and evolution.  
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Harrison’s (2015) Territories also informs us that when investigating the relationship 
between religion and science, we must take care with categorisations. Which sciences and 
which religions do we mean? Even though Harrison uses historical examples, this is also 
relevant to investigations of contemporary attitudes toward science and religion. Just as 
these categories have shifted throughout history, we cannot presume that today there are 
two static categories of religion and science shared by all. Echoing the words of philosopher 
of science Stuart Glennan we must ask: “Whose science and whose religion?” (Glennan, 
2009: 797). What forms do they take? Are we being sufficiently reflexive to fully capture 
their differences in our data collection? Therefore, when investigating and commenting we 
must remember we are talking about a multitude of constructed relationships, rather than 
the singular.  
1.2.2 Contemporary conflict  
 
Despite the move by historians of science away from the conflict thesis and simplistic 
master narratives to a more contextualist approach, Aechtner’s analysis of contemporary 
anthropology textbooks shows the conflict thesis persists in other disciplines. Aechtner  
found that depictions of the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment, and religious 
responses to heliocentrism and Darwin’s theory of evolution in introductory anthropology 
texts, still perpetuate simplistic science-religion conflict myths, which have long been 
discredited by historians (Aechtner, 2015: 209-211). 
Beyond the educational setting, the conflict thesis continues to have wide appeal in 
public discourse on science and religion, with, in Cantor’s  view, authors and commentators 
such as Richard Dawkins forwarding the ‘strong version’ of conflict (Cantor, 2010: 285). The 
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continued prevalence of the conflict thesis in educational and public spaces shows it still has 
significance today, over a century after Draper and White’s influential texts were first 
published.  
Today, there is a wealth of literature, both academic and popular, presenting 
theorisations on the supposed ‘proper’ relationship(s) between religion and science, be it 
conflict or otherwise (e.g. Barbour, 1990; Gould, 1997; Polkinghorne, 1998; Dawkins, 2006). 
Contemporary social studies of science and religion, and by extension this thesis, are not 
concerned with the truth claims of these treatises, but rather with the various ways science 
and religion relate in society. Therefore, while one could use Barbour's classic taxonomy of 
relationships between religion and science—conflict, independence, dialogue, and 
integration—in a research protocol, it would only be to assess the prevalence of such 
perceptions across a population, rather than for their philosophical validity (Barbour, 1966; 
1974; 1990; 2000). Although this approach also arguably has its own conceptual issues, in 
that it imposes concepts from professional discourse onto publics (see Elsdon-Baker and 
Mason-Wilkes, 2019: 6-9).7 
Baker (2012) employs Barbour’s taxonomy, seeking to investigate the prevalence of 
beliefs of generalised conflict or compatibility between science and religion in the USA. 
Baker’s work, based on data from the Baylor Religion Survey 2007 (Wave II), noted that any 
perceived relationship between religion and science is socially constructed, and that these 
 
7 Following Kaden et al. (2017; 2019: 75) I use the term ‘professionals’ in the field of science and religion 
to mean individuals: “whose vocation it is to develop, distribute, defend and critique systems of 
explanation that relate science to different forms of ultimate belief.” A clear example of a science and 
religion professional being Richard Dawkins (e.g. Dawkins, 2006). 
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perceptions are dependent upon how an individual has interacted with, understood, and 
(re)constructed each magisterium (see also Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Latour and 
Woolgar, [1979] 1986; Searle, 1997; Hacking, 1999). Using Barbour's (1966; 1974; 2000) 
general taxonomy of positions, Baker (2012) labelled the two distinct groups who perceive 
conflict in his study as ‘scientific materialists’ and ‘biblical literalists’. Only 17% of 
respondents agreed that religion and science were incompatible, but this was a dichotomous 
group, split between people with views of incompatibility who favoured science (‘scientific 
materialists’) and others who favoured religion (‘biblical literalists’). Baker goes on to state 
that “[s]uch perceptions are pragmatic, heuristic, and vary depending on how individuals 
engage both institutions, rather than being indicative of an inherent relationship between 
the two” (Baker, 2012: 341).  
In the American context, where the overwhelming majority of scholarly work in this 
area has taken place, assessments of conflict perceptions have mostly been studied within 
academic (specifically scientific) and student populations (e.g. Leuba, 1934; Stark, 1963; 
Larson and Witham, 1998; Ecklund and Scheitle, 2007; Scheitle, 2011). Scheitle’s (2011) 
study of American undergraduates found that the majority of students did not perceive a 
conflict between religion and science. Similar to the findings of Baker (2012), Scheitle's 
analysis of longitudinal data, generated from the Spirituality in Higher Education Project, 
found two distinct groups with views of magisterium incompatibility: one ‘pro-science’, and 
the other ‘pro-religion’.8 
 
8 For a detailed review of surveys of conflict and compatibility see Hill (2019). 
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The public attitudes analysis in this project aims to go beyond the study of general 
perceptions of conflict and compatibility between religion and science, to the more specific 
question of Catholic attitudes towards evolution. The analysis will be grounded in the lived-
experience of participants, rather than categorised by notions of ‘proper’ science-religion 
relationships. However, to understand social scientific work in the area, it is first important 
to chart the development of the sociological study of science and religion; noting as we go 
the conceptual issues which may affect our analysis. 
1.2.3 Sociological ‘conflict narrative’ and secularisation  
In their influential paper, Evans and Evans (2008: 88) remark that the field of religion 
and science is perhaps “one of the muddiest in all sociology.” The source of this muddiness, 
according to Evans and Evans (2008: 88), is the entrenched academic assumption that 
religion and science are always in conflict due to their “competing truth claims about the 
world”: the epistemological conflict narrative. Furthermore, as sociology was founded as a 
scientific alternative to religion, it can be difficult for sociologists to analyse the relationship 
between religion and science dispassionately (Evans and Evans, 2008: 88). As Jones et al. 
observe: “[I]t is hard for sociologists to jettison the underlying idea that science is something 
they do, while religion is something they […] study” (Jones et al., 2019: xxi). 
Just as the conflict thesis dominated historical analyses of the relationship between 
religion and science, only to be discredited in the last thirty years (Brooke, 1991; Numbers, 
1985; 2010), the epistemological conflict narrative was formed at the foundation of 
sociology, and is embedded in some sociological definitions of religion and science. This 
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history leaves conflict between religion and science as an unexamined theoretical 
assumption within a lot of, but not all, sociological analyses (Evans and Evans, 2008: 89-90). 
Auguste Comte (1798-1857), who popularised the term ‘sociology’, believed his new 
science of society would replace the current religions of the time (Wernick, 2005: 128-134). 
He proposed a “law of the three stages”, which stated that each branch of human 
knowledge goes through three progressive phases: (1) the Theological, or fictitious; (2) the 
Metaphysical, or abstract; and (3) the Scientific, or positive (Comte, 1853). His new science 
of society would therefore replace religion as a way of human understanding and 
organisation, setting up a conflict between scientific and religious knowledge in the quest for 
societal organisation. 
 The other founding figures of sociology—Durkheim, Weber, and Marx—were also 
deeply concerned with the implications of the decline of religion in society (Jones et al., 
2019: xxviii). As Elsdon-Baker and Mason-Wilkes  argue, all three sociologists’ social theories 
saw societal progress as in some way inevitable, and modernity and religion as opposed 
(Elsdon-Baker and Mason-Wilkes, 2019: 13-14). Furthermore, within the discipline are 
embedded Enlightenment assumptions about the positive relations between science, 
modernity, and progress. This has influenced the contemporary movement of the public 
understanding of science, where lack of scientific knowledge is often seen as an indicator of 
a lack of societal progress (Elsdon-Baker and Mason-Wilkes, 2019: 13-14). I will return in 
more detail to research on the public understanding of science in the next section. 
 While religion was of primary concern for the founders of sociology, the sociology of 
religion has become a marginal sub-field (Catto, 2015). The sub-field itself has had an 
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overwhelming focus on secularisation, whether or not the process has happened, and how 
religious practice has changed in contemporary societies (Davis, 2013). 9 Where once, taking 
from the founding assumptions of the opposition between modernity and religion, 
secularisation was a widely held belief, there have been recent developments that see 
religious decline not as an inevitable process. Rather, secularisation happens in differing 
ways in different contexts, and while we may see a decline in religious affiliation in Western 
Europe, there are places in the world seeing a religious revival, while new ways of being 
religious, such as “believing without belonging” are emerging (Davis, 1994). These critiques 
of the classic secularisation thesis, where religion and modernity are necessarily opposed, 
and therefore religion need not be investigated, has thus led to a renewed interest in 
studying religious practice. For studies of science and religion, this means that we need to 
resist the conflict narrative and axiomatically utilising science as an explanation of religious 
decline, instead investigating the ways science and religion actually interact in contemporary 
societies. There are still lingering issues however, such as how we define religion itself.  
Definitions of religion in sociology have traditionally come in functional or 
substantive forms (Berger, 1967: 175-77). The functional definition relates to any cultural 
 
9 Sociologist Peter L. Berger, one of the leading advocates of the ‘secularisation thesis’ in the 1960s, 
defined secularisation as: “the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the 
domination of religious institutions and symbols” (Berger, 1967: 107). The key idea of the secularisation 
thesis was that modernisation necessarily leads to a decline in religion, both for society and for individuals 
(Berger, 1999: 2). However, over time, Berger reversed his views on secularisation, “My point is that the 
assumption that we live in a secularized world is false. The world today, with some exceptions to which I 
will come presently, is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever. This 
means that a whole body of literature by historians and social scientists loosely labelled "secularization 
theory" is essentially mistaken” (Berger, 1999: 2). Clearly this is just the view of a single sociologist 
working in the field, but does to some extent mirror a broader paradigm shift within the sociology of 
religion. For a detailed review of the changing debates about secularisation in the sociology of religion, 
see Davis (2013). 
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system, and therefore can relate very broadly to any system of meaning, such as Marxist, 
secular humanism, or modern science. As observed by Evans and Evans (2008: 90), 
functional definitions of religion are rarely used in empirical analyses. The more common 
substantive definitions of religion tend to split the world into the sacred and the profane, 
with religion rationalising irrationalities, being concerned with the supernatural, and 
ultimately everything that is not science (O’Toole, 1984: 142; Johnstone, 1997: 13; Verhey, 
1995). In this way, a science-religion conflict has been embedded in the methodology of 
sociology itself. We can see this in some public understanding of science literature, where 
religiosity variables are constructed using anti-science measures like creationist views, when 
looking into other areas of science (e.g. Allum et al., 2014). 
Evans and Evans (2008) argue that the sociological study of science and religion must 
extend beyond competing truth claims and challenge the assumptions built into earlier 
sociological discourse. They categorise studies of the relationship between religion and 
science into two broad groups:  symbolic epistemological studies, which discuss religion and 
science as systems of ideas, beliefs, or discourses, and tend to focus on conflicting truth 
claims; and social-institutional studies, which are concerned with the institutions that 
propagate these ideas, beliefs, or discourses. Today religion is concerned with much more 
than truth, both individually and institutionally, although many previous studies have aimed 
to investigate some form of epistemological conflict (Evans and Evans, 2008: 90). More 
recently Evans (2018) has argued that contemporary conflicts are not about knowledge at 
all, but rather are moral contentions.  
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According to Evans and Evans (2008: 97), many of the most promising studies in the 
sociology of science and religion look at social-institutional relationships, where “truth or 
falsity of religion or science is bracketed, and contests for authority or the power to 
determine truth between science and religion are recast as power-inflected discursive 
struggles.” Examples cited of this type of study are Gieryn (1983) and Gieryn et al., (1985), 
who investigated how scientists gained cultural authority by drawing boundaries around 
science, to separate it from ‘non-science’. Another example given of the social-institutional 
approach is Evans’s own (2002) study, investigating the struggle between theologians and 
scientists over authority on the ethics of genetic engineering, Evans bracketed the truth 
claims of science and religion, instead investigating the struggle for resources and power to 
make ethical statements about genetic engineering. In this case, it is argued that the 
scientists nurtured the profession of bioethics, which furthered the scientists’ interests and 
wrestled the ethical authority from the theologians (Evans and Evans, 2008: 97-98). 
While Evans and Evans (2008) show that the relationship is far more complex than 
competing truth claims, we must leave the notion of perceived competing truth claims an 
open empirical question. It is clear that some religious people’s lived experience is that of 
epistemological conflict, albeit a conflict often driven by social-institutional forces. For 
example, Hildering et al. (discussed in more detail below) interviewed ten Dutch protestant 
creationists and found that evolution was “identified as being in conflict with the biblical 
message of creation” (Hildering et al., 2012: 993). Their study is self-selective for 
epistemological conflict, as it only studies the beliefs of those who reject evolution, but if we 
are to reframe the entire relationship beyond an epistemological frame, we must be careful 
not to ignore the lived experiences of those who do perceive epistemic conflict. 
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Nonetheless, these instances should be viewed in light of Merton’s analysis of historic 
accounts of potential conflict, and his reminder to avoid “the short leap from such empirical 
episodes of conflict to a belief in the logical and historical necessity for such conflict” 
(Merton, 1970 [1938]: 308). 
Evans and Evans suggest that: “future sociologists who examine the relationship 
between religion and science not assume the epistemological conflict model, but rather 
leave the source of contestation as an empirical question” (Evans and Evans, 2008: 101). This 
is in important proposition for this thesis; when investigating Catholic attitudes toward 
evolution, we must leave open notions of both conflict and complementarity, and also not 
assume that any instances of conflict are due to the idea that the “different methods for 
making truth claims lead science and religion to reach different conclusions about the 
natural world” (Evans, 2011: 708). In this way, we can proceed to more nuanced 
investigations of the relationships between religion and science. This approach has been 
successfully deployed in recent works, such as Jones et al. (2019) and Moran (2019), which 
reject a simplistic epistemic framing of the issue. 
In this section, we have seen how the historical conflict thesis—the proposition that 
science and religion have inevitably clashed historically—has been debunked by historians 
over the last few decades. Historians of science and religion today adopt the notion of 
complexity for science and religion’s historical relations, which better explains the 
heterogeneity of past events. We have also explored the complex conceptual issues in the 
sociological study of science and religion. The once perceived inevitability of secularisation, 
the decline of religion, has been revised by contemporary sociologists who note the variety 
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of developments of religious practices seen in contemporary societies. We have also seen 
how the epistemological conflict narrative can hinder sociological investigations of science 
and religion, and how in recent years studies have sought non-epistemic explanations for 
episodes of conflict between science and religion. In relation to this thesis I heed the advice 
of Elsdon-Baker and Mason-Wilkes, who argue: “[d]rawing on the groundwork undertaken 
by eminent historians of science, we need to likewise move away from an assumption of 
implicit conflict between science and religion and towards a complexity thesis for the social 
study of science and religion” (Elsdon-Baker and Mason-Wilkes, 2019: 19). Therefore, in this 
thesis I am seeking to better understand the complex relations between science and religion 
by not focussing on a presumed ‘problematic group’ such as Evangelicals. Instead, I study 
and analyse the complexity of the relationship between Catholics and evolution, without 
inadvertently magnifying conflict perceptions over all other possible positions by solely 
focussing on self-professed Catholic creationists. 
 
1.3 Science and the public: Knowledge and attitudes  
To achieve one aim of the present study—to investigate Catholic attitudes towards 
evolution in England—not only must I ensure proper attention is paid to the history and 
sociology of science and religion, but it is also necessary to draw upon the field of the public 
understanding of science. Discussions of the contemporary field of study into the public 
understanding of science often begin with the 1985 Bodmer Report. However, this ignores 
the much longer history between the two categories of “science” and “public”. Indeed, these 
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categories are historically constituted, and have been, and continue to be, constantly 
negotiated through boundary work (Shapin, 1990). To add to the complexity, it is necessary 
to engage in some boundary work of my own. There are various areas, fields, disciplines, and 
sub-disciplines which seek to understand science and its relation to the public. Science 
communication, the public understanding of science, science and society, and science and 
technology studies, among others, all in their own way seek to understand or actively 
facilitate the processes of interaction between the sciences and publics. How the stories of 
these fields are told, and who is telling it, can change our conception of them. 
In this thesis, I will refer to the area of “public understanding of science” (or PUS), 
following the linguistic tradition of Bauer, who sees PUS as an area of: “social research that 
investigates, using empirical methods, what the public’s understanding of science might be 
and how this might vary across time and context” (Bauer, 2009: 111). Beyond analyses of 
public attitudes and understanding, PUS also investigates science in the media, popular 
science, and other communication efforts. As a field it has experienced several paradigms 
and normative commitments over 30 plus years (Bauer et al., 2007). I refer to the field as 
PUS while acknowledging that some scholars are talking of a similar area when they describe 
“science communication” (e.g. Trench and Bucchi, 2010). In this thesis, I distinguish science 
communication from PUS, by denoting science communication as an area more focussed on 
the transfer of information between science and publics. To confuse matters more, science 
communication is also an area of practice as well as a field of research, which seeks to 
understand how that practice operates, its commitments, and impacts. As people do not live 
in a vacuum, the practice of science communication, both historically and today, and the 
actualities of public understanding and attitudes towards science are inherently linked. 
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Although, as will be discussed below, this link should not be seen as a one-way diffusion of 
knowledge from expert scientists, through problematic mediators, to an ignorant public. 
Neither should we be tempted by the idea that simply increasing public science knowledge 
will inevitably lead to more ‘positive attitudes’—whatever they may be. 
In this section I first discuss the historical antecedents of the contemporary field of 
PUS. As we are dealing with different areas of study, I borrow from Cassidy (2004: 18) the 
useful phrase “science in public”, which usefully incorporates studies of popular science, 
science communication, science and media, and the public understanding of science in a 
single term. This area has a longer history than is usually explained. Indeed, one cannot 
properly understand the contemporary field of PUS, and the impetus of its inception, 
without understanding the shifting historical and political landscapes in which it was 
fashioned. After briefly charting this history, I then turn to the development of PUS as a 
research agenda, noting the shifting normative commitments of each paradigm. This is in 
reality a telling of what the public and science are, how they are viewed, and how they view 
or should view each other. 
1.3.1 A pre-history of science in public 
Given its central position in some histories of PUS (e.g. Bennett and Jennings, 2011) it 
is easy to assume that there was no interest in what the public thought about science prior 
to the Royal Society’s famous 1985 “Public Understanding of Science” report. The Bodmer 
Report, as it became known, called for an increase of public knowledge of science to rectify 
perceived negative attitudes, which it was feared could damage both the institution and 
society. In this section I show that concerns about the relations between science and the 
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public have a much longer history. Indeed, without this historical context it is difficult to 
understand why the Bodmer Report was commissioned in the first place.  The critical 
analysis of this history, and the subsequent development of PUS, can be said to involve a 
number of problematisations of the very categories of “public”, “media”, “communication”, 
“understanding”, and “science” itself (Shapin, 1990; Silverstone, 1990; Wynne, 1992a; 
Collins and Pinch, 1993; Irwin, 1995; Bucchi, 2008). 
The popularisation of science also has a longer history than the late-20th century 
boom of the science communication industry. As an example, the Society for the Diffusion of 
Useful Knowledge was founded in 1826, with the aim of undermining political radicalism by 
supplying rational information in cheap publications. The intellectual founder, Henry 
Brougham, stated in an introduction to one series that science: “elevates the faculties above 
low pursuits, purifies and refines the passions, and helps our reason to assuage their 
violence” (Brougham, 1827: 2). Although, apparently, some working-class readers saw a 
different interpretation of the endeavour, with one claiming Brougham sought to “stop our 
mouths with kangaroos” (Secord, 2003: 46-48).10 
However, it can be tempting to take present day categories and project them 
backwards through time, as is often done in discussions of science and religion (as 
introduced earlier). The seemingly solid nature of our contemporary categories can lead us 
to perceive them as rigid natural kinds. However, this view ignores the historical 
construction of these categories, and the purposes for which these boundaries were drawn. 
 
10 The Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge’s Penny Cyclopædia did contain an exhaustive 
account of “Marsupialia”, reaching nearly nineteen pages (Dawson, 2012: 650). 
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Here I take from Shapin’s (1990) articulation of this argument in his critique of what he 
terms the “canonical account” of historical relations between science and the public. Later, I 
will return to associated accounts of science in public in contemporary scholarship, namely 
the “deficit model” of PUS. In the “canonical account” of historical relations between science 
and the public, science was once poorly demarcated from what was not science, and the 
proceedings of science were influenced by public concerns. This negatively impacted the 
nature of knowledge produced. Science, over time, shed the influence of the public in its 
affairs, and with them shed their negative influence on the production of reliable and 
objective knowledge. Therefore, according to the “canonical account”, the past three 
centuries can be read as an inverting of relations between science and public: where once 
science was interfered with by the public and other institutions, now science has autonomy, 
controls the relations it has with the public, and can exert its own influence on societal 
affairs (Shapin, 1990: 992).11 Despite containing some descriptive truth, this canonical 
account is inadequate in its explanatory utility. As Shapin (1990: 992) argues, science has 
won a degree of autonomy since the 17th century, and science has enjoyed a significant shift 
in political power, away from non-scientists and public institutions. However, the danger is 
to conflate description and explanation under the guise of a historical process of 
“professionalization”. Instead of reading out of this history some teleological process 
through which modern relations between science and the public are unveiled, we are better 
served to investigate the conscious (and often contested) efforts of individuals in the past to 
construct the categories of “science” and “public”. Indeed, when considered in this way, the 
 
11 In the last few decades, however, scholars have argued for increased public participation in scientific 
governance through what has become known as ‘deliberative democracy’, and developed models for how 
this normative commitment can be achieved (Irwin, 2008: 200). 
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constitution of “science” and “public” are not inevitable or natural developments, but the 
result of historical successes of individuals working for specific purposes. 
Historically, where science was neither sufficiently institutionalised nor recognised as 
valuable, scientists have sought public recognition of their legitimacy. A clear example can 
be found in the work of Merton (1938), who contended that in 17th-century England, natural 
philosophers argued for the legitimacy of emergent science by stressing its compatibility 
with dominant Puritan values. It was argued, therefore, that the pursuit of natural 
knowledge was not dangerous to religion, indeed the pursuit of natural knowledge could be 
seen as a reading of God’s work in nature.12 
A further example of this legitimisation process, is how scientists between the 17th 
and 19th centuries asserted public legitimacy through utilising natural theology—where the 
study of nature could enrich religious perspectives, giving it a wide appeal. As Shapin  
argues, however, this left a legacy of certain orientations within scientific culture, such as 
teleology (Shapin, 1990: 999). It was only through the (concerted) movement of the 
Scientific Naturalists between the 1860s and the 1880s that natural theology, and views such 
as teleology, began to be excised from what was defined as science.13 With the newly 
secularised nature of the Scientific Naturalists, however, the public were offered fresh 
utilitarian benefits from the endeavours of science, on the condition they respected its 
autonomy. Shapin argues that if, however, there was public interference with science, then 
 
12 Merton’s thesis isn’t without its critics (see Brooke, 1990), however I use it here as one example of 
scientists’ communication with the public having legitimising pretexts. 
13 See Lightman and Dawson (2014) for a detailed discussion of scientific naturalism in Victorian Britain. 
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the objective nature of the knowledge would be lost, and with it the promised public 
benefits (Shapin, 1990: 1000). 
Shapin’s (1990) sketch of the canonical account, his subsequent critique, and the 
instances of boundary drawing between the public and science, reminds us that everywhere 
we discuss science in public we must also talk of individual and institutional interests and the 
politics of the society in question. Historians of science have investigated in detail the links 
between science and the public in the Victorian era, demonstrating interactions between 
science and the public shaped the formation of Victorian science itself (Secord, 2003; Fyfe, 
2004; Lightman, 2009). These works also stress the role of popular engagement in the 
professionalization of science. 
It was often assumed that as science had become largely professionalised by the 
early 20th century, scientists’ withdrew from public spaces into their “well-funded ivory 
tower” (Bowler, 2009: 2). However, Bowler’s (2009) study of early 20th-century popular 
science has shown that in this period a significant proportion of scientists in Britain were still 
writing for non-specialist audiences. Therefore, the apparent withdrawal of scientists from 
public spaces, which was referred to in 1985 in the Bodmer Report, was not the immediate 
result of the professionalization of science. Indeed, it must have happened post-WWII, if it 
ever happened at all. 
Gregory and Lock (2008: 1252-1253) argue that after successful interactions with 
society and government during WWII, science in Britain was both celebrated and well-
funded. Although we do continue to see the contestations of how science should relate to 
society on display in the aftermath of WWII. Ideologues on the political left and right were 
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united in honouring science, but differed in their visions of how science and society should 
interrelate. For the Left, society should control the direction and outputs of science, which 
would then be collectively owned. For the Right, however, scientists sought autonomy from 
any external governance, seeing interference as restricting science’s ability to optimally 
function (Gregory and Lock, 2008: 1252-1253). 
From the 1960s to the 1970s, a shift in the governance of science occurred. In the 
1960s the scientific community itself mediated government funding of science, this model 
had at least some democratic control. However, in the 1970s, coinciding with Margaret 
Thatcher becoming Minister for Science, science became increasingly organised in a free-
market, corporate model (Gregory and Locke, 2008: 1253). It was in this political context 
that a number of scientists came together to address what they feared was a breakdown in 
relations between science and the public. Thus, the Royal Society commissioned the Bodmer 
Report. 
The problem as defined by the report was that science and the public were suffering 
from a breakdown in relations, and this was due to the public’s lack of knowledge about 
science. The report called for scientists to improve and increase their communication efforts, 
and urged more science coverage in the media. Furthermore, the authors urged political 
decision makers to seek more advice on science, and that businesspersons needed to 
increase their understanding of science to maximise the competitiveness of the UK economy 
(Bodmer, 1985: 31). Surveys of the public’s knowledge of science were then issued, and the 
lack of knowledge found was then interpreted as corroborating the Bodmer Report’s 
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recommendation: to communicate more science to the public (Gregory and Locke, 2008: 
1254). 
In 1985, the Committee on the Public Understanding of Science (COPUS) was 
launched by the British Association for the Advancement of Science, the Royal Institution 
and the Royal Society. COPUS funded a series of initiatives, not only to popularise science, 
but also to increase the public’s scientific literacy. It was hoped that this newly envisioned 
scientifically literate public would be more enthusiastic about scientific research, more 
supportive of new technological developments, and presumably more enthusiastic about 
funding science (Sturgis and Allum, 2004: 55). 
1.3.2 The public understanding of science: Deficit to context 
Now we have briefly charted the background to the development of PUS as an area 
of research, I will turn to the subsequent development of the field itself, noting the shifting 
paradigms and normative commitments of each. This story can broadly be told as a move 
from a deficit model of science-public interaction, introduced above and expanded on 
below, towards a more contextualist approach, where factors beyond the epistemic are seen 
to most influence public attitudes. 
1.3.2.1 Paradigms and development 
Multidisciplinary studies of the public understanding of science (PUS), and the 
related field of science communication, aim to investigate the interrelationship between 
science and the public. PUS has undergone many changes, with Bauer et al. arguing it can be 
divided into three paradigms: science literacy (1960s onwards), public understanding of 
science (1985 onwards), and science and society (1990s onwards) (Bauer et al., 2007: 79-80). 
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According to their analysis the key feature of each paradigm is the attribution of a particular 
‘deficit’ to the public (see Table 1.1). These purported deficits, were then to be overcome by 
various forms of action, for example through education in the science literacy paradigm, or 
public participation in scientific decision making in the science and society paradigm. 
Table 1.1 Paradigms, problems and proposals in PUS (Reproduced from Bauer et al., 2007: 
80) 
Period Attribution Problems Proposals Research 
 
Science Literacy 
1960s onwards 
 
Public deficit  
Knowledge 
 
Literacy measures  
Education 
Public Understanding 
After 1985 
 
Public deficit  
Attitudes 
Education 
Knowledge–attitude  
Attitude change 
Image marketing 
Science and Society 
1990s–present 
Trust deficit 
Expert deficit  
Notions of public  
Crisis of confidence 
Participation  
Deliberation 
‘Angels’ mediators 
Impact evaluation 
 
It should be noted that these paradigms overlap, and do not neatly succeed each 
other. In Bauer’s (2009) view, this is not representative of progress, but of the multiplication 
of discourses. The ‘protagonists’ of each paradigm, however, use the rhetoric of progress to 
dismiss the previous. Public understanding researchers, who chase attitude deficits, have left 
behind the ‘old’ science literacy deficit. Science and society practitioners profess to have left 
the old deficit models behind, whilst still seeking to investigate their own deficit, one of trust 
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(Bauer et al., 2007: 86). Despite Bauer et al.’s caveats it could be argued that their 
prescriptive approach is ahistorical and does not take account of the heterogeneity of 
approaches of communicating science to the public across the 20th century. For example, as 
early as the 1940s British broadcasters were discussing the utility of a science and society 
approach to aid the dissemination of scientific knowledge (Hall, forthcoming). Still, what we 
are left with is a perceived deficit—of knowledge, attitude, or trust—on the part of publics, 
which it is thought must be plugged or filled with some new form of education, engagement, 
or deliberation.  
In an analysis of the 50 most influential papers in a key PUS journal, Public 
Understanding of Science, Smallman (2014) attempts to empirically chart the development 
of the field. Though it could be argued that solely studying only the highly influential papers, 
in one journal, ignores large parts of PUS literature and research, this attempt to map the 
development of the field’s arguments and theory serves a useful purpose here. Smallman 
(2014: 10) describes how there have been mainstay topics in PUS from 1992-2010—
specifically media coverage, surveys, and models of public understanding. Although there 
has been a shift in the focus of these topics, studies of media coverage of science, for 
example, have moved from more general studies of the patterns and structure of the media, 
to a more recent focus on specific case studies, such as climate change and genetics 
(Smallman, 2014: 5). Secondly, over time there has been a move to consider PUS media 
studies within their wider societal context and social discourse—with the inclusion of terms 
such as “public perceptions” and “political discourse” in later studies. Thirdly, studies of 
media coverage have developed from a largely North American focus, from 1992 to 1994, to 
more international studies from 2000 onwards (Smallman, 2014: 7). The media analysis in 
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the present thesis aligns with these developments, being a contextualised case-study 
approach, investigating papal statements about evolution in English newspapers specifically. 
The focus of surveys in PUS has also shifted over time. Smallman notes how between 
1995 and 1999 typical words in relation to survey work were: ‘item’, ‘attitude’, ‘literacy’, 
‘dimension’, ‘understand’ and ‘measure’.  However, between 2003-2010 words such as 
‘deficit’, ‘contextualist’, ‘model’, ‘relationship’, ‘critique’ and ‘hypothesis’ are more 
prominent (Smallman, 2014: 7). This thesis aims to synthesize the ‘mainstay topics’ of PUS 
research, by combining media analysis and attitudes research. Though instead of using 
quantitative surveys, I employ a qualitative interview method to explore individuals’ lived 
experiences of the relationship between their religious beliefs and attitudes towards 
evolution. As will be discussed in more detail in the final section of this chapter, using 
inductive, qualitative methods is important for social studies of science and religion, 
especially when measuring public attitudes to evolution. As has been critiqued by Elsdon-
Baker (2015a), some quantitative survey questions in this area are problematically framed, 
and may not adequately allow individuals’ views to emerge in data collection. Thus, using 
interviews allows the generation of more detailed, exploratory data. 
1.3.2.2 Deficit to context  
While there are different types of deficits which have been focused on in PUS 
research, a main focus in this thesis will be the knowledge deficit model. Indeed, when PUS 
scholars talk about “the deficit model” without any qualifier it is most frequently the 
knowledge deficit model to which they refer. As discussed earlier, the authors of the Bodmer 
Report (1985: 31) crystallised this notion, arguing that increasing the public understanding of 
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science would lead to improved attitudes, personal wellbeing, and support for science. 
Therefore, scientists had to improve their communication of science and its benefits to the 
public.  As the authors argued: 
Given the importance of public understanding of science and the extent to which scientists must 
be democratically accountable to those who support their training and research through public 
taxation, it is clearly a part of each scientist's professional responsibility to promote the public 
understanding of science. (Bodmer, 1985: 34) 
Sturgis and Allum (2004) state that the Bodmer Report only assumed that the public 
did not understand science, or had a lack of knowledge, and it was this lack on the part of 
the public that had led to negative attitudes. This assumption became known as the ‘deficit 
model’ (Ziman, 1991; Wynne, 1991; Layton et al., 1993; Sturgis and Allum, 2004). Simply 
stated, the deficit model assumes that “the more you know, the more you love it” (Bauer, 
2009: 8). In this conception, negative attitudes toward science are perceived to be the result 
of ignorance, and the way to overcome these negative attitudes is through knowledge and 
education. 
The deficit model, and the notion that the public have irrational fears of science due 
to a lack of understanding, has been criticised on a number of grounds resulting in a 
scholarly distancing from it (Sturgis and Allum, 2004: 57).14 This move was in part influenced 
by scholars in the neighbouring discipline of science and technology studies (STS). A key text 
here is Wynne’s (1992b) classic explication of the way expert knowledge and lay knowledge 
interacted during the Chernobyl fallout in Cumbria. Wynne demonstrated that laypeople 
were able to deeply reflect on their social relationships towards scientific experts, and on 
 
14 Though the deficit model still finds popular appeal among some scientists and science communication 
practitioners (see Simis et al. 2016). 
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the epistemological status of their own ‘local’ knowledge in relation to scientific expertise. 
Furthermore, lay knowledge shouldn’t be seen as an inferior version of expert knowledge, 
but instead as qualitatively different. Therefore, expert knowledge is to be seen as but one 
ingredient of lay knowledge, mixed in with other elements such as value judgements, trust in 
the scientific institutions, and the person’s perception of their ability to put scientific 
knowledge to practical use (Bucchi, 2008: 60). Thus, context is important. 
Risk scholars have also contributed to critical analysis of the deficit model. Douglas 
and Wildavsky (1982) demonstrated the role of social relations in technological risk 
perception, with the public selecting risks depending on the social norms of their cultural 
environment, rather than knowledge of objective hazards. Further divergence from the 
deficit model can also be seen in the work of Slovic and Peters (1998), who show 
technological risk perception to be associated with worldviews, such as environmentalism, 
rather than being determined by scientific knowledge alone.  
Beyond these scholars, others have criticized the knowledge measures used in 
attitude studies, typical of deficit model approaches. Peters (2000) argues results from such 
surveys depend on which aspects of scientific knowledge are selected in the survey design. 
For example, Peters criticized the knowledge indicators used in the 1993 Eurobarometer 
survey as “culturally determined idealisations”. The resultant indicators are therefore a 
biased indication of scientific understanding, which are dependent on respondents’ national 
and cultural location (Sturgis and Allum, 2004: 57).    
Wynne (1995: 362) labels his approach the “constructivist strand of PUS”, which 
problematizes both science and the public. Other scholars such as Sturgis and Allum (2004: 
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69), however, have labelled it as the “contextualist approach” to PUS, where scientific 
knowledge is seen not as an abstract collection of ‘facts’ but as sets of understandings within 
various social contexts. This labelling is, in part, due to Sturgis and Allum’s (2004) and other’s 
(e.g. Bauer et al. 2007) resistance to the linkage of deficit approaches to survey methods. In 
this view, surveys are seen to promote the deficit model, and qualitative methods are seen 
as critical in their approach. For Bauer et al (2007: 79) this essentialist connection must be 
severed; liberating the research agenda by contextualizing survey research, finding cultural 
indicators, integrating datasets and conducting longitudinal analysis, and utilising other data 
streams. As discussed in Chapter 4, the present thesis does utilise some notion of 
constructionism, yet I follow the tradition of calling this type of research the contextualist, or 
critical, approach to PUS. 
Despite the many criticisms of the deficit model, Sturgis and Allum (2004: 57) argue 
that it should not be scrapped entirely. A meta-analysis of 193 surveys in 40 different 
countries found an overall small positive correlation between scientific knowledge and 
attitudes toward science, although these correlations differed depending on the particular 
scientific topic analysed (Allum et al., 2008). This does seem to indicate knowledge has some 
role in determining attitudes, but it undoubtedly goes beyond a simple conception of: the 
more you know, the more you love it. 
As introduced in the conceptual issues section above, Elsdon-Baker and Mason-
Wilkes (2019: 13-14) make an interesting observation about the deficit model in relation to 
science and religion. They argue that if we take some founding assumptions about the 
relations between science, modernity, and progress, and similar assumptions about the 
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inverse relationship between religion and modernity, then measures of scientific literacy, 
and (reducing) religiosity, could be viewed as proxy measures of a societal progress. Elsdon-
Baker and Mason-Wilkes (2019: 13-14) argue that these assumptions are problematic for 
several reasons. They do not take into account contextual scholarship on how publics 
interact with science, nor the diverse relations of religion and modern societies (see Davies, 
2013). 
Simis et al. (2016: 401) contend that while multiple empirical analyses have shown 
that public attitudes to science are more complex than the deficit model suggests (e.g. 
Sturgis and Allum, 2004; Davies, 2008; Nisbet and Scheufele, 2009; Brossard et al., 2009; Yeo 
et al., 2015), the deficit model still persists among scientists and practitioners in the public 
communication of science. Reasons for this persistence, according to Simis et al. (2016: 410) 
are: the juxtaposition between how scientists are trained and how the public processes 
information; institutional structures that continue to support the deficit model—for example 
scientists with less positive attitudes toward the social sciences are more likely to adhere to 
the deficit model; scientists’ conception of ‘the public’; and the attractiveness of the deficit 
model for policy making. We see this preservation and continued promotion of the deficit 
model in the examples given in the introduction to this chapter, where both Miller et al. 
(2006) and Richard Dawkins called for greater efforts to enlighten and educate the public 
about evolution, in response to surveys of apparent low acceptance.  
In this thesis, whether knowledge of evolution corresponds with more positive 
attitudes towards evolution is left as an open empirical question. The interviews explore 
individuals’ understandings and perceptions of evolution and science in general. From this, I 
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can then assess how knowledge about evolution relates to attitudes about it, thus testing 
the assumptions of the deficit model. As this study does not posit that knowledge is the sole 
influencer of attitude, it follows in the more critical contextualist tradition in PUS where 
other social and institutional forces are relevant in shaping attitudes. 
In this section, I have demonstrated that questions of how the public and science 
interact have a much longer history than the Bodmer Report. Indeed, interactions and 
boundary drawing between scientists and the public in Victorian Britain shaped the very 
nature of science itself. In the mid- to late- 20th century, concerns over negative public 
attitudes and appreciation of science led to the calls for increasing public understanding of 
science. The paradigm of the deficit model, where greater knowledge leads to improved 
attitudes, has subsequently been critiqued by the PUS community though it still finds 
popular appeal among some scientists and communicators. In PUS, however, there has been 
a turn to a critical or contextualist perspective, where other factors in addition to scientific 
knowledge are seen to be important in shaping attitudes towards science. 
 
1.4 What do religious people think about evolution? 
Having given an overview of the conceptual issues that afflict many investigations of 
science and religion, and reviewed the developments of efforts to investigate (and 
sometimes improve) the public understanding of science, I now turn to studies which have 
sought to analyse religious attitudes towards evolution. I separate studies into two 
methodological traditions, quantitative and qualitative, and aim to show shortcomings and 
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strengths in the current literature. Given the focus of this thesis, the reader will note the lack 
of specific studies on Catholicism. This is not an omission, but rather reflects the lack of 
attention given to Catholicism in the literature. As suggested earlier, this may well be 
because of a focus on ‘problematic groups’ in research into science and religion. Below I 
discuss the implication of research frames generated from studying groups who are 
perceived to be problematic, and their subsequent application to other religious traditions, 
such as Catholicism.  
1.4.1 Quantitative studies of religious attitudes towards evolution 
Most studies investigating attitudes towards evolution utilise a quantitative 
methodology, and have often relied on epistemic explanatory factors of attitudes (Elsdon-
Baker, 2018; Elsdon-Baker and Mason-Wilkes, 2019: 12; Hill, 2019: 46). Furthermore, it is 
only these quantitative studies that are reported on in the media, prompting such headlines 
as “Pope Francis may believe in evolution, but 42 percent of Americans do not” in The 
Washington Post (McCoy, 2014). Therefore, as the results of quantitative studies are 
reported by the media, and can set the agenda for public discourse on religion and 
evolution, it is necessary to critically review how the results of these studies are generated. 
In a recent review paper, Hill shows that most evolution-related polling falls into two 
categories: (1) direct questions about belief in human evolution; or (2) questions that 
attempt to have respondents self-categorise as evolutionists or creationists (Hill, 2019: 31). 
As I contend in this section, both these types of study, where either human evolution is the 
focus, or predefined categories of belief are offered by the researcher, are problematic in 
terms of understanding how religious publics interact with evolution. These methods 
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construct a somewhat definitive view of public attitudes towards evolution, and ignore other 
factors, such as an individual’s identity and moral salience, which may also influence how 
individuals perceive evolution (Moran, 2019; Guhin, 2016). 
One of the earliest and longest-running surveys which has sought to investigate 
public attitudes towards evolution is Gallup’s Values and Beliefs survey. Beginning in 1982, 
Gallup has asked individuals in the USA a simple three-part question about human origins: 
“Which of the following statements comes closest to your views on the origin and 
development of human beings?” With three positions into which participants must self-
categorise: 
(1) God created human beings pretty much in their present form at one time within the last 
10,000 years or so;  
(2) Human beings have developed over millions of years from less advanced forms of life, 
but God guided this process; 
(3) Human beings have developed over millions of years from less advanced forms of life, 
but God had no part in this process. (Newport, 2014) 
A major issue with this type of measure is that it focusses solely on human evolution, 
arguably the most contentious area of biological evolution. For example, in recent polling 
work in the UK and Canada, a large-scale cross-cultural survey found that questions over 
human origins and consciousness play a part in uncertainty towards aspects of evolution 
across religious, spiritual and non-religious groups (Elsdon-Baker et al., 2017). Therefore, 
specifically assessing attitudes towards human evolution and drawing conclusions about 
attitudes toward evolution in general is a problematic extrapolation. 
While the longitudinal Gallup poll has demonstrated steady levels of Young-Earth 
Creationism (YEC) in the US (based on the particular formation of their three-part question), 
there are no comparable longitudinal studies in the UK. As Unsworth and Voas (2017: 2-3) 
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explain, depending on the wording of the question, in the UK levels of ‘creationism’ have 
been claimed between 9% and 22% (YouGov, 2013; IpsosMORI, 2006). Whilst ‘acceptance’ 
of evolution has been measured between 38% and 79% (Elsdon-Baker, 2015a; 
Eurobarometer, 2005). Are acceptance and rejection of evolution such wildly unstable 
attitudes in society that they can change so much in a 10-year period? Or does the way in 
which the questions are formed and analysed dramatically affect the apparent prevalence of 
acceptance and rejection? One common feature of much of this polling work is that surveys 
force individuals’ views into predefined categories. These categories are then used to argue 
about levels of ‘acceptance’ and ‘rejection’ of evolution, often in an uncritical way. Elsdon-
Baker (2015a) examines the role of this issue framing in studies of public attitudes towards 
evolution, concluding that in effect we are “creating creationists”, and suggests we must 
allow more subtle belief positions to emerge through the use of additional categories, such 
as various forms of human exclusionism. 
Elsdon-Baker’s (2015a) critique draws on the work of philosopher Ian Hacking. 
Hacking (1986) aims to show that between the somewhat rigid camps of nominalism and 
realism lies an interesting principle. The ‘dynamic nominalism’ perspective suggests that 
numerous kinds of human beings and human acts come into existence “hand in hand” with 
the creation of the categories that label them. Hacking (1986: 166) argues that dynamic 
nominalism makes little sense when applied to things rather than people, stating that 
“[w]hat happens to tuberculosis bacilli depends on whether or not we poison them with BCG 
vaccine, but it does not depend upon how we describe them.” The possibilities for the 
bacillus are dictated by nature. For humans, though, the possibilities of actions depend 
largely on the possibility of descriptions. Therefore, if new descriptions come into being, new 
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possibilities for acting also come into being, and people can then act in the ways which we 
have described. 
Although Hacking notes there is no general story of dynamic nominalism, or principle 
that describes all cases of “making up people”, he offers a partial framework based on a 
two-vector approach. One vector is labelling from above, a community of experts create a 
label, a ‘reality’, which some people make their own. Different from this is the vector of the 
autonomous behaviour of the labelled person, which presses from below, creating a reality 
which every expert must face. The general outline of dynamic nominalism, as detailed by 
Hacking (1986), has clear implications for research into acceptance of evolution and 
specifically for categorising ‘creationism’ and ‘creationists’. One obvious implication of 
“making up people” stems from prescriptive categorisations, which necessarily arise from 
large-scale survey work. As we create surveys with the general aim of describing patterns in 
society, what is the extent of the interplay between these bottom-up and top-down vectors? 
Elsdon-Baker (2015a) produces a thorough expansion of this point, showing that 
through the use of restrictive, binary questioning we perpetuate preconceived categories of 
incompatibility between religion and science, rather than allowing subtler belief positions to 
emerge from the data. Many previous surveys, which have received considerable media 
attention, have used restrictive questions that require those who accept evolution to reject 
God, and vice versa. In this sense, we perpetuate a contrived dualism and in Elsdon-Baker’s 
(2015a) words we “create creationists”. This restrictive, binary framing is clearly shown in 
the Horizon: War on Science poll (2006) (mentioned in the introduction to this chapter) 
where respondents were asked which statement best describes their view on the origin and 
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development of life.15 Through these statements the survey carves the respondents into 
three distinct camps, with little option for more nuanced beliefs. In this survey, to accept 
‘evolution theory’ one must accept that God has no part in the process. 
It is possible, then, that through the use of restrictive categories we are missing other 
important belief positions into which some individuals may self-categorise. Elsdon-Baker 
(2015a) sets out three of these broad conceptual categories, which have been missed in 
prior large-scale survey work on religion and evolution:  
• Spiritual Human Exclusionist Evolutionist accounts. Versions of human exclusionism that 
allow for humans’ physical form to be subject to both macro- and micro-evolution, but 
that allow for a form of special spiritual creation, for example, an insertion of higher level 
cognitive functioning or a human ‘soul’ by a higher power, deity or God. 
 
• Theistic or Deistic Human Exclusionist Evolutionary accounts. Versions of human 
exclusionism that allow for a form of special creation for humans’ physical form, but also 
allow for micro-evolution within human history. 
 
• Creationist Human Exclusionist accounts. A conceptualization of humans having been 
inserted into a larger scale process of evolution, which includes all life forms except 
humans, whereby humans are subject to a form of special creation, but not subject to 
either macro- or micro-evolution (Elsdon-Baker, 2015a: 14). 
 
These categories are useful in their ability to more accurately describe the potential 
positions of a larger section of the population. Embedding these categories in new waves of 
quantitative surveys, may allow researchers to better understand a wider range of public 
opinions on the matter. However, I contend that while offering a larger range of positions 
 
15 As introduced earlier, these statements were: “The ‘evolution theory’ says that humankind has 
developed over millions of years from less advanced forms of life. God had no part in this process;  
The ‘creationism theory’ says that God created humankind pretty much in his/her present form at one 
time within the last 10,000 years; And the ‘intelligent design’ theory says that certain features of living 
things are best explained by the intervention of a supernatural being, e.g. God.”  
(From Horizon: A War on Science poll, as quoted in Elsdon-Baker (2015a: 5) 
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may well capture some previously missed beliefs, the approach may have its limitations for 
others who don’t hold formalised positions. I will now expand on this point below with 
reference to recent work which has sought to include more subtle categories of evolution-
religion interaction. 
North-American sociologists Ecklund and Sheitle (2018: 74-79) developed a new 
approach for investigating public attitudes towards evolution, which includes more belief 
categories. In a large study of the American religious population, participants were asked to 
choose from six narratives of the origin and development of life, rather than the traditional 
three-part measure. Their new categories were: young-earth creationism, recent human 
creation, God-guided evolution, Intelligent Design, God-initiated evolution, and naturalistic 
evolution. Unlike previous surveys, the researchers also allowed participants to select more 
than one narrative. For each narrative chosen, participants also had to state whether the 
narrative was “probably true” or “definitely true”. Interestingly, 57.5% of respondents said 
none of the narratives were “definitely true”. Furthermore, the majority of individuals in 
every religious group selected more than one narrative on the origin of life. While it could be 
argued that this is due to an insufficient number of options, Ecklund and Scheitle interpret 
the selection of multiple narratives as an indicator that individuals are not sure enough 
about their position to commit to one perspective. A similar conclusion was reached through 
the large-scale Theos poll in the UK, which found that attitudes towards evolution were 
often “confused and contradictory” (Lawes, 2009). 
In Britain, Unsworth and Voas (2017) have also attempted to better survey public 
attitudes towards evolution; moving away from self-categorising positions, to the 
 64 
deployment of multiple measures related to questions around religion and evolution. Their 
survey includes 8 separate questions, responded to on a 5-point Likert scale. Participants 
were asked: 
For each of the following statements, please say whether you Strongly Agree, Agree, Neither 
Agree nor Disagree, Disagree or Strongly Disagree: 
(1) The world was created in six 24-hour days; 
(2) Plants and animals have developed over time from simpler life forms; 
(3) Humans have developed over time from simpler, non-human life forms; 
(4) The whole human race is descended from Adam and Eve; 
(5) There is strong, reliable evidence to support the theory of evolution; 
(6) The earth is young – less than 10,000 years old; 
(7) The earth is billions of years old; 
(8) Life is too complex to have evolved solely by natural processes.  
(Unsworth and Voas, 2017: 8) 
 
Also of note in Unsworth and Voas’s study, is their decision to include in addition to 
the nationally representative sample, an oversample of 5 religious affiliations: Anglicans, 
Catholics, Muslims, Pentecostal Christians, and Independent Evangelicals. Allowing a more 
representative view of the differences between religious groups in Britain. Their results 
reveal that public attitudes towards evolution are complex and cannot be adequately 
measured with a single dichotomous survey item. 
A clear example of the utility of this disambiguation is the difference in levels of YEC 
found between the Ipsos MORI War on Science poll and Unsworth and Voas’s (2017) work. 
Ipsos MORI, utilising the 3-part blunt measure, suggested 22% of the British population were 
YEC. That is, they agreed with the proposition: “The ‘creationism theory’ says that God 
created humankind pretty much in his/her present form at one time within the last 10,000 
years.” Unsworth and Voas (2017: 9) however, through cross tabulation of their separate 
young earth and human evolution questions, find that only 2% of the British population 
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subscribe to the idea of a young earth that is less than 10,000 years old and also reject 
human evolution. A marked difference of 20%, even given the 11-year gap between the 
studies. 
Furthermore, 3.8% of the whole sample in Unsworth and Voas’s (2017) study 
accepted a human exceptionalism view (accepting plant and animal evolution, but rejecting 
human evolution). The figure was 12.6% for Independent Evangelicals, 6.3% for Catholics, 
and 2% for the non-religious. Suggesting that there are indeed people who hold human 
exclusionist perspectives, who had been missed by previous surveys as suggested by Elsdon-
Baker (2015a). Interestingly, like Unsworth and Voas (2017), Elsdon-Baker et al. (2017: 16) 
found that evolutionary explanations for the origins of human beings were difficult for both 
religious and non-religious respondents, although religion had an amplifying effect. In their 
study, 18% of non-religious/spiritual and 37% of religious/spiritual respondents agreed 
(somewhat agree, agree, or strongly agree) with the statement: “Animals evolve over time 
but evolutionary science cannot explain the origins of human beings” (Elsdon-Baker et al., 
2017: 18). The differences found between these two 2017 studies highlights how using 
different survey instruments on the same issue can deliver different results. 
Due to the inclusion of a Catholic oversample (n=978), Unsworth and Voas’s (2017) 
study gives us the most up-to-date and comprehensive study of Catholic attitudes towards 
evolution in Britain. The full results of their 8 Likert items introduced above, and how the 
Catholic population differs from the whole sample and other denominations, can be seen in 
Figure 2.2 below. Most interesting here, is that only 6% of Catholics in the sample disagreed 
with the statement: “There is strong, reliable evidence to support the theory of evolution.” 
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This indicates less opposition towards evolution among British Catholics, compared with 
British Evangelicals (47.3%) and Muslims (30.2%). However, with only 3.4% of Anglicans in 
the study disagreeing with the same statement, the same figure as the non-religious 
population, shows more opposition to evolution among British Catholics than Anglican 
Christians based on this measure. The study also demonstrates the danger of treating 
“Christians” as a monolithic group, with differing belief positions being adopted at different 
levels by Anglicans, Catholics, Pentecostals, and Evangelicals, specifically in regard to the 
question of Adam and Eve (Figure 1.2). Yet, this type of approach cannot inform us about the 
idiosyncrasies behind these belief positions. This is where exploratory, interview methods 
can contribute to the emerging literature of SSSR. 
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Figure 1.2 Results from eight Likert-scale items about evolution. Black=Strongly Agree or Agree; 
Grey=Neither Agree Nor Disagree; White=Disagree or Strongly Disagree. (Unsworth and Voas, 
2017: 7) 
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In the USA, Hill (2014a) employed a similar strategy to Unsworth and Voas (2017) by 
disaggregating packaged belief positions. Instead of the well-used strategy of using a 
measure designed to categorise individuals as creationists, theistic evolutionists or atheistic 
evolutionists, Hill employed a number of disaggregated measures about evolution, God’s 
involvement in the emergence of humans, the historicity of Adam and Eve, belief in 24-hour 
day periods of creation, and geological time, before constructing the categories of YEC, 
theistic and atheistic evolution. From analysing these measures, Hill (2014a) concluded that 
fewer people in his US sample fit definitively into the categories of YEC, theistic evolution, 
and atheistic evolution, than when compared to simple Gallup-style blunt measures. In 
Gallup-polling, between 40 and 47% of the US population select the YEC option; between 31 
and 40% select the theistic evolution position; and between 9 and 19% select the atheistic 
evolution, as the closest to their view (Hill, 2014a: 6). In Hill’s study using disaggregated 
measures, 37% were creationists, 16% theistic evolutionists, and 9% atheistic evolutionists. 
When considering if the individuals were “very certain” or “absolutely certain” about these 
beliefs, the numbers fell to 29%, 8%, and 6%, respectively. Hill  concludes that the 
differences were: “almost certainly due to Gallup respondents being forced to choose from 
limited options, even when many are unsure of what they believe or maintain beliefs that do 
not fit into the options available” (Hill, 2014a: 1). 
Above I have described how quantitative studies of public attitudes towards science 
have developed from the very blunt measures in the Gallup poll, to newer methods, which 
allow a more subtle understanding of the public’s views on evolution. In these more 
nuanced, newer studies, we see that attitudes towards evolution are sometimes held 
tentatively (Ecklund and Sheitle, 2018), and can be contradictory and confused (Lawes, 
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2009). Here, even though he was discussing views of science and religion more broadly, I 
find Hill’s recent recommendation particularly instructive: 
The reason for this is that most people are not logically consistent and coherent in their world 
views – religious conservatives included. This is not because the public is stupid; most simply do 
not have the time or incentive to develop coherent world views. Yet, the vast majority of what is 
‘out there’ is elite dialogue about these topics. Books, web sites and blogs all represent aspects of 
elite discourse. Elites often assume that the public is as invested in creating coherent and 
intellectually defensible positions as they are, but this is simply not true. Turning to social context 
and group identity will be far more important in understanding why the public adopts certain 
beliefs and narratives about science and religion. (Hill, 2019: 47) 
 
Thus, one of our mistakes as researchers may well be in the expectation of coherent 
positions from the public regarding their religious (or non-religious) beliefs and evolution. 
Following Elsdon-Baker’s (2015a) creating creationists critique, I would argue that more 
work must be done to assess the ‘bottom-up’ push (Hacking, 1986) of people’s beliefs and 
lived experiences through the development of methodologies, which allow people’s beliefs 
(or indeed lack thereof) to emerge through data rather than be framed in its collection. I do 
not posit that this is simply an inadequacy of quantitative work; as will be discussed below 
some qualitative work has also been framed problematically, and restricts the types of 
voices heard. 
1.4.2 Qualitative studies of religious attitudes towards evolution 
As has been discussed, the dominant discourses on science and religion have been 
largely cultivated in the USA, and this has arguably influenced academic research agendas. 
Therefore, research has (in some ways justifiably) tended to focus on apparent ‘problematic 
groups’, namely Evangelical Protestant creationist groups. In the US, there has been a long 
tradition of studying creationism and creationist movements (e.g. Toumey, 1994; Long, 
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2011). More recently, work in this area has begun to look at issues such as moral salience for 
those who reject evolution (Guhin, 2016), and the importance of moral beliefs in evolution 
debates (Evans, 2011). There has also been a recent increase in studies looking at the 
‘problem’ of Muslim perceptions of evolution. However, as with the critiques seen in PUS, 
much of this work focusses on epistemic factors, and ignores contextual factors which may 
also feed into perceptions.16 
To date, there have been no dedicated qualitative studies examining Catholic 
communities’ attitudes towards evolution. This may be because they are not seen as a 
‘problem group’, as many quantitative surveys show them at higher rates of acceptance of 
evolution than groups such as Evangelicals and Muslims, in both the US and the UK (Hill, 
2019: Unsworth and Voas, 2017).17 However, I would argue that to understand how 
evolution and religion are interacting in society, we must move beyond solely investigating 
‘problem groups’, justifiably labelled or not. As without insights from communities which 
have not been traditionally labelled problematic, at least in academic discourse if not in 
popular culture, then our picture of the relationship between science and religion in society 
will remain problematically skewed. Recent attempts have been made in this direction, with 
some seeking to expand our investigative gaze beyond how religious identity negatively 
affects attitudes towards evolution, to how non-religious identities may positively influence 
attitudes towards evolution (Jones, Unpublished manuscript). More work is needed to 
critique this normative position, where religion is a de facto detractor from positive 
 
16 See Carlisle et al. (2019) for a thorough review of the emergent literature on Muslim attitudes towards 
evolution. 
17 This is not to say that Catholics have escaped the labelling of anti-science. Historically, their treatment 
of Galileo is used as a prime exemplar of the conflict thesis. See Chapter 3. 
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perceptions of evolution and science, and to further investigate how non-religious identities 
may contribute to more positive perceptions of evolution and science more generally. 
Beyond large-scale quantitative surveys, qualitative approaches also have conceptual 
issues to consider. Hildering et al. (2012) interviewed ten Dutch Protestant Christians and 
attempted to understand their rejection of evolution through three public understanding of 
science paradigms: knowledge deficit, attitude deficit and trust deficit. Even though trust 
and knowledge deficits were found in some participants, none of the paradigms proved 
sufficient to fully explain participant’s rejection of evolution. The researchers found the main 
reason for rejecting evolution was an a priori decision by some participants to trust the Bible 
over science. Furthermore, all respondents claimed that evolution does not meet the 
standards of good science, and therefore is as unscientific as creationism. Nonetheless, all 
participants had positive attitudes to science in general. The researchers suggest this overall 
positive attitude was maintained by participants by their exclusion of evolutionary science 
from science in general (Hildering et al., 2012: 988). Hildering et al. conclude that debates 
which seek to discuss the validity of evolution with religious individuals who oppose it, will 
have little success. This is in-keeping with critiques of the deficit model in the public 
understanding of science, as discussed below (Hildering et al., 2012: 997). 
The aim of Hildering et al.’s (2012) study was to analyse those who reject evolution 
using public understanding of science paradigms. Although this is a useful contribution to 
understanding certain religious rejections of evolution, it is another study, which focusses 
solely on epistemological conflict, rather than potential complementarity, or an exploration 
of multiple relationships between religion and science. This type of literature is described by 
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Evans and Evans (2008: 91) as “symbolic incompatible epistemological conflict literature”, 
where religion and science are seen as making competing truth claims about the world. By 
focussing on those who perceive conflict, studies such as this may well inadvertently help 
propagate the conflict narrative. Therefore, a broader approach is needed when 
investigating attitudes towards evolution. 
Through the application of qualitative approaches to a wider range of religious 
individuals, not solely selecting a sample who reject evolution outright (and in doing so may 
well be an outlier group), we could better attain views, and therefore categories using 
Hacking’s (1986) ‘bottom-up’ push. These studies, and their limitations, have informed my 
thesis’ methodological design. Using a qualitative methodology, but interviewing a broader 
sample not restricted to those who reject evolution, will allow the exploration of a range of 
perspectives of the epistemological relationship between religion and science, without 
necessitating conflict perceptions, but also without ignoring them. In this sense, I am 
studying the symbolic epistemological relationship, with no need to focus solely on conflict. 
Recent attempts which seek to investigate religious attitudes towards evolution have 
adopted the contextual perspective called for by critical scholars of PUS. For example, 
Moran’s (2019) investigation of Muslim attitudes toward evolution in the UK, which unlike 
previous studies (discussed in Carlisle, 2019), employs a contextualist perspective by utilising 
the perspectives and implications of social identity affecting Muslim perceptions of evolution 
in the UK. This type of work is much needed, employing perspectives beyond the 
epistemological to explain differences in religious perceptions of evolution. Despite this, 
however, Moran (2019) utilises a categorisation based on acceptance and rejection of 
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evolution in his analysis of orientations towards evolution. Acceptance and rejection of 
evolution plays an important part in public discourse on evolution and religion, however 
there may be other ways to categorise their relationship beyond these hard-fixed binary 
categories. 
Elsdon-Baker and Mason-Wilkes suggest that the call for more qualitative work in the 
area is in part a call to move away from the use of abstract typologies of professional and 
scholarly discourse, towards the investigation of lived experiences. 
It is an unfortunate legacy of debates in this field to date that quantitative research has tended to 
operationalize these abstract categories in survey instruments, thus applying categorical labels 
that individuals may not readily identify with […] Drawing on qualitative findings would, in turn, 
allow future quantitative researchers seeking to examine societal trends to build a more 
informed approach to any forms of classification or categorization that are inherently implied by 
this kind of data collection. Furthermore, rather excitingly, it may also lead to entirely different 
modes or directions for future quantitative data collection. (Elsdon-Baker and Mason-Wilkes, 
2019: 9) 
There have also been recent attempts to investigate the differences between 
professional discourse on science and religion, and how issues are understood by the public 
(e.g. Kaden et al., 2017). Using data from a recent large-scale qualitative study, consisting of 
123 interviews and 16 focus groups, Kaden et al. (2019) investigated how science-religion 
labels from popular discourse (such as: ‘creationism’, ‘intelligent design’, ‘Darwinism’ and 
‘New Atheism’) were identified with among religious and non-religious publics and scientists 
in the UK and Canada. As has been discussed above, apparently neat terms such as 
‘creationism’ often feature in quantitative research, however little work has been conducted 
to investigate what people think of these labels, and how (if at all) they identify with them. 
Kaden et al. (2019: 64) found that publics’ awareness of labels such as: ‘Darwinist’, 
‘creationist’, ‘evolutionist’, ‘theistic evolutionist’, was limited; arguing: 
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In our research, while people did not typically ‘fit’ or identify with science and belief labels, some 
participants did use them to position themselves: labels sometimes functioned as discursive 
resources in the construction, remaking and articulation of personal identity, and this includes 
contesting common assumptions about what (religious and secular) communities hold to be true 
(Kaden et al., 2019: 57). 
Furthermore, the researchers found that participants also rejected labels of public 
discourse, even when their stated beliefs appeared to correspond to such labels—often 
because of a separation of participants’ epistemic beliefs, and the broader political or social 
motivations of groups in public discourse, which promotes those labels (Kaden et al., 2019: 
64). Due to the political social interests of groups prominent in popular discourse, such as 
New Atheism or the ID movement, there is a danger that when we impose these labels as 
researchers onto publics, that we are doing the political work of these groups in our social 
scientific research. However, the problem with any systematic investigation of beliefs is that 
we need some form of categorisation to say anything meaningful about our data. In this 
regard, Kaden et al. (2019: 74-75) suggest two proposals: firstly, the development of 
different labels, which are less reliant on the terms of public debate, such as YEC and ID. 
Secondly, researchers should pay more attention to how publics use labels, and, in 
particular, the creative ways in which they may be engaged with, or distanced from them. 
These proposals inform the theoretical orientation of this thesis. As I have already 
argued, I wish to employ an inductive strategy of the ‘bottom-up’ push of individual’s lived 
experience when it comes to their views on evolution. I therefore aim to articulate a 
categorisation of these individuals which fits their lived experience, and resists the terms of 
popular discourse, which can both distort how we see our participants’ views, and 
unwittingly forward the agendas of organisations which have stakes in these debates. 
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1.5 Conclusion 
Contemporary studies of science and religion in society are beset by conceptual 
issues. In this chapter I have discussed how the conflict thesis, the once-dominant 
historiographic approach to historical studies of science and religion, has been critiqued by 
recent historians. Furthermore, I have discussed how the related conflict narrative and the 
secularisation thesis—the belief that modernisation, including the expanding of scientific 
knowledge and practice, would necessarily lead to the decline of religion—is being 
challenged by contemporary sociologists. However, despite the distancing from these 
paradigms and perspectives in recent years, there are well-cited studies which 
operationalise a “contrived dualism” between science and religion in the measure of public 
attitudes towards evolution. By embedding a conflict framing of the possible positions one 
can hold in regard to evolution, these simplistic quantitative surveys may well have skewed 
and simplified our view of how religion and evolution can relate in societies. Furthermore, it 
is these surveys, which are exclusively presented in mainstream media coverage of the 
matter, consequently informing public discourse on science and religion. More recently, 
there have been commendable attempts to disambiguate various propositions, which are 
grouped into classical belief positions about creation and evolution, providing fruitful ways 
forward for quantitative study. 
The groups we choose to study in SSSR is also an important consideration. If we 
continue to only study controversies and perceived problem groups, then we will perpetuate 
very particular science-religion relations in the academic literature. In this thesis, I 
investigate Catholic attitudes towards evolution in England, exploring the views of a 
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previously understudied group. However, using survey measures which mirror professional 
or scholarly discourse on attitudes to evolution, often transposed from US-based debates, 
may not be the optimum way to measure public attitudes in the UK. More exploratory, 
qualitative work is needed in this area, and indeed is growing, with more recent studies 
employing critical contextualist PUS approaches, which seek explanations beyond the 
epistemic. We must also ensure that when investigating public attitudes towards evolution, 
we don’t simply impose labels from professional or scholarly discourse onto our participants. 
In this thesis, I seek to classify my participants’ views in a way which reflects their lived 
experience, and which does not necessarily reflect professional discourse on religion, 
creation and evolution. 
As I have stressed, the present thesis aims to utilise the perspectives of notable 
historians in science and religion, leaving behind simplistic notions of necessary conflict and 
harmony, moving toward a more nuanced investigation of the contingent relationships 
between religion and science, specifically Catholicism and evolution. To enable a nuanced 
analysis, it is paramount to investigate the historical context of the contemporary debate. 
Therefore, in the next chapter, I will turn to the literature exploring the historical relations 
between Catholicism and evolution. As well as critically reviewing historical studies of the 
reception of evolution in the Catholic Church, and recent papal statements on evolution, I 
give an overview of the developments of evolutionary science itself. This historical context is 
necessary in order to properly situate the subsequent analyses of public discourse and public 
attitudes.
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Chapter 2: Historical perspectives on Catholicism and 
Evolution 
2.1 Introduction 
To understand how recent papal statements on evolution have been represented in 
the media, and to contextualise contemporary Catholic attitudes towards evolution, it is 
necessary to explore the historical context of debates around Catholicism and evolution. It is 
therefore important to review the literature on the historical receptions of evolution, and 
the historical relations between evolutionary thought and the Catholic Church. In this 
chapter I first present an overview of the history of the idea of evolution, before surveying 
how it was received in broader society. I then review the literature specifically relating to the 
Catholic Church’s reception of evolution from 1859 to the second half of the twentieth 
century. Finally, I outline contemporary papal statements on evolution, beginning with John 
Paul II’s 1996 address, and ending with Francis’s address in 2014. 
It was not until 1950 that the Catholic Church officially stated a position on evolution. 
In the encyclical Humani generis, Pope Pius XII stressed that the Catholic Church did not 
prohibit discussions about evolution, which he deemed to be a serious hypothesis. Yet, why 
did it take almost 100 years after the publication of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species 
for the Catholic Church to address evolution publicly? What had been the Catholic Church’s 
internal position on evolution during these silent years? Are the statements of modern 
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popes similar or different to Pius’ comments in 1950? Over the following review of historical 
literature, I aim to provide context to these questions. 
 
2.2 Evolution 
2.2.1 A (brief) history of the idea 
To understand the reception of evolution by the Catholic Church and individuals, it is 
first necessary to understand what evolution is. As a concept, evolution has a long history, 
and today the term is used in many ways. While contemporary biologists almost universally 
accept that evolution has happened, there are still active debates within the scientific 
community regarding various evolution-related questions, such as gradualism vs. punctuated 
equilibrium, at what level selection happens, and, indeed, if selection is evolution’s primary 
driver (Pigliucci and Müller, 2010). Given this complexity, it is prudent to begin with a 
general definition: 
evolution, n.: 8. a.  Biology. The transformation of animals, plants, and other living organisms into 
different forms by the accumulation of changes over successive generations; the transmutation 
of species (cf. transmutation n. 3f); the origination or transformation of an organism, organ, 
physiological process, biological molecule, etc., by such a series of changes. (OED, 2019)  
Evolution and Darwin have become synonymous. However, transformist thought 
predates Darwin’s conception of natural selection. Ideas of biological change have been 
around since at least the times of ancient Greece (Pigliucci and Müller, 2010: 5). For 
example, the pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, Anaximander of Miletus (c.610 BC – 546 BC), 
forwarded a notion of biological change and spontaneous generation, although whether 
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Anaximander should be considered an ‘evolutionist’ by today’s conception of the term is 
debatable (Gregory, 2016: 34-36). Some authors also argue the works of Greek philosopher 
Empedocles (c. 490 BC – 430 BC), and the Roman atomistic poet Lucretius (c.99 – 55 BC), 
include notions of evolution (Sedley, 2003). Others, such as Campbell (2003: 8), contend that 
Lucretius can be classed as both an evolutionist and anti-evolutionist, since he both insists 
on a fixity of species, but also accounts for the emergence of modern humans from a 
“bestial” form which he nevertheless still considered to be human.1 
The influence of these early proto-evolutionists on subsequent thought is 
insignificant when compared to the form-based thinking of Plato (c. 428 – 348 BC) and the 
teleology of his student Aristotle (c. 384 – 322 BC). Prominent evolutionary biologist Ersnt 
Mayr labelled Plato as “the great antihero of evolutionism” (Mayr, 1982: 304). According to 
Mayr, this was because of the harmful effect on biological enquiry that four of his dogmas 
had over the next two thousand years. These dogmas included: essentialism, an animate and 
harmonious universe, the shunning of spontaneous generation in favour of a creative power 
or demiurge, and the concept of a non-corporeal soul (Mayr, 1982: 305). 
Unlike Plato, Aristotle did undertake biological observations, and much of his later 
work can be considered “anti-Platonic” (Sedley, 2009: 167). Aristotle devised an early 
classificatory system based on his teleological conception of natural efficiency, which 
grouped living things into various categories based on functional similarities (Boylan, 2005). 
Although, like Plato, Aristotle did not advocate biological change. His taxonomic work and 
 
1 Although, calling anyone who lived before modern evolutionary thought an ‘evolutionist’ or ‘anti-
evolutionist’ is of course anachronistic, in that it imposes a contemporary category onto past events. 
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biological observations, however, led Darwin himself to remark in a famous 1882 letter to 
his friend William Ogle, who had recently translated Aristotle’s The Parts of Animals: 
“Linnaeus and Cuvier have been my two gods, though in very different ways, but they were 
mere school-boys to old Aristotle” (Gotthelf, 1999: 3). 
Despite these classical considerations of the subject, it was not until the late 18th and 
early-19th centuries that transmutationist thinking received concerted scientific attention. In 
1809, French naturalist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck published his Philosophie Zoologique, 
recognised as the first major attempt to develop a comprehensive theory whereby 
organisms developed from primitive ancestors (Bowler, 2009: 86). Lamarck proposed that 
the transmutation of organisms occurred through the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics, particularly through the use and disuse of organs (Elsdon-Baker, 2007: 15). 
Gillespie (1959) noted that while post-Darwinian thought proposed a tree metaphor for the 
process of evolution, Lamarck had employed a progressive ladder metaphor. This, and other 
differences, led Barthélemy-Maudaule (1982) to conclude Lamarck should be seen as a 
precursor, rather than a contributor to modern evolution. Bowler (2009: 87) however, 
contends that even if we are not to consider Lamarck a modern evolutionary thinker, the 
influence of his widely-debated ideas may have shaped later evolutionary thought in 
significant ways. Certainly, today, some of his views are still debated by evolutionary 
biologists, who seek to integrate his ideas with those of Darwin (see Jablonka and Lamb, 
2007). Furthermore, his ideas about the use and disuse of organs play into popular and folk 
conceptions of what evolution is—such as thinking our appendices or little toes are evolving 
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out due to disuse, or that our thumbs will get bigger over the next few generations because 
of the use of touchscreen phones. 
In the early- to mid-19th century, Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace were 
busily and separately formulating the foundations of evolutionary thought as recognised by 
evolutionary scientists today.2 Interestingly, both had been influenced to some extent by the 
work of Thomas Malthus (Sober, 2014: 14). In An Essay on the Principle of Population, 
Malthus forwarded the idea that an unchecked population grows geometrically, and 
sustenance for that population grows arithmetically. This principle, Malthus argued leads to 
a “struggle for existence” (Malthus, 1798: 4-14). Darwin broadened Malthus’s 
anthropocentric formulation of the struggle for existence in his 1859 On the Origin of 
Species: 
I should premise that I use the term Struggle for Existence in a large and metaphorical sense, 
including dependence of one being on another, and including (which is more important) not only 
the life of the individual, but success in leaving progeny. […] Hence, as more individuals are 
produced than can possibly survive, there must in every case be a struggle for existence, either 
one individual with another of the same species, or with the individuals of distinct species, or 
with the physical conditions of life. It is the doctrine of Malthus applied with manifold force to 
the whole animal and vegetable kingdoms. (Darwin, 1859: 62-63). 
After many years observing artificial selection of plants and animals by humans, 
Darwin proposed his theory of ‘natural selection’. For Darwin, natural selection was 
intricately tied to the struggle for existence: 
Owing to this struggle for life, any variation, however slight and from whatever cause proceeding, 
if it be in any degree profitable to an individual of any species, in its infinitely complex relations to 
other organic beings and to external nature, will tend to the preservation of that individual, and 
will generally be inherited by its offspring. The offspring, also, will thus have a better chance of 
surviving, for, of the many individuals of any species which are periodically born, but a small 
number can survive. I have called this principle, by which each slight variation, if useful, is 
 
2 For a discussion of the differences between Darwin and Wallace’s conceptions of evolution, and their 
comparative receptions in context, see Hull (2005). 
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preserved, by the term of Natural Selection, in order to mark its relation to man's power of 
selection.  (Darwin, 1859: 61) 
With his broadened conception of the struggle for existence, and the mechanism of natural 
selection, Darwin had proposed a theory which could explain the great varieties of species 
on the planet through natural processes. 
As will be discussed below, while the Vatican seems to have exhibited a general 
scepticism toward evolution at the end of the 19th century, there were a few Catholic 
scientists and theologians who accepted evolution and even began utilising it in their own 
work. Famously, the Catholic biologist and friend of Darwin, St. George Jackson Mivart 
(1827-1900) initially accepted Darwin’s evolution by natural selection, but later became one 
of Darwin’s fiercest critics (Haught, 2013: 485). In On the Genesis of Species, Mivart (1871) 
laid out his criticisms of Darwin’s work, most notably the issue of the gradual development 
of complex structures such as the eye. Interestingly, Mivart’s critique influenced later 
creationist, specifically Intelligent Design (ID), thinking, with ID proponent Michael Behe 
labelling the argument “irreducible complexity” (Behe, 1996: 22). Darwin took Mivart’s 
critique so seriously that he devoted an entire new chapter in the sixth edition of On the 
Origin (1872) to respond point-by-point to Mivart’s critique. 
Bowler (1988: 15) argues that it was not Darwin’s form of evolution which initially 
took hold in the late-19th century, but a form of developmentalism, which was incompatible 
with Darwin’s ideas of natural selection. Herbert Spencer’s ideas on the cosmic progressive 
nature of evolution also proved popular in the late-19th century, and directly competed with 
Darwin’s non-directional and non-progressive evolutionary perspective (Lightman, 2010: 5-
13). Julian Huxley later termed this period—where evolution was accepted scientifically, but 
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the mechanism of natural selection was dismissed—“the eclipse of Darwinism” (Huxley, 
1942: 22). 
Mathematical-scientific developments between 1918 and 1950 brought the eclipse 
of Darwinism to a close, with a move towards consensus positions regarding evolutionary 
thought. The Modern Synthesis—as it was termed, again by Julian Huxley (1943)—emerged 
out of a number of population statistical approaches which fused Mendelian genetics and 
Darwinian natural selection (e.g. Fisher, 1918; Dobzhansky, 1937; Mayr, 1942; Simpson, 
1944). Today, that organisms evolve is an accepted scientific observation; however, debates 
still take place on the mechanisms of this change. For example, there are disputes between 
those who associate with neo-Darwinism and neo-Lamarckism, which may not be helped by 
the ambiguity of some terms used in the debates, or indeed the issues of group identity in 
associating with these labels (Elsdon-Baker, 2015b). 
Today, there are also scientists calling for an ‘Extended Synthesis’, which goes 
beyond the statistical correlations of the Modern Synthesis (Pigliucci and Müller, 2010: 12). 
This has been enabled due to the emergence of huge datasets in genetics, inheritance, and 
development, among other areas. Due to the previous lack of such data, the Modern 
Synthesis black-boxed mechanistic aspects of evolution, therefore relying on gene-centric, 
population-level statistical correlations. However, the availability of new data has allowed 
causal-mechanistic theory of phenotypic evolution. For Pigliucci and Müller (2010: 14) 
overcoming three main restrictions of the Modern Synthesis—gradualism, externalism, and 
gene centrism—are the hallmarks of what they term the Extended Synthesis (Figure 2.1). 
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Although naming current trends in evolutionary biology as the ‘Extended Synthesis’, is not 
without its critics (e.g. Tanghe et al., 2018). 
Figure 2.1 Representation of key concepts of Darwinism (centre field), the Modern Synthesis 
(intermediate field), and the Extended Synthesis (outer field). The scheme depicts the broad steps 
in the expansion of evolutionary theory (Pigliucci and Müller, 2010) 
As this short overview of evolutionary thought has shown, ‘evolution’ has not been a 
static concept from the 1859 publication of On the Origin onwards. We must be careful 
when assessing the Catholic Church’s response, or lack thereof, to evolution in the late 19th, 
early and mid-20th centuries, as the very concept and scientific consensus around ‘evolution’ 
was changing in these periods. Likewise, when investigating public attitudes today, we must 
be careful to assess how individuals are conceiving of evolution. As an example, Hildering et 
al. (2012: 993) found a great variety in the understandings and conceptions of evolution 
among Dutch Protestant creationists. Some outlined the mechanism of natural selection, 
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whilst others proposed a form of progressivism, where organisms evolve from “small to big”. 
All participants in their study rejected ‘evolution’, but they were rejecting different forms of 
evolution. It is important for this thesis, and other contemporary studies of attitudes, to 
understand what form or definition of evolution we are assessing attitudes toward. 
Given evolution’s long history, and its contentious and varied contemporary forms, 
terminological exactitude is required. Therefore, in this thesis the words ‘evolution’, 
‘evolutionary theory’ and ‘evolutionary science’, will be used to denote the broad class of 
scientific ideas which forward the notion that organisms change over time. The word 
‘Darwinism’ will be used in cases that specifically deal with Darwin’s conception of evolution 
by natural selection. Using ‘Darwinism’ to refer to all conceptions of evolution would 
misrepresent the ideas which individuals are basing their attitudes upon, as it specifically 
refers to one interpretation of the adaptive mechanism which drives evolution, and is 
therefore too specific to incorporate all individuals’ interpretations of evolution. In relation 
to this thesis, it is important to investigate what form of evolution the public conceives of, 
and what their attitudes towards that form of evolution are. 
2.2.2 Receptions of evolution 
To understand how evolution was received by senior figures within the Catholic 
Church and Catholic individuals, it is important to understand how it was received in wider 
society. Fleming and Goodall (2002: 262) argue that while there is a large body of literature 
on the reception of Darwinism in the Victorian era, the notion that Darwin’s ideas were 
“fundamentally threatening” and represented a “traumatic paradigm shift” was widely 
unchallenged within the historiography for many decades. It is only in recent decades that 
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this narrative has begun to be unpicked alongside other efforts at deconstructing an 
embedded conflict approach within historical analysis of science and religion. According to 
Fleming and Goodall (2002: 259) the culture-shock myth which started in the early stages of 
the Darwin debates, resurged in the last two decades of the twentieth century (e.g. in 
Dawkins, 1999; and Dennett, 1995). 
Bowler suggests that “the impact of Darwin’s theory on science, let alone on Western 
culture as a whole, was a good deal more complex than we used to imagine” (Bowler, 1996: 
11). However, Fleming and Goodall argue that Bowler’s (and others’) analysis still follows the 
“simple dramaturgy of the theorist with his ‘dangerous secret’ agonizing over the prospect 
of releasing it” (Fleming and Goodall, 2002: 262). To summarise Fleming and Goodall’s 
(2002) conclusions, to understand whether evolution did represent a culture-shock to all 
Victorian society, it is important to understand how it was received in different places and by 
different sections of society, and the reasons for the potential differences in these 
receptions. In response to several critics, Bowler provided an updated account of his work, 
stating: “My conclusion is, then, that there was a Darwinian revolution in the nineteenth 
century, even if its impact was not as dramatic as had once been imagined” (Bowler, 2005: 
30). Suffice to say there is an active debate within the history of science about the reception 
of Darwin’s ideas in Victorian Britain, and the episode continues to be explored as part of the 
process of unpacking the conflict thesis.3 
 
3 See Bowler (2005) for a discussion and overview of historiographic positions about the impact and 
reception of Darwin’s ideas in late-19th and early-20th century. 
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The first statistical study to investigate the reception of Darwin’s theory was Alvar 
Ellegård’s (1958a) Darwin and the general reader: the reception of Darwin's theory of 
evolution in the British periodical press, 1859-1872. Ellegård studied 115 British newspapers, 
magazines, and journals for the 12-year period after the publication of the Origin of Species. 
Hull (2005: 149) notes the trends found in the work: that evolution was accepted, but not 
other parts of Darwin’s work such as the role of ‘chance’ in variations, and there was also a 
general scepticism in regard to natural selection.4 
Ellegård (1958b: 379) saw his approach as the ‘social history of ideas’, situated 
between the history of ideas and sociology. For example, while many historians have 
commented on the infamous debate between Thomas Huxley and Samuel Wilberforce, 
Ellegård (1958b: 380) remarks that not a single daily London newspaper reported on it. It is 
this question of the distribution of ideas within a community which Ellegård intended to 
explore. Whereas when studying contemporary populations we can make use of 
questionnaires to gauge public opinion, Ellegård observes “we cannot submit questionnaires 
to our great-grandfathers” (Ellegård, 1958b: 381). To overcome this, Ellegård’s (1958b: 384-
385) approach, sought to ascertain the opinions of all the various contemporary periodicals, 
their public appeal and circulation, and draw from this a detailed picture of public opinion. 
While the media analysis section of the present thesis share’s some common aims with 
Ellegård’s, it does not share the same conception of possible conclusions. Instead of using a 
media analysis to demonstrate the penetration of ideas in various social strata, I aim to show 
 
4 Although, it should be noted that Ellegård’s analysis has been criticised for not taking into account the 
changing periodical formats of the time. See: Dawson et al. (2004: 1-15). Also see Lightman (2011) for a 
discussion of the public controversy about evolution in the Victorian periodical press. 
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the themes of coverage and common assumptions in English newspaper coverage of papal 
comments on evolution. A further elaboration on the aims of the media analysis can be 
found in Chapter 3.  
The reception of Darwinian evolution in the late-19th century among scientists and 
wider society is still an actively debated topic among historians. In recent decades, historians 
have begun to unpick the idea that Darwin presented an instantaneous, traumatic paradigm 
shift in Victorian society. However, some scholars argue that even if previous work 
overstated the immediacy of the impact of Darwin’s work on society, somewhat of a 
‘Pandora’s box’ was still opened, even if it took a number of generations to be realised 
(Bowler, 2005: 30-31). In the next section, I turn to the literature relating to the reception of 
evolution among Catholic laity groups. 
2.2.3 Historical communication and receptions of Darwinism in Catholic laity groups 
Building on the work of John Hedley Brooke (1991), Blancke (2013: 2) notes grand 
narratives of the history of evolution and Catholicism are not supported by historical 
evidence. Like other areas of the history of science and religion, the conflict thesis does not 
present an adequate picture of the historical relations between Catholicism and evolution. 
Blancke (2013: 2) suggests that local factors are likely to play a significant role in Catholic 
responses to evolution, as they have in the diversity of Protestant reactions (e.g. Livingstone, 
1999). While Livingstone’s analysis of Protestant receptions of Darwinism in Princeton, 
Belfast, and Edinburgh in the 1870s focussed on the impact of local factors at the communal 
level, Blancke (2013) aimed to investigate the influence of local factors at the national level 
for Catholic communities. In each approach, the dependence on contextual factors—such as 
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the manner in which evolution was communicated—influencing the relationship between 
science and religion renders grand historical narratives obsolete (Blancke, 2013: 2).  
It has been argued that the way evolution was communicated had an impact on its 
reception (see Lightman, 2012). For example, John Tyndall’s famous Belfast address, 
delivered to the British Association for the Advancement of Science in 1874, which 
highlighted purported anti-religious implications of Darwinism, contributed to religious 
opposition in Ireland in both the Calvinist and Catholic communities (Blancke, 2013: 9).5 
Livingstone (1999: 16) summarises his work on the comparative reception of evolution 
amongst the Protestant communities of Belfast, Edinburgh and Princeton, by stating: “the 
theory of evolution was absorbed in Edinburgh, repudiated in Belfast and tolerated in 
Princeton.” Of the places Livingstone studied, the greatest opposition to evolution was in 
Belfast, particularly due to the method through which it was communicated by Tyndall. The 
work of Lightman (2012: 160) also emphasizes the effect of the Belfast address on religious 
groups, explaining how Protestants and Catholics joined together branding Tyndall a 
materialist and an atheist. 
Fleming and Goodall (2002: 265) contend that if religious individuals in Belfast felt 
threatened by scientific materialism, this was more likely due to Tyndall’s hegemonic 
proclamations rather than with anything inherently threatening in the ideas he had adopted 
from Darwin. However, Lightman (2012: 160) explores in detail Tyndall’s remarks, noting 
 
5 Though the focus here is on Tyndall, for a detailed discussion of the various popularisers of evolution—
Darwin himself, The Darwinians, Spencerians and neo-Lamarckians, Spiritualists and religious 
evolutionists, and Christian evolutionists—see: Lightman (2010). 
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that he forwarded a “higher materialism” and distanced himself from a more “vulgar 
materialism”.6 Nevertheless, Tyndall’s Belfast Address was met with a religious backlash in 
Ireland, and therefore so too was Darwin’s evolution. 
Compared to the literature investigating Catholic elites’ receptions of evolution 
(discussed below), there are few historical studies which investigate the reception of 
evolution among Catholic laity. Notable here are O’Leary’s studies of Irish Catholics between 
1889 and 1950, and De Bont’s work examining Belgian Catholics in the mid-19th century. 
O'Leary (2009: 15-16) argues how the strong ties between Darwinism and anti-Catholicism in 
Tyndall’s address, led to negative responses towards evolution among Irish Catholics. These 
attitudes persisted even after Pope Pius XII released Humani generis in 1950, which first 
publicly highlighted the potential compatibility between evolution and the Catholic faith 
(O’Leary, 2009: 15-16).  
According to O’leary’s analysis (2009: 22), in Ireland Darwinism was associated with 
irreligious and unorthodox ideologies, such as materialism, communism, secularism and 
laissez-faire capitalism, which hindered its acceptance. O’Leary’s study of the acceptance of 
evolution in Ireland between 1889 and 1950 highlights the importance of analysing debates 
about the public acceptance of evolution in context, rather than just exploring the 
competing truth claims of religion and science. In contrast to the reception of evolution in 
Ireland, Raf De Bont (2007; 2008) notes how a kind of spiritual evolution had already been 
 
6 For an overview of the development of Tyndall’s religious beliefs, and how they have been presented, 
see: Cantor (2015). For an overview of Tyndall’s ‘higher materialism’ see Lightman (2012). 
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introduced in Belgium by Jean d’Omalius Halloy by the mid-19th century. According to De 
Bont, this meant that there was no fierce rejection of evolution in Belgium, with many 
Belgian Catholics remaining largely silent on the issue (De Bont, 2007: 114; 2008: 43).7 
Recent historical research highlights that communicators in the past had an influence 
on the reception of evolution in various locations. This historical evidence reinforces my 
assertion in Chapter 1, that we must not only study public attitudes, but also public 
discourse on the topic. Might contemporary public attitudes towards evolution also be 
influenced by the communicators of today? We see that Tyndall’s communication of 
evolution, and links to materialism and anti-Catholicism, instigated anti-evolution sentiment 
in certain religious groups at the end of the 19th century. Has the rise of ‘New Atheist’ 
literature today, which highlights anti-religious and materialistic forms of evolution, also 
swayed public attitudes on evolution among religious groups? Contemporary sociologists 
observe that the relationship between religion and science is affected by historical, 
locational, and social-institutional context (Evans and Evans, 2008). Therefore, when 
investigating public attitudes towards evolution, attention must be given to social and 
cultural factors, which may be influential. Such insight can be ascertained through empirical 
research, investigating what people believe about evolution, and why they believe it. We 
can, unlike historians (as Ellegård lamented), submit questions to our subjects of study. 
Without such empirical studies, we cannot be sure, for example, that the presentation of 
evolution with an explicit anti-religious framing, such as the popular writings of Richard 
 
7 For detailed discussions of evolution’s acceptance in other religious groups and locations in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries, see: Cantor and Swetlitz (2006); Moore (1979); Livingstone (1987); Glick (1988); 
Numbers and Stenhouse (1999). 
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Dawkins (e.g. Dawkins, 2006), directly leads to religious groups developing an aversion 
toward evolutionary theory more broadly. 
 
2.3 Receptions of evolution in the Catholic Church (1859-1950) 
As this thesis aims to investigate contemporary Catholic individuals’ attitudes 
towards evolution, alongside public discourse on Catholicism and evolution through 
analysing media representations of papal statements, it is important to review the historical 
context of the Catholic Church’s reactions to evolution. In this way, contemporary Catholic 
attitudes toward evolution, and media coverage of papal statements on evolution, can be 
situated in their historical context. As discussed earlier, it wasn’t until 1950 that the Catholic 
Church publicly commented on evolution. Therefore, the question remains: what attitudes 
existed within the Church before Pius XII’s inaugural comment? 
Before continuing to histories of the Church, some considerations should be noted 
when investigating Catholicism and evolution. Firstly, even though the Catholic Church is an 
institution with a clear hierarchical power structure, it is made up of individuals. These 
individuals have their own attitudes and opinions, which aren’t necessarily representative of 
the official position of the institution. Secondly, one could view the laity of the Catholic 
Church as the lowest rungs of the power ladder, whose opinions and attitudes trickle down 
from the papal heights above. However, adopting this approach would homogenise a large 
and varied population of individuals. The laity have their own attitudes and opinions, 
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influenced by various identities, and contingent upon local and national factors. Taking the 
transubstantiation as an example, the Church teaches that during the Eucharist the 
sacramental bread and wine become the body and blood of Christ, rather than being mere 
symbols of the body and blood of Christ (Catholic Church, 2012). Recent data from the US, 
however, shows that only 31% of US Catholics believe “the bread and wine actually become 
the body and blood of Jesus”, with 69% saying they are “symbols of the body and blood of 
Christ” (Smith, 2019). Therefore, investigating the Vatican’s attitudes cannot act as a proxy 
for individual Catholics’ thoughts, neither historically nor today. 
In this section I first detail the lasting influence of the so-called ‘Galileo Affair’ on 
discussions of Catholicism and evolution, and science and religion more broadly. Then I 
sketch the theological environment around the time Darwin’s theory of evolution was first 
proposed. Here, debates on Modernism and Americanism influenced the way evolution was 
received. Next, I discuss the literature related to the Vatican’s treatment of pro-evolutionary 
writings, the handling of which is the best evidence we have to deduce Vatican attitudes 
towards evolution after the publication of On the Origin in 1859 up to Humani generis in 
1950. Finally, I overview the content of Humani generis itself, the first instance of Vatican 
public comment on evolution. 
2.3.1 Galileo’s legacy 
The life of Galileo Galilei has fuelled much discussion over the relationship between 
religion and science. Galileo defended Copernicus’ idea of heliocentrism over the then 
predominant geocentric view, after which he was forced to retract his views and placed 
under house arrest (Finocchiaro, 2009). Finocchiaro observes that because the Galileo affair: 
 94 
“involved a conflict between one of the founders of modern science and one of the world’s 
great religions, it has traditionally been seen as an example of the conflict between science 
and religion, or at least science and Christianity, or science and Roman Catholicism” 
(Finocchiaro, 2001: 161). 
As contemporary scholars have suggested, the Galileo Affair may well have had more 
to do with the correct interpretation of the Bible, rather than solely the truth of scientific 
claims (e.g. McGrath, 1999: 12). Nevertheless, the legacy of Galileo’s trial and treatment has 
been described as the “greatest scandal in Christendom” (Paul, 1979: 158); and scholars 
have argued that: “the Galileo affair is but a wrinkle in the centuries-long ecclesiastical 
patronage of astronomy” (Heilbron, 1999; Shank, 2000: 574). However, as Finocchiaro 
(2001: 131) argues in his historiography of the Galileo affair, historians (e.g. Draper, White, 
Drake, Feyerabend, Morpurgo-Tagliabue, and Whewel) tend to bring their own assumptions 
about the relationship between religion and science to their studies and interpretations of 
the trial. Though the history of the Church and astronomy is not central to this thesis, the 
history of this affair informs this work by helping us to understand whether the Church’s 
treatment of Galileo affected their subsequent reactions toward evolution. 
Artigas et al. (2006: 281) claim that the Galileo Affair had a lasting legacy on the 
Vatican’s future responses to new scientific theories. Galileo’s Dialogo (1633) was placed on 
the Index Librorum Prohibitorum, the Vatican’s list of prohibited books, and Galileo was 
placed under house arrest (Artigas et al., 2006: 282). In the 19th century, the Galileo Affair 
was often referred to in anti-Catholic polemics (e.g. Draper, 1874: 20-24). As discussed 
below, the Church’s reservation to publicly respond to Darwin’s theory in the 19th century 
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can be seen as influenced by the prior treatment of Galileo, for example when proposing to 
condemn Raffaello Caverni’s pro-evolution book, New Studies of Philosophy: Lectures to a 
Young Student (1887), the Congregation of the Index stated the book should be condemned, 
as this would carry an indirect condemnation of Darwinism. However, the Congregation also 
noted the probable clamour in opposition to this, and how the case of Galileo would be held 
up as an example (Artigas et al., 2006: 47).  
O’Leary (2006: 47) also interprets the effect of Galileo’s legacy in this way, arguing 
the Vatican opted to abstain from creating an official statement on evolution, considering 
the legacy of the Galileo affair. Furthermore, in the 19th century, due to the legacy of Galileo, 
it has been claimed that the Church lost credibility within the scientific community. Paul 
(1979: 2-3) argues that in France, for example, the Church felt an acute need to recover the 
intellectual community, with scientists a particular focus. Therefore, the lack of a Vatican 
response to evolution during the 19th century must be viewed in light of the legacy of the 
perceived harsh treatment of Galileo in the 17th century, and the Church’s attempts to 
distance itself from its own past. 
2.3.2 Modernism and Americanism 
To help us understand the Church’s reaction, or lack thereof, toward evolution, 
especially in the late-19th century, we must acknowledge the social and intellectual context 
of the time. In the mid- to late-19th century, there was a growing movement dubbed 
‘Americanism’, born out of the attempts by liberal Catholics to help the growing immigrant 
population integrate into American life (Appleby, 1999: 178). Proponents of Americanism 
argued for the separation of church and state, and focussed on individual choice when 
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dealing with religious questions (O’Leary, 2006: 102). With this focus on individualism, 
Americanism was perceived by the Church as a danger to Catholic doctrine (O’Leary, 2006: 
102; Artigas et al., 2006: 159). Whilst originating in the United States, Americanism started 
to spread to Europe in the 1880s (Brundell, 2001: 93). Traditionalists in Rome and the USA 
were worried about its development, especially when the movement became popular in 
France, a country which was highly secular following the 1789 revolution (Blancke, 2013: 8). 
In the mid- to late-19th century, the Catholic Church also saw the beginning of what is 
now referred to as the ‘Modernist crisis’ (Brundell, 2001: 82). Although Catholic Modernism 
cannot be represented by a single intellectual movement or set of opinions, it has been 
described as a “series of loosely coordinated initiatives that sought to bring Catholicism into 
a more positive relationship with modernity on intellectual, social, and political fronts” 
(Talar, 2010: 426). It has also been described as a group of intellectuals who “adopted a 
critical and skeptical attitude toward the traditional doctrines of their church” (O’Leary, 
2006: 114), and in reference to those who used “methods of historical research and the 
natural sciences to bear on the interpretation of the Bible and Catholic dogma” (Blancke, 
2013: 7). These definitions reflect the respective interests of their authors. For example, 
Talar, a historical theologian, is concerned here with broader intellectual and social 
movements of the church; while Blancke’s definition aligns with his background in the 
history of science.  
Despite the heterogeneity of Modernism, we can summarise some commonalities. In 
Modernist thought, there was a general focus on post-Kantian philosophy and historical 
criticism. Kant’s focus on the subjectivity of human knowledge questioned objective 
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knowledge of all forms, and newly emerging historical methods questioned the authority of 
historical texts, including religious books (Talar, 2010: 427-430). For example, authors such 
as Alfred Loisy and George Tyrell, who are most often cited as Modernists, stated that 
biblical texts contained traces of the contexts from which they originated, and believed 
Christian dogmas were subject to ‘evolution’ over time (De Bont, 2005: 462). Talar (2010: 
429) suggests that because of these new methods of knowing, Modernism was perceived 
not as an attack any particular dogma, but as an attack on the very nature of dogma itself.  
The Modernist approach directly contradicted Pope Leo XIII’s (1878-1903) attempts 
to realign Catholic thought with the teachings of Thomas Aquinas. In part this was an 
attempt to unite religion and modern science (Blancke 2013: 7). However, in ‘neo-Thomism’, 
as the Pope’s attempts became known, scientific findings were placed within the rigid 
structure of Catholic dogma, whilst in the Modernist approach it was the dogma itself which 
‘evolved’ (Paul, 1988: 421). 
Although early histories of the movement represent the Modernists as a uniform, 
organized group, more recent works question whether the large variety of opinions 
encompassed within Modernism warrant a single category.8 Some scholars denounce the 
term ‘Modernism’ altogether because it implies a non-existent cohesion (Thompson, 2008: 
34). Therefore, while the term is useful for us to categorise a loose collective of individuals 
 
8 See Talar’s (2010) The ‘Synthesis of All Heresies’: Roman Catholic Modernism for a historiography of 
modernism, detailing the ‘three waves’ of studies into the subject. 
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who shared some common ideas about how the Church should develop, we should not 
conclude there was a collective, concerted Modernist movement. 
Despite the difficulties in categorizing the Modernists, what is clear is that in the mid- 
to late-19th century the Church was dealing with a set of intellectual developments, which it 
perceived to be fundamentally dangerous. Klumpenhouwer (2011: 6) argues that in this 
period evolution came to be incorporated under the aegis of Modernism. Although, it is 
important to note that the Church made no explicit condemnation of evolution in its anti-
Modernist encyclical Lamentabili Sane (Syllabus of Errors) (1907). Pius X (1903-1914) did, 
however, condemn a number of supposedly Modernist thoughts which alluded to evolution, 
including the notion that: “Scientific progress demands that the concepts of Christian 
doctrine concerning God, creation, revelation, the Person of the Incarnate Word, and 
Redemption be readjusted” (Pius X, 1907). This statement relates to what the Catholic 
Church perceived as the proper interpretation of the bible.  
The Syllabus of Errors was followed by a further damning condemnation of 
Modernism by Pope Pius X in his 1907 encyclical Pascendi Dominici Gregis (Feeding the 
Lord’s Flock). It labelled modernism the “synthesis of all heresies” and detailed a 
comprehensive strategy for dealing with the Modernist threat, including the restriction and 
retraction of Modernist publications (Pius X, 1907: 51-52). Blancke (2013: 7) suggests that 
Pascendi includes passages intended to target evolution, but as they are indirect the 
messages did not have the desired effect. Indeed, Catholic intellectuals at Louvain 
University, Belgium, continued their work on the compatibility of evolution and Catholic 
dogma after Pascendi’s publication (De Bont, 2008).  
 99 
While being aware of the historical context of the Modernists allows us to 
understand potential scepticism toward evolution among Catholic elites, it does not 
necessarily help us with respect to lay Catholic publics. It remains to be seen if the history of 
Modernism, and its association with progressive doctrine and evolution, still influences 
contemporary Catholic attitudes toward evolution. In short: today, are pro-evolution 
Catholics modernists, while those with anti-evolution stances traditionalists? Would 
individuals identify with these terms, or if not how do they conceive of their Catholic 
identities? Alternatively, are there other influences on Catholic attitudes toward evolution 
today, beyond these more formal theological traditions? In this thesis, through interviews 
with Catholic individuals in England, I attempt to explore the relationship between Catholics 
attitudes to evolution and their theological beliefs. 
2.3.3 Council of Cologne 
Many histories discussing Catholicism and evolution mention the 1862 decree of the 
Council of Cologne, which declared that the evolution of humans was contrary to scripture 
(e.g. O’Leary, 2006: 47; Artigas et al., 2006: 21-23). The decree was scrutinised and 
recognised by the Vatican, but as the decree was issued by the Council of Cologne, its 
authority was limited to that specific jurisdiction. Artigas et al. (2006: 23) argue that while 
this decree may initially seem like an outright rejection of evolution, it did actually present 
opportunities for Catholics seeking harmony between evolutionary theory and Catholic 
doctrine. The Council specifically denied that the body of Adam evolved by “spontaneous 
change”.  Therefore, this could be interpreted, not as a rejection of evolution outright, but as 
a rejection of evolution without divine intervention.  
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Reading across these histories, we can interpret the decree more broadly still, the 
Council’s message could be read as a rejection of evolution only when specifically relating to 
the origin of humans, and not the evolution of other animal and plants species, known as 
human exclusionism (See Chapter 1). Blancke (2013: 6) summarises from a review of 
secondary literature, that the council’s conclusions on evolution, especially in relation to 
biblical interpretations of the book of Genesis, foreshadowed the position of later Vatican 
policy.  
Thus, while a Catholic authority did speak out against evolution in 1862, this should 
not be taken as a condemnation of evolution by the Vatican for the universal Church. Rather, 
the decree must be discussed in its proper jurisdictional context.9 The Council of Cologne 
lacked the hierarchical power to issue such a universal statement, so it should not be 
interpreted as holding such weight. 
2.3.4 Evolution and the Vatican  
As there were no official Vatican statements on evolution until 1950, the most 
detailed picture we can build of senior Vatican figures’ thoughts and actions regarding 
evolution is by investigating how the hierarchy treated pro-evolution Catholic writing. This is 
an important approach, as when the church disagrees with a movement, or perceives an 
idea as a threat to its authority and orthodoxy—as in the case of Modernism—the Church 
can use its considerable power and resources to control that threat.10   
 
9 This is not always done, however, e.g in the thesis of Donnelly (2006: 73). 
10 The use of denunciation as a form of ecclesiastical control in the Catholic Church, and its communities, was 
prevalent in the period (see Lease, 1996). 
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Using this approach in Negotiating Darwin, Artigas et al. (2006) aim to identify the 
Church’s ideological and operational stance on Darwinian ideas between 1877 and 1902 
(Artigas et al., 2006: 5).  In doing so, they deal with six cases of pro-evolution writing and the 
treatment of the authors—Raffaello Caverni (1837–1900), Dalmace Leroy (1828–1905), John 
Zahm (1851–1921), Geremia Bonomelli (1831–1914), John Hedley (1837–1915), and St. 
George Mivart (1827–1900)—by the Congregation of the Holy Office and the Congregation 
of the Index of Prohibited Books. The differences between these cases illustrates the range 
of responses from the Vatican when dealing with pro-evolution writing in the period (Artigas 
et al., 2006: 15).  
Throughout most of these cases we see the contested influence of the Roman Jesuit 
journal La Civiltà Cattolica. Brundell (2001) argues that the publication’s traditionalist 
influence went right to the very top in Rome. First published in 1850, La Civiltà Cattolica was 
encouraged by Pope Pius IX (1846–78) in his call for intellectuals to assist him in his fight 
against modernity (Brundell, 2001: 82). From 1860, La Civiltà Cattolica published regular 
anti-evolution articles, critiques of pro-evolution writing, and the public retractions of 
authors of censured pro-evolution works (Blancke, 2013: 5). Before each issue, a copy was 
sent to the Vatican’s Secretary of State for approval, to ensure they were in accord with the 
teachings of the Church on faith and morality (Artigas, et al., 2006: 27).  
Artigas et al. (2006: 121) however reject Brundell’s claims about the extent of the 
influence of La Civiltà Cattolica in Rome, identifying errors in Brundell’s analysis. 
Furthermore, Artigas et al. (2006: 5) suggest that the Vatican’s responses cannot be 
determined by the influence of any one particular group. Brundell (2008) countered that his 
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depictions of the role of La Civiltà Cattolica had been more nuanced than had been 
presented by Artigas et al. (2006). Nonetheless, the influence of a single journal on public 
perceptions of the Catholic Church’s position on evolution informs this thesis. If one highly 
influential journal could affect large swathes of public opinion about the attitudes of the 
Church in the past, is this still applicable today? If our newspapers describe the Catholic 
Church as anti-evolution, rightly or wrongly, how might this influence the perceptions of the 
public? As I have argued, attention must be paid to public discourse as well as public 
attitudes in the study of science and religion. 
What conclusions can be drawn from the Vatican’s handling of pro-evolution writers 
at the end of the 19th century? Firstly, Artigas et al. (2006: 279-281) argue that the length of 
deliberations provides evidence that there was no official anti-evolution policy at the time. If 
there was, the cases would have been dismissed outright. That some consultors found no 
issues with pro-evolution books, and others were ardent critics, shows that various attitudes 
toward evolution existed within the walls of the Vatican. Secondly, the Church made no pro-
active decisions in seeking out pro-evolution writing to assess; they were limited to dealing 
with work that had already been denounced by others (Artigas et al., 2006: 273). The actions 
of the Church, however, do point toward a general scepticism toward evolution in the 
period, especially in its purely materialistic form.  
We can conceive of the Vatican’s response to pro-evolution books as a ‘pragmatic 
policy’ of pressured retractions (Artigas et al., 2006: 279-281). There was a perception that 
materialistic forms of evolution posed a threat to certain doctrines, such as the soul and 
original sin, concepts which were to be returned to by Pope Pius XII in 1950. Furthermore, 
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evolution posed a threat to the literal interpretation of the Bible, which while not a 
necessarily central feature of Catholic theology, was being discussed at the time in light of 
new Modernist historical methods. For example, the implications of ‘liberal’ interpretations 
of Genesis posed a threat to the account of God’s special intervention in the creation of the 
body of Adam.   
Artigas et al. (2006: 279-281) conclude that perhaps the Church preferred the more 
pragmatic means of retraction rather than outright condemnation, as this was sufficient to 
slow the spread of evolutionary ideas, without compromising the Church. Especially if a 
critical article in La Civiltà Cattolica was viewed as authoritative theology, and was influential 
in Catholic intellectual circles. Overall, Artigas et al. (2006: 5) state their investigation cannot 
be reduced to any single simple thesis, this being in keeping with the complexities other 
scholars have encountered when investigating the historic relationship between science and 
religion. 
In Catholicism and Science, Catholic theologians Hess and Allen (2008) attempt to 
chart the interactions of the Catholic Church with science over 2000 years. On evolution, 
they state that we should not expect to find a monolithic Catholic reaction, either among the 
papacy, bishops, or the laity (Hess and Allen, 2008: 73). The present thesis aims to follow in 
this approach, appreciating the need to not oversimplify the Vatican’s nor Catholic 
individuals’ positions by aggregating them into a single view. Still, Hess and Allen (2008: 73) 
reflect that individuals within the Vatican did show scepticism over the concept of evolution. 
Like Artigas et al. (2006), they highlight the political struggles of the Church at the time, 
specifically the perceived threat of Modernism, and the resultant moves by the Church to 
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reassert its authority. Furthermore, they observe that evolution as a ‘Catholic problem’ had 
less to do with biblical literalism, than it did with theological adherence to rigid neo-
Thomism (Hess and Allen, 2008: 73-88).  
The conclusions of Artigas et al. (2006), that initial Catholic opposition gave way to 
steady acceptance, are also reached by O’Leary (2006) in Roman Catholicism and Modern 
Science: A History. As Freiburger and Numbers (2009: 637) note, while O’Leary’s works 
interpretive approach is to its benefit, in comparison to Hess and Allen’s (2008) Catholicism 
and Science more descriptive account, it is a case of unfortunate timing that O’Leary’s work 
could not benefit from Artigas et al.’s (2006) detailed archival work which was published in 
the same year.  
Other histories use a different approach, yet still find similar results of initial 
opposition. One such work by Fr. Michael Chaberek, a Polish Dominican and a proponent of 
ID, broadly corroborates the historical accounts of scholars such as Artigas et al. (2006) and 
O’Leary (2006), but brings a different interpretation to events. Chaberek (2015) has said he 
did not want to diminish the initial scepticism by the Church, as he perceives others have 
done, but instead present the ‘true’ history, including initial resistance to evolution and 
current ‘confusion’ in the Church. So, while Chaberek (2015) agrees with Artigas et al. 
(2006), O’Leary (2006), Hess and Allen (2008) and Blancke (2013) on the slow acceptance of 
evolution by the Church, he interprets this process as a distancing from ‘true’ Catholic 
teaching. In contrast to Chaberek (2015), the present thesis benefits from not taking any 
particular interpretive theological stance when investigating Catholicism and evolution. It 
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will not compare what Catholics think about evolution or theology, with some notion of 
what they should think about evolution or theology.  
While there has been increasing amounts of scholarly work conducted on the 
Vatican’s response to evolution in the mid- to late-19th century, there has been less scholarly 
work conducted on the early- to mid-20th century period. This is in part due to the Vatican 
archives for this period still remaining largely embargoed. Raf De Bont (2005: 459) observes 
that between 1902 and 1950 little is known about Vatican policy towards evolution. The one 
document which comes closest to peripherally addressing evolution was issued by the 
Pontifical Biblical Commission in 1909. The Commission had been established in 1902 to 
ensure the proper interpretation of Biblical scripture, defending Church orthodoxy under the 
“gaze of the Supreme Pontiff” (Leo XIII, 1902: 2). Their report, De charactere historico trium 
priorum capitum Geneseos, (Concerning the historical nature of the first three chapters of 
Genesis), published on June 30, 1909, stated that: “the unity of the human race, the creation 
of man by God, and the conception of the first woman from that man, had to be interpreted 
as being the historical truth” (as quoted in De Bont, 2005: 459). Brundell (2001: 94) observes 
that while some saw the Commission’s report as a sign of growing traditionalism in Rome, 
others have argued that the Commission did not suggest a purely literal interpretation of 
Genesis, and displayed no repugnance toward evolution. As the published materials of Rome 
at the time were open to multiple interpretations, they alone are not sufficient for 
ascertaining Rome’s policy toward evolution in the early 20th century (De Bont, 2005: 459). 
Instead De Bont (2005) seeks to understand the Church’s attitude toward evolution 
between 1902 and 1950 by investigating how the Vatican responded to Henry de Dorlodot’s 
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work promoting theistic evolution. In 1918, Dorlodot—a Belgian theologian, professor of 
geology, and priest—published Darwinism and Catholic Thought, a book forwarding a 
version of theistic evolution and a reconciliation of evolutionary theory with Catholic 
theology (De Bont, 2005: 457). According to De Bont some Catholics saw this as an indication 
that they were free to explore evolutionary ideas. For example, The Universe, a popular 
British Catholic newspaper, saw Dorlodot’s book as “the first glow of that new orientation to 
which we have been looking forward to so earnestly” (as quoted in De Bont, 2005: 469). 
After multiple interactions with the Vatican, who pressured Dorlodot to retract his work as 
they had with previous authors, the whole affair ended in a status quo. Dorlodot never 
withdrew his book, but never wrote a second volume or lectured on evolution again. De 
Bont (2005: 475) suggests the Vatican perhaps did not take the Dorlodot affair any further, 
as the only step left after Dorlodot’s refusal to give in to the policy of intimidation and 
retract his work, was to publicly reject evolution. Something the Church had avoided for 
decades. The influence of modernist-traditionalist tensions is evident here. However, De 
Bont argues that it was in this period that the generation of anti-Modernists was nearing an 
end, and “the period of the anti-modernist witch hunt seemed to be over” (De Bont, 2005: 
475). Therefore, the Dorlodot affair can be seen as a pivotal moment in Church history, 
exemplifying how the authority’s attitudes changed in regard to evolution in the early-20th 
century, although many Catholic authors still maintained a resistance to evolutionary ideas 
(De Bont, 2005: 457; O’Leary, 2006: 126-128). Similarly, Bowler (2009; 324) suggests that 
this softening of the Church’s position occurred at the time authors such as Dorlodot and 
Ernest Messenger—echoing the earlier work of Mivart—were noting that the Church Fathers 
did not interpret Genesis literally on this issue. 
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In 1943 Pope Pius XII released the encyclical Divino Afflante Spiritu (Inspired By the 
Divine Spirit), which permitted Catholic scholars to use Modernist literary and historical-
critical approaches to biblical texts (Haught, 2013: 488). These were the same methods 
which had been shunned and prohibited in the anti-Modernist decades of the late-19th and 
early-20th century. Reflecting the linkage between the Vatican’s softening attitudes towards 
Modernism and growing acceptance of evolution towards the mid-20th century, Pius also 
addressed evolution 7 years later. In his 1950 encyclical, Humani generis (Of Mankind), Pius 
became the first pope to publicly address evolution: 
[...] the Teaching Authority of the Church does not forbid that, in conformity with the present 
state of human sciences and sacred theology, research and discussions, on the part of men 
experienced in both fields, take place with regard to the doctrine of evolution, in as far as it 
inquires into the origin of the human body as coming from pre-existent and living matter... Some 
however, rashly transgress this liberty of discussion, when they act as if the origin of the human 
body from pre-existing and living matter were already completely certain and proved by the 
facts. (Pius XII, 1950) 
While in 1950 Pius professed the Church’s openness to evolution, he deemed it to be 
an unproven hypothesis and urged the need to remember the special creation of human 
intelligence and the soul. Furthermore, he stated all humanity must be descended from a 
literal Adam (monogenism), rather than separate groups of individuals (polygenism). This 
was because, in Pius’s view, it was in no way apparent how polygenism could be compatible 
with the doctrine of original sin, which he thought to have been committed by an individual 
Adam, and passed down through the generations. Brundell (2001: 94-95) explains how in 
1966, Pope Paul VI asked theologians to find a more modern presentation of original sin, 
which would better satisfy the demands of faith and reason for contemporary Catholics, 
leaving open the possibility of finding an interpretation of the doctrine of original sin which 
potentially incorporated polygenism. 
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In this section I have attempted to give historical context to more recent statements 
by popes on evolution, which I will explore in the following section. I have shown that in 
1862, the Council of Cologne declared evolution as contrary to scripture, however this 
statement cannot be seen as a proclamation for the universal Church, as the Council lacked 
the authority to make such a statement. As the Vatican was silent on evolution until 1950, 
historians have sought to investigate the workings of offices which dealt with the writings of 
pro-evolution Catholic authors. As Artigas et al. (2006) argue in their detailed work covering 
the end of the nineteenth century, it cannot be ascertained that the Vatican had a strict 
policy of condemnation against evolutionary writers, instead there was perhaps a ‘pragmatic 
policy’ of pressured retractions to stem the flow of evolutionary ideas. These congregations 
were weary of beginning a new Galileo Affair, which was still being used in anti-Catholic 
polemics at the time. 
Similarly, in the early 20th century, the same sceptical attitudes can be attributed to 
individuals within the Church (De Bont, 2005). What is clear is that there were attempts to 
pressure Catholic authors who proposed a theistic evolutionary account of origins to retract 
their work, especially when these works considered the human body. It is reasonable to 
conclude from the historical evidence that the senior hierarchy of the Catholic Church were 
sceptical of evolution in the years after Darwin published On the Origin of Species, although 
it was never explicitly condemned. This scepticism was not necessarily due to literal 
interpretations of Genesis, more so the broader theological paradigms which were actively 
fighting in the Church. Over time, this scepticism diminished, and the Church became more 
open to evolutionary ideas. This culminated in the first papal public comment on evolution 
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in 1950, where Pius XII pronounced in Humani generis that the Church did not restrict 
research and discussions about the evolution of the human body, but these should not 
extend to the evolution of the soul. Following Pius XII’s pronouncement on evolution in 
1950, it was to be another 46 years before another official papal statement received 
considerable attention. In the next section I reflect on the content and reception of papal 
statements from 1996 to the present day. 
 
2.4 Recent papal statements on evolution (1996-Present) 
In this section I first overview John Paul II’s 1996 comments, which characterised 
evolution as “more than a hypothesis” (John Paul II, 1996). As I will show, his comments 
have received considerable media and scholarly attention. Then, I discuss Benedict’s 
multiple comments on evolution, both before and during his papacy. Finally, I explore 
Francis’s 2014 address to the Pontifical Academy of Science, where he argued: “The 
evolution of nature does not contrast with the notion of creation” (Francis, 2014). 
2.4.1 John Paul II: “More than a hypothesis” 
On 22nd October, 1996, nearly 50 years after Pius’s Humani generis in 1950, Pope 
John Paul II publicly addressed the topic of evolution describing it as “more than a 
hypothesis.” In his address, he recalled the words of Humani generis, which marked the first 
occasion of papal public comment. In Humani generis, Pius had stated the Church did not 
forbid research or discussion of the evolution of the human body, but at the time deemed it 
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a “hypothesis” with “some sort of scientific foundation.” John Paul II’s speech, however, 
published in French on 22nd October, 1996, recognised evolution as “more than a 
hypothesis,” noting that evidence in many fields had converged on the scientific theory 
(John Paul II, 1996).  
As Brundell (2001: 95) argues: “views that were officially censured at the end of the 
nineteenth century were officially adopted at the end of the twentieth by the highest 
teaching authority in the Catholic Church.” Considering subsequent historical work based on 
the Vatican’s records (e.g. Artigas et al., 2006; O’Leary, 2006; Chaberek, 2015), we can see 
this as an accurate account. Positions which forwarded the compatibility between evolution 
and Catholic theology were met with a scepticism by the Church in the late 19th century, 
who used a ‘pragmatic policy’ when dealing with such writings (Artigas et al., 2006); 
however, many of these same positions were adopted by John Paul II in the late 20th 
century. 
How were John Paul’s statements received by scholars and commentators? In a 
widely cited response to the pope’s statement, evolutionary biologist Stephen J. Gould 
(1997: 2-3) noted his initial puzzlement, both at the Pope’s statement about evolution and 
the media response to it.11 In Gould’s view, the Church had never opposed evolution, so why 
 
11 Gould (1997) also proposed his famous Non-Overlapping Magesteria (NOMA) hypothesis in his 
response to John Paul’s comments on evolution. While this thesis is not directly concerned with 
prescriptively stating what the ‘proper’ philosophical or theological relationship between religion and 
science may be, it is worth briefly reflecting on Gould’s NOMA hypothesis. In NOMA, Gould presents 
religion and science as distinct entities, which do “interdigitate” at their boundaries. Gould (1997: 8) 
notes, however, this is no mere diplomatic stance, instead it is a principled position on moral and 
intellectual grounds. Gould (1997: 8) continues: “If religion can no longer dictate the nature of factual 
conclusions properly under the magisterium of science, then scientists cannot claim higher insight into 
moral truth from any superior knowledge of the world's empirical constitution.” However, as discussed in 
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was such a statement needed? On rereading Pius XII’s view in Humani generis, however, 
Gould declares he realised why the Pope’s statements seemed new, and worthy of the 
headlines. In Gould’s words:  
Official Catholic opinion on evolution has moved from ‘say it ain't so, but we can deal with it if we 
have to’ (Pius's grudging view of 1950) to John Paul's entirely welcoming ‘it has been proven true; 
we always celebrate nature's factuality, and we look forward to interesting discussions of 
theological implications.’ (Gould, 1997: 7) 
Gould (1997: 2) also reflected on his views of ‘scientific creationism’ (specifically 
young earth creationism) stating he thinks it to be a distinctly American, Protestant problem, 
which arises through some denominations’ strict literalist reading of the Bible; something, 
he adds, which makes little sense in the Catholic tradition of reading metaphor and allegory 
in their sacred texts. Here the work of Numbers (2006) shows, in fact, creationism is not 
solely an American phenomenon.12 I will explore the relation of biblical interpretations to 
attitudes on evolution for Catholics in England in Chapter 6. 
Like Gould, Eugenie Scott13 also welcomed Pope John Paul II’s statements on 
evolution, and criticised the media backlash (Scott, 1997: 405). Scott, being concerned with 
the perceived rise of creationism, saw the Pope’s endorsement of evolution as a positive 
 
Chapters 1 and 3, as this thesis aims to investigate the lived-experience of Catholic individuals, ‘proper’, 
preformed, philosophical relationships between religion and science must be bracketed. Instead, my 
approach is to allow the views of individuals to emerge through the data collection. 
 
12 For an overview of creationism in Europe, see: Blancke et al.’s (2013) Creationism in Europe: Facts, Gaps, and 
Prospects. 
 
13 Between 1986 to 2014 Scott served as the Executive Director of the National Center for Science 
Education, a US not-for-profit which aims to promote and defend science education, combatting issues 
such as creationism and climate change denial. Scott has played an active role in opposing attempts to 
teach creationism and ID in science classrooms of the USA, as well as conducting research into public 
attitudes towards evolution. 
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step. Indeed, the perception of a rise in creationism may well have had an influence on John 
Paul II in making these statements; as an attempt to distance the Church from a largely non-
Catholic phenomenon. As always, it is important to understand the context within which 
events took place. As an educator, for Scott (1997) the relationship between science and 
religion is more than philosophical, it is a matter of the public understanding of evolution 
which she sees as an important part of contemporary education. 
John Paul’s “more than a hypothesis” phrase, however, became the centre of a small 
controversy of its own. On 30th October, the Vatican’s L'Osservatore Romano published the 
first English translation of the French speech, which read (emphasis added here): "Today, 
more than a half-century after the appearance of that encyclical, some new findings lead us 
toward the recognition of more than one hypothesis within the theory of evolution.” Some 
US news sources initially took this purported translation error to mean there was more than 
one hypothesis about the theory of evolution, not that the Pope now saw evolution’s 
epistemological status as more than a mere hypothesis. The translation dispute was settled 
on 19th November 1996, when the editor of the English version of L'Osservatore Romano, 
Father Robert Dempsey, said the “more than a hypothesis” translation was the more 
accurate version of the Pope’s words (Scott, 1997). I show in Chapter 4, that English 
newspapers did not report the translation error, highlighting different cultural orientations 
towards science and religion in the US and England.  
Still, reading John Paul’s address we can see why some individuals believed the 
“more than one hypothesis” to be the correct translation. Later in the statement, John Paul 
discussed not only the various mechanisms posited for evolutionary change, but also 
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stressed that there are various philosophical foundations on which evolution is based: 
“Hence the existence of materialist, reductionist, spiritualist interpretations” (John Paul II, 
1996). This recognition of the diversity of philosophical formations of evolution is an 
important conceptual point. John Paul, Benedict, and Francis, all in their own way state a 
belief in some form of evolution, while setting out certain provisos. These are related to a 
special conception of humanity, but also relate to the separation of evolution as a scientific 
theory from evolution as part of an all-encompassing atheistic or materialistic worldview. 
Popes, when speaking on evolution, have argued in these broader philosophical and 
theological terms. However, as I discuss in Chapter 4, some press reporting has tended to 
focus on the popes’ comments on evolution’s natural scientific validity—mirroring a 
simplistic notion of evolution as something one can ‘accept’ or ‘reject’. I further explore the 
problems with this dualistic thinking in the following chapters. 
For John Paul, the special status of humans is linked to these broader philosophical 
and theological conceptions of evolution. John Paul argued that for humans there is an 
“ontological leap”, a discontinuity due to humanity’s intellect and eternal soul. He warned 
that: “theories of evolution which, because of the philosophies which inspire them, regard 
the spirit [l'esprit] either as emerging from the forces of living matter, or as a simple 
epiphenomenon of that matter, are incompatible with the truth about man” (John Paul II, 
1996). Furthermore, he argued that science and its observational and experimental methods 
could not assess the experience of metaphysical knowledge, self-consciousness, moral 
conscience, liberty, or aesthetic and religious experience. For John Paul (1996), some 
conception of evolution may be “more than a hypothesis”, but he warned that there are 
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some questions that science cannot answer. These, he believed, are best left to philosophy 
and theology.  
In his 1996 address the Pope chose not to fight science on scientific grounds, rather 
drawing a boundary around what it is possible to say scientifically. He argued that 
philosophy and theology are the disciplines in which these larger questions of morality, self-
consciousness and ultimate meaning must be answered. Evolutionary biologist, Richard 
Dawkins, vehemently resisted this boundary drawing, arguing in The Quarterly Review of 
Biology that the Pope’s position on the soul was “fundamentally anti-evolutionary” 
(Dawkins, 1997: 398). For Dawkins, religion posed questions about the world, and these 
were therefore scientific questions. This two-way boundary drawing is a vivid example of the 
jostling for power between representatives of religion and science. Dawkins and John Paul 
aren’t the only two people who attempt to draw these boundaries, however they are 
indicative of the larger processes of demarcation and contestation, which occur in debates 
around science and religion.  
2.4.2 Benedict XVI 
While Pope Benedict had in fact commented on the subject many times before his 
papacy began, he did not receive any press attention for his comments on evolution until 
2007. It is therefore the content and response to his 2007 remarks which are examined in 
the media analysis in Chapter 4. Here, though, I give an overview of his other remarks on 
evolution, so that his 2007 comments and the subsequent media reporting can be properly 
understood. 
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During his 2005 installation speech, Benedict said: “Only when we meet the living 
God in Christ do we know what life is. We are not some casual and meaningless product of 
evolution. Each of us is the result of a thought of God. Each of us is willed, each of us is 
loved, each of us is necessary.” Although, pre-pontificate, as a professional theologian, 
Benedict repeatedly called for more attention to be paid to the story of creation, a topic he 
believed had become marginalised by theologians and the faithful alike. Given this context, 
it is unsurprising to see him reflect on the topic of evolution over many years, in a number of 
books, and in his work for the Vatican’s Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, of which 
he was President from 1981-2005. Illustrative is the following section of Benedict’s 1990 
book, In the Beginning: A Catholic Understanding of the Story of Creation and the Fall: 
What response shall we make to this view [evolution]? It is the affair of the natural sciences to 
explain how the tree of life in particular continues to grow, and how new branches shoot out 
from it. This is not a matter for faith. … More reflective spirits have long been aware that there is 
no either-or here. We cannot say: 'creation or evolution', inasmuch as these two things respond 
to two different realities. The story of the dust of the earth and the breath of God, which we just 
heard, does not in fact explain how human persons come to be but rather what they are. It 
explains their inmost origin and casts light on the project that they are. And, vice versa, the 
theory of evolution seeks to understand and describe biological developments. But in so doing it 
cannot explain where the 'project' of human persons comes from, nor their inner origin, nor their 
particular nature. To that extent we are faced here with two complementary - rather than 
mutually exclusive - realities. (Ratzinger, 1990) 
In a lecture in 1999, Benedict (then Ratzinger) did seemingly question a concept he 
termed “macro-evolution”, although it is uncertain that this “macro-evolution” is the same 
concept used by creationist and ID critiques of evolutionary science.14 Reading the broader 
 
14 Creationist organisations such as the Institute for Creation Research define a strict boundary between 
‘microevolution’, the variation in a single type of animal such as the variety of beak shape among the 
finches of the Galapagos Islands, and ‘macroevolution’, the changing of one species to another. While 
most agree that microevolution has occurred, they argue there is no evidence for macroevolution and 
that the accumulation of microevolutionary changes cannot cause macroevolutionary change, i.e. 
speciation (Morris, 1996). While the term ‘macroevolution is sometimes used in scientific discourse, it is 
not normally a stand-in for the term speciation, and the classic rebuttal of the creationist micro-macro 
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passage, which is reprinted in the 2003 book Truth and Tolerance, it seems that what 
Benedict was particularly drawing attention to was what he termed evolution as a 
“philosophia universalis,” a universal philosophy: “which claims to constitute a universal 
explanation of reality and is unwilling to allow the continuing existence of any other level of 
thinking” (Ratzinger, 2003: 144-145). 
As Benedict is a theologian, his comments on evolution are rarely concise, instead 
they tend to be reflective and discursive. It is therefore difficult to summarise his views on 
evolution, however Allen (2006) attempts to summarise them in the following way:  
(1) Whatever the findings of the natural sciences, they will not contradict Christian faith, 
since ultimately the truth is one. 
(2) As a scientific matter, the evidence for "micro-evolution" seems beyond doubt; the case 
for "macro-evolution" is less persuasive. 
(3) Evolution has become a kind of "first philosophy" for enlightened thinkers, ruling out the 
possibility that life has any ultimate meaning. Here Christianity must draw the line. 
(4) On the moral level, the widespread acceptance of evolution as a "first philosophy" is 
dangerous. (Allen, 2006) 
This is a fair summary, although I believe Benedict’s use of “macro-evolution” is 
linked more to his conception of evolution as an overarching worldview, rather than how it 
is used in creationist or ID critiques of speciation. That is, rather than his scepticism being 
about speciation, his scepticism of evolution seems to be in regard to evolution as an 
overarching materialistic worldview, which represents the only plane of thinking about 
 
split is to simply state that macroevolution is what happens when microevolutionary changes accumulate. 
However, there is active debate about the relationship between micro and macroevolution in science, 
although not in the same terms as the creationist debate. See Erwin (2001) for a discussion of the origin 
and usage of the term ‘macroevolution’ in science, and the relationship between micro- and 
macroevolution in scientific discourse. 
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reality. Particularly taking account of later comments where Benedict claimed: “there are so 
many scientific proofs in favour of evolution which appears to be a reality we can see and 
which enriches our knowledge of life” (Benedict XVI, 2007). Like John Paul’s call for attention 
to be paid to the various philosophical conceptions of evolution, Benedict’s concern seems 
to have been with the propagation of a worldview, which necessarily excludes other modes 
of thinking—i.e. evolution as an atheistic/materialistic universal philosophy, which attempts 
to explain everything, including morality, to the exclusion of God. With these broader 
conceptions of the issue at hand, it is hard to see how a simplified discourse of ‘acceptance’ 
and ‘rejection’ of evolution could be appropriate here. We are dealing with differing 
conceptions of evolution, not the acceptance or rejection of a static concept. However, of 
particular note, is that nowhere in Benedict’s musings has he ever explicitly backed ID. 
In a summary of the last 150 years of evolutionary thought in Nature, Mark Pagel 
asserts that: “Even the Pope [Benedict] now accepts the reality of evolution among 
individuals of a single species, but he and many others with religious beliefs draw the line at 
speciation” (Pagel, 2009: 810). Pagel does not state which of Benedict’s comments he is 
referring to here. It may well be his 1999 comments on “macro evolution”. However, I argue 
that two further comments subsequently made by Benedict suggest that he does not have 
an issue with speciation, rather, it is with overly materialistic or atheistic conceptions of 
evolution. 
Firstly, Benedict’s comments made on the 24th July, 2007, at a meeting with the 
Clergy of the Dioceses of Belluno-Feltre and Treviso. Here Benedict stated that an antithesis 
between evolution and creation is ‘absurd’: 
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Currently, I see in Germany, but also in the United States, a somewhat fierce debate raging 
between so-called ‘creationism’ and evolutionism, presented as though they were mutually 
exclusive alternatives … This antithesis is absurd because, on the one hand, there are so many 
scientific proofs in favour of evolution which appears to be a reality ... But on the other, the 
doctrine of evolution does not answer every query. (Benedict XVI, 2007) 
The queries which he was referring to were: “Where does everything come from? 
And how did everything start which ultimately led to man?” This was in a speech answering 
a question on meaning in life, where Benedict also argued that: “were God not to exist and 
were he not also the Creator of my life, life would actually be a mere cog in evolution, 
nothing more; it would have no meaning in itself.” Here, again, we see a rejection of 
materialistic conceptions of evolution, due to their perceived lack of ultimate meaning. 
Secondly, at the end of Benedict’s papacy in 2013, he addressed a letter to a well-
known Italian atheist and mathematician Prof. Piergiorgio Odifreddi. The letter was a 
response to Odifreddi’s 2011 book Dear Pope, I’m Writing to You, in which Odifreddi 
critiqued Benedict’s theological works. Odifreddi referred to theology as “science fiction”, 
with Benedict responding that with such an attitude, he was surprised that Odifreddi 
considered his work worth reviewing. Benedict’s comments to Odifreddi, should further 
evidence that he should not be considered a proponent of ID. In response to the book, 
Benedict rebuts several charges laid by Odifreddi, including the charge that theology is 
“science fiction.” Benedict also made what may be his final public comment on evolution, 
telling Odifreddi: 
[A]llow me to be more concise with regard to evolution. First I would like to point out that no 
serious theologian will dispute that the entire “tree of life” is in a living internal relationship, 
which the word evolution fittingly describes. Likewise, no serious theologian will be of the 
opinion that God, the Creator, repeatedly at intermediate levels had to intervene almost 
manually in the process of development. In this sense, many attacks on theology regarding 
evolution are unfounded. However, it would be useful for the advancement of knowledge if those 
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who represent the natural sciences would also show themselves more openly aware of the issues 
and if they would say more clearly what questions still remain open. (Benedict, 2013) 
In response to Odifreddi’s labelling of theology as “science fiction”, Benedict 
remarked that science fiction happens in many sciences, and that this occurs “in the best 
sense.” That is: “they are visions and anticipations, by which we seek to attain a true 
knowledge, but in fact, they are only imaginations whereby we seek to draw near to the 
reality.” Benedict suggested the theory of evolution has a “great style” of science fiction: 
referring specifically to Dawkins’s The Selfish Gene and sections of Jacques Monod’s Chance 
and Necessity. It’s not clear what exactly Benedict is referring to here, but from his quoting 
of Monod, he alludes to the use of storytelling, narrative and metaphor in the service of the 
conceptualizing scientific work and in the communication of this science.15 
Despite these many previous words on evolution, newspaper coverage of Benedict 
focuses on one book, published in 2007, entitled Creation and Evolution. In the book 
Benedict argues: “that it is not a question of deciding either for a creationism that is closed 
off from science as a matter of principle, or else a theory of evolution that has its own gaps 
yet overplays its hand and is unwilling to look at the questions that go beyond the 
methodological possibilities of the natural sciences” (Benedict XVI, 2008: 161-162). Rather, 
for Benedict, the real issue was the interplay and conversation between these various ways 
of knowing. He argued that the theory of evolution implied questions which must be 
assigned to philosophy, as they are beyond the scope of the natural sciences. Benedict’s 
comments in this book were interpreted in numerous ways by the press, both in the UK and 
 
15 Interestingly, the question of the place of narrative in science has received scholarly attention by 
historians and philosophers of science. See Morgan and Wise (2017) Narrative in Science for a special 
issue dedicated to questions relating to the use of narrative in science, historically and today. 
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abroad. With some outlets suggesting that Benedict’s remarks “endorse ‘intelligent design’” 
(Owen, 2007). As the media coverage of Creation and Evolution is a central focus of my 
media analysis, I will discuss the book’s content and the context in which it was produced in 
more detail, alongside English newspaper representations of it in Chapter 4. 
2.4.3 Francis 
In 2014, Pope Francis passed comment on evolution in an address to the Pontifical 
Academy of Sciences (PAS). In the address, Francis warned of the pitfalls of simply imagining 
God as a magician. Instead Francis argued that creation was an ongoing process:  
[God] created beings and allowed them to develop according to the internal laws that he gave to 
each one, so that they were able to develop and to arrive at their fullness of being … And so 
creation continued for centuries and centuries, millennia and millennia, until it became which we 
know today, precisely because God is not a demiurge or a magician, but the creator who gives 
being to all things ... The evolution of nature does not contrast with the notion of creation, as 
evolution presupposes the creation of beings that evolve. (Francis, 2014) 
Like previous popes, Francis also added caveats for humans. Particularly important 
for Francis was the freedom and autonomy God bestowed on humans and their special place 
as the stewards of nature. In Francis’ view, God had made man the “steward of Creation, 
even that he rule over Creation, that he develop it until the end of time” (Francis, 2014). He 
also called upon scientists, especially Christian scientists, to eliminate risks to the 
environment, be they natural or manmade. 
This theme of environmental stewardship foreshadowed Francis’s 2015 encyclical 
Laudato si’, where he stressed the importance of taking action on climate change to protect 
the Earth. Interestingly, Francis mentioned evolution in passing in Laudato si’: “the speed 
with which human activity has developed contrasts with the naturally slow pace of biological 
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evolution” (Francis, 2015). It is notable that this statement received no press coverage, nor 
indeed much scholarly attention, as this represents the first time since Humani generis that a 
pope has commented on evolution in an encyclical, which are among the most authoritative 
documents in the Church. This passing comment on evolution in Laudato si’ (2015) was 
overshadowed by Laudato si’s main message of human responsibility for climate change, 
which dominated headlines around the world (e.g. Green, 2015; The Guardian, 2015). 
Still, Francis’s 2014 comments on evolution to the PAS sparked media reaction 
around the world. In the US, journalists at MSNBC claimed the Pope’s remarks were a 
“significant rhetorical break with Catholic tradition” and NBC News claimed Francis made a 
“theological break from his predecessor Benedict XVI, a strong exponent of creationism” 
(Berger, 2014; Jamieson et al., 2014).  
In the UK, a writer at The Independent declared that “the Pope made comments 
which experts said put an end to the ‘pseudo theories’ of creationism and intelligent design 
that some argue were encouraged by his predecessor, Benedict XVI.” Again, highlighting the 
image of the Church as anti-science, the article claimed the Church “has long had a 
reputation for being anti-science – most famously when Galileo faced the inquisition and 
was forced to retract his ‘heretic’ theory that the Earth revolved around the Sun” (Withnall, 
2014). Conversely, other journalists at the time remarked that the Pope’s position was not 
new for the Church, and criticised the general media response, observing how publications 
had “ramped up the Pope’s words and took them out of context” (Dias, 2014). The content 
of this widespread media coverage suggests that some media producers held a perception of 
the Catholic Church as being anti-science or anti-evolution. However, to date, no studies 
 122 
have empirically investigated the content of this coverage. I therefore outline the first study 
of newspaper representation of recent papal statements on evolution in Chapter 4. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
Evolution, or the transmutation of species, as a concept, has a much longer history 
than Darwin. However, it wasn’t until Darwin’s formulation of the mechanism of natural 
selection, and his compilation of empirical data, that a feasible process by which species 
might change was forwarded. In the years after On the Origin of Species was published, 
Darwin’s conception of natural selection experienced somewhat of an eclipse, but this came 
to an end with the Modern Synthesis of the early to mid-20th century. Today, evolution is an 
accepted scientific observation, however there are still active debates about the 
mechanisms which drive evolution. In recent years, there have been calls for an Extended 
Synthesis, which attempts to update the Modern Synthesis with more recent evidence from 
a number of fields. Though these claims are contested by other scientists who argue the 
Modern Synthesis itself is enough to incorporate the new evidence. Therefore, when 
studying public attitudes towards evolution we must remember that evolution is a broad 
and often fluid term, the mechanisms of which are still (rightly) subject to ongoing 
reconsideration, re-examination and research within the scientific community. It is 
important when studying public attitudes to understand what exactly people mean when 
they talk of ‘evolution’. Popular usage and understanding may well have less to do with 
current scientific understandings of the term, and instead may relate to an assortment of 
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historical positions and folk understandings of evolution, such as the Lamarckian notion that 
as we do not use our appendix it will get smaller and eventually disappear. Although, the 
only way to understand in-depth how people conceive of evolution is to conduct qualitative 
studies of public attitudes, as I aim to in this thesis. 
In this chapter I have also attempted to give historical context to more recent 
statements by popes on evolution. As the Vatican did not speak publicly about evolution 
until 1950, historians have sought to investigate the workings of Vatican congregations 
which dealt with pro-evolution writing. As Artigas et al. (2006) observe in their detailed work 
covering the end of the 19th century, it cannot be ascertained that the Vatican had a strict 
policy of condemnation against evolutionary writers, instead they argue there was perhaps a 
‘pragmatic policy’ of pressured retractions to stem the flow of evolutionary ideas. These 
councils were weary of beginning a new Galileo Affair, which was still being used in anti-
Catholic polemics at the time. 
Similarly, in the early 20th century, the same sceptical attitudes can be attributed to 
individuals within the Church (De Bont, 2005). What is clear, is that there were attempts to 
pressure Catholic authors who proposed a theistic evolutionary account of origins to retract 
their work, especially when these works contemplated the evolution of humans. It is 
reasonable to conclude from the historical evidence that the senior hierarchy of the Catholic 
Church were sceptical of evolution in the years after Darwin published On the Origin of 
Species, although it was never explicitly condemned. This scepticism was less related to 
literal interpretations of Genesis, rather it reflected a battle between broader theological 
paradigms, which were actively fighting in the Church. Over time, this scepticism diminished, 
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and the Church became more open to evolutionary ideas. This culminated in the first Public 
comment on evolution in 1950, where Pius XII pronounced in Humani generis that the 
Church did not restrict research and discussions about the evolution of the human body, but 
these should not extend to the evolution of the soul. 
With John Paul II, Benedict XVI, and Francis, we see that the popes have begun to 
publicly support forms of theistic evolution, while at the same time maintaining warnings 
about its materialistic form. Given the statements of these popes, who adopted positions 
accepting evolution that were not given by the Church a century before, we can conclude, in 
line with Blancke (2013: 3), that the Church has become gradually more receptive to 
evolution over time.  
Despite this, parts of the media have responded to these popes in a reactionary way, 
hinting they perceive the Catholic Church, and perhaps by extension Catholic individuals, as 
being anti-evolution, or even anti-science. Again, this highlights the need to study instances 
of public discourse in the social study of science and religion. Currently, no empirical studies 
exist which analyse representations of these papal statements in the media. This thesis aims 
to fill this gap in the literature. 
While there have been historical investigations into Catholic elites, analyses of 
Catholic individuals’ attitudes are much less common. Though successive popes have 
publicly accepted evolution, they have set out no prescriptive position on evolution for 
Catholic individuals. Therefore, we may ask: do Catholics today share modern popes’ views 
of evolution? In the following Chapter I outline the methodology that I will use to investigate 
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this question, remembering the lessons from historical work; namely a focus on fine context 
and a scepticism of simplification.
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This thesis contains two principal types of empirical analyses. The first, investigates 
English newspaper representations of papal statements on evolution from 1996 to 2017. The 
second explores contemporary Catholic individuals’ perceptions of evolution, and how they 
perceive evolutionary theory as interacting with their religious beliefs (if at all). In this 
methods chapter I first outline the thesis’ general research rationale, aims and objectives, 
and outline how the methods originally envisaged have been adjusted during the PhD 
project. Then, I detail the specific method of the media analysis, including details of the 
publications studied, and the process of analysis. Next, I overview the method utilised in the 
interview analysis, including the process of recruitment and details of the participants in the 
study. I finish with a section on reflexivity that covers the overall research process, and 
ontological and epistemological concerns. 
 
3.2 Research design 
3.2.1 Research rationale 
In offering guidance on the key features of good qualitative projects, Gough et al. 
(2003: 4) propose that research questions in qualitative research should have originality and 
social relevance. On the question of originality in research, Braun and Clarke (2013: 44) state 
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the aim is to generate knowledge, which is new because of a different context, approach, 
topic or sample to previous studies. As discussed in Chapter 1, much of the limited existing 
research on the relationship between religion and evolutionary science takes place in a US 
context, mostly using a quantitative survey-based method (e.g. Stark, 1963; Ecklund and 
Parks, 2009; Evans, 2011). While large-scale surveys help us to see general patterns of 
opinion and belief across a society, they cannot detail individual’s constructions of meaning, 
belief, perceptions and opinions about evolution in any depth. Although, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, some studies using a qualitative approach do exist, they are fewer than the 
already scarce quantitative studies in this area. Regarding Catholics specifically, there are 
some large-scale quantitative studies which include Catholics as a sub-sample (e.g. Francis 
and Greer, 1999; Unsworth and Voas, 2017), however no research projects have been 
specifically dedicated to Catholic individuals’ beliefs in relation to evolution. 
The present thesis aims to investigate Catholic individuals’ attitudes and perceptions 
of evolutionary science and its interactions with their religious beliefs. Utilising the 
qualitative research paradigm, and a semi-structured interview method, I aim to investigate 
in depth the topic of Catholic individuals’ perceptions of evolutionary science, and their 
attitudes about them. Therefore, the present thesis’ aims to fulfil all four of Braun and 
Clarke’s (2013: 44) criteria for originality—a new context (England), approach (qualitative), 
topic (Catholicism and evolution), and sample (Catholics). 
On the question of social relevance of the research, it may at first seem a harder 
charge to answer. With so many clearly purposive social research avenues, with explicit links 
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to policy implementation, why choose to study Catholicism and evolution? The following 
rationale is offered to justify the present research’s social relevance. 
Beyond the immediate practical applicability of research, social relevance can also 
refer to “critiquing taken-for-granted social norms” (Braun and Clarke, 2013: 51). Over the 
last two decades, discussions on the incompatibility of science and religion have become 
commonplace; although, as introduced in Chapter 2, the origins of these discourses are 
much older. Engaging with these public discourses may lead one to conclude that if you are 
religious, you cannot accept science.1 Especially when according to some scientists, such as 
the particle physicist Vic Stenger, they are “diametrically opposed” ways of seeing the world 
(Stenger, 2011). 
There are two main issues with this, firstly, this type of theorising by professionals 
completely ignores the lived experiences of individuals. It is not empirical. Take for example 
Stenger,  who states those who accept both science and religion: “have compartmentalized 
their brains into two sections that don’t talk to each other” (Stenger, 2011). This does not 
consider the experiences and perceptions of religious individuals. Do they 
compartmentalize? Do they synthesise? No research conducted to date can be marshalled in 
support of Stenger’s statement; therefore, this type of theorising ignores the experiences of 
those it attempts to evaluate.2 
 
1 According to Elsdon-Baker et al.’s (2017b: 3) study, 60% of UK adults think that religious members of the 
public will find it very difficult, difficult or somewhat difficult to “accept information about evolutionary 
science, in reference to their own personal beliefs or way of seeing the world”. 
2 Of interest here is the psychological work of Legare et al. (2012), who argue there is considerable 
evidence that individuals use both natural and supernatural explanations to interpret the same events, 
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Secondly, claiming science and religion must be incompatible is exclusionary. To 
accept science, the reasoning goes, you must renounce your faith. Or, if you do accept 
science, and keep your faith, then the two cannot be working together harmoniously in your 
perception of the world. Hence, discourses which focus on the opposition of science and 
religion may play a part in excluding religious publics from engaging with science. This is an 
important problem for science communication and its practitioners, whose aim is to engage 
diverse publics with science. Therefore, the social relevance in this research is in the 
empirical grounding of discussions around Catholicism and evolution. 
Therefore, it is not only important to study the attitudes of religious publics 
themselves, but it is also necessary to investigate the types of narrative about religious 
groups and science in public discourse. In this way, we can explore both the societal 
expectations of these religious groups regarding science, and what members of those 
religious communities themselves think on the issue. In this thesis, I examine a facet of the 
public discourse elements of this by studying English newspaper representations of recent 
papal statements on evolution. 
3.2.2 Aims and research questions 
This thesis aims to empirically investigate the relationship between Catholicism and 
evolution in England. It achieves this in two ways: 
 
such as evolution or illness, and that there are multiple ways in which both kinds of explanations coexist 
in individuals’ minds. 
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• Through analysing public discourse3, by exploring how English newspapers 
have represented popes’ recent statements on evolution; 
• Through analysing public attitudes, by exploring individual Catholic’s 
perceptions and attitudes towards evolution, and the relationship between 
evolution and their faith. 
The study has two specific research questions, one for the analysis of public 
discourse and one for the analysis of public attitudes: 
1) How have papal statements on evolution been represented in large-circulation 
English newspapers? 
2) In what ways do Catholic individuals in England perceive evolutionary science in 
relation to their faith and worldview? 
A number of research objectives relate to these research questions: 
1)  Public discourse 
1.1 To map the historical context leading to contemporary papal statements 
on evolution; 
1.2 To analyse initial news coverage for each of John Paul’s, Benedict’s, and 
Francis’ evolution comments; 
 
3 I follow Kaden et al. (2017; 2019: 75) by denoting public discourse relating to science and religion as: 
“popular media coverage of issues relating to science and belief and the publications of […] ‘professionals’ 
in the field of science and religion whose vocation it is to develop, distribute, defend and critique systems 
of explanation that relate science to different forms of ultimate belief.” 
 131 
1.3 To analyse subsequent coverage to see how subsequent references to 
these papal comments are used. 
2) Public attitudes 
2.1 To analyse Catholic individuals’ perceptions and attitudes towards 
evolution; 
2.2 To analyse how Catholic individuals conceptualise evolution; 
2.3 To situate these understanding in the larger literature on religious 
attitudes towards evolution, especially quantitative measures; 
2.4 To explore how, if at all, dominant media coverage/narratives are 
informing or interacting with individual perceptions. 
While the broad aim of the research, to investigate Catholicism and evolution, has 
remained the same throughout, my approach to the topic has progressed. I will now reflect 
on these developments. 
3.2.3 How the methods have evolved: Qualitative research paradigm 
In its original conception, this study was planned to be mixed methods. Initially, I 
proposed a quantitative content analysis of media articles covering papal statements about 
evolution, a set of qualitative interviews generating in-depth data on individual Catholic’s 
beliefs, and from this, a larger quantitative survey to assess the prevalence of those beliefs 
over a more nationally representative sample. Given time constraints, and after reflecting on 
the most appropriate way forward for the aims of the study, the project has changed in 
several ways. Most notably, I chose to drop quantitative methods from the project, and 
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situate the study fully within the qualitative research paradigm. This is not because I believe 
quantitative methods have nothing to add to such endeavours, but in this instance 
qualitative methods are better suited to my research aims. This shift has had the following 
impact. 
Firstly, I chose to carry out a qualitative media analysis, rather than a quantitative 
content analysis. Content analysis in its quantitative form has its beginnings in a positivist 
epistemology, cherishing notions of objectivity and replicability (Altheide and Schneider, 
2013: 24). The main aim is to catalogue frequencies of occurrences of words and phrases, so 
objective statistical inferences can be made about the symbolic content of the corpus 
(Neuman, 1997: 273). This deductive framework, however, can lead to important 
information being omitted from the analysis. 
Neuman describes how qualitative media analysis is “not highly respected among 
positivist researchers” (Neuman, 1997: 273). Though, others such as Newbold et al. (2002: 
84) argue instead that quantitative content analysis cannot capture important context within 
which meaning emerges from a media text. Furthermore, researchers in the qualitative 
research paradigm reject the notion of an objective researcher being possible or even 
desirable, and reject natural science as the best model for social research (Silverman, 2000: 
8). 
Qualitative media analyses focus on meaning, in-depth readings of the corpus, and 
can extend to include media, audience, and contextual factors beyond the text (Macnamara, 
2005: 5). This is important in the present study, where I will be including contextual 
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information beyond the corpus, which would not be as easily incorporated into a strict 
content analysis. Also, as I wish to explore the nuances in the corpus, this is best done 
inductively from the bottom-up; a qualitative media analysis enables me to achieve this. 
Furthermore, research in the qualitative paradigm sees researcher interpretation as a 
benefit, rather than a ‘bias’ as in content analysis. The researcher plays an active and 
interpretive part in the analysis, and the construction of meaning around the data while 
answering the research question. However, to beneficially acknowledge subjectivity in the 
research process, careful consideration and research design is required. This is achieved 
through reflexivity (Braun and Clarke, 2013: 36-37). 
Reflexivity can be said to come in two types, functional and personal (Wilkinson, 
1988). While functional reflexivity considers how research tools and processes are 
influencing the research, personal reflexivity considers how the researcher as an individual is 
influencing the production of knowledge in the research (Braun and Clarke, 2013: 37). It was 
through the process of functional reflexivity that I decided to move away from quantitative 
methods within this project, concluding that the qualitative approach better suited my 
exploratory approach and research aims. For personal reflexivity, it is important to carefully 
contemplate how your values, history, and assumptions as an individual are influencing the 
work. This influence is not necessarily a negative one, but it should necessarily be 
thoughtfully considered. I include an account of my reflexive practice in the final section of 
this chapter. 
I also opted to focus solely on qualitative methods for the public attitudes section of 
this research. In part this is due to time constraints, and because there are no existing in-
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depth studies of Catholic attitudes toward evolution. Qualitative research is focussed on 
inductive, hypothesis-generating research (Braun and Clarke: 2013: 6), therefore I aim to use 
interviews to generate rich data on various ways Catholics perceive science and religion to 
interact in their worldviews. Deploying set survey items to the population would generate 
some meaningful data, but it would lack detail in documenting the way in which science and 
religion feature in the lived-experience of individuals, as we lack the appropriate information 
to construct such survey items specifically for Catholics. Furthermore, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, it is some of these ‘blunt measures’ which I aim to critique in this study using data 
from previously unexamined Catholic publics. Therefore, I have opted for an exploratory, 
inductive, qualitative attitudinal study to generate detailed data, rather than a quantitative 
survey, which may well be statistically representative, but may have used categorisations 
that are not salient for Catholics.4 
3.2.4 Interviews vs. ethnography: Naturalistic or contrived? 
Interviews have become the de facto data generation method in qualitative research 
(Silverman, 2013: 35-39). While interviews are a useful method to generate data, they are 
not best suited to every research question, and regularly studies offer no rationale or 
justification for their use. Researchers often ignore other methods, and only contrast the 
benefits of open-ended interviews with fixed-choice interviews or surveys (Silverman 2013: 
134). To justify my use of interviews, I will contrast the method with ethnography. 
 
4 See Elsdon-Baker (2015) for a critique of issue framing in large surveys, and the forced categorisation of 
individuals’ views of religion and science which can stem from poorly constructed surveys. 
 135 
While an ethnographic approach could lead to interesting data on a range of 
research topics concerning Catholicism and evolution, the method is not appropriate for my 
research question, which seeks to explore a range of perceptions and attitudes toward 
evolution amongst those who identify as Catholic. If, to pose a hypothetical research 
proposal, I was to investigate how the Pontifical Academy of Sciences discusses, synthesises, 
and negotiates science and religion matters in their proceedings and laboratories, an 
ethnographic method would be best suited. Or, if I wished to understand how the topic of 
science and religion is preached from the pulpit, I would use an ethnographic method and 
embed in various congregations to better understand how these conversations take place in 
a ‘natural’ setting.5 However, as this research is in the PUS tradition, and I wish explore the 
opinions of a range of individuals, interviews provide the best method to accomplish this. 
Ethnographic approaches are however seen as producing more ‘naturalistic’ data, 
where the researcher has less influence on the generation of data. There has been 
considerable debate on the topic of naturalistic versus contrived data in qualitative research, 
with these two types of data being represented as bipolar (Speer, 2002; Potter, 2002). 
However, it is unhelpful to conceive of naturalistic and contrived data as two distinct poles, 
the methods should instead be seen as a continuum of researcher influence on data 
generation (Silverman, 2013: 49-51). 
 
5 This would, however, be an extremely time consuming task given the accounts of my interview 
participants, none of which could recall a single instance of the topic of science and religion being raised 
by a priest in Church. 
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Even with ‘naturalistic’ data, there is still researcher influence. For example, the 
media articles included in this project are highly naturalistic data, as I was not involved in 
their generation. However, the media articles used were selected based on specific search 
terms, were taken from certain newspapers, and between certain dates. Therefore, even 
though I was not personally involved in generating the data items themselves, I’ve had an 
active role developing the criteria through which items are selected. In the analysis of those 
articles themselves, I obviously play an active role in constructing meaning from the data. 
Though, again, this should not necessarily be seen as a negative (see Braun and Clarke, 2013: 
36). 
Data generated from interviews is more at the contrived end of the spectrum 
compared to media articles. The researcher and participant are actively engaged in co-
constructing the knowledge produced during the interview process. As Rapley has argued: 
“Interviews are, by their very nature, social encounters where speakers collaborate in 
producing retrospective (and prospective) accounts or versions of their past (or future) 
actions, experiences, feelings and thoughts” (Rapley, 2004: 16). Therefore, they should be 
analysed in reference to the context in which they were produced. 
This does not mean, however, that all insights from interviews are forever bound to 
the context of their creation. For example, as Goodman (2008) has shown in discursive 
analysis, the notion of ‘generalizability’ can still apply in qualitative research. That is, insights 
can be ‘transferable’ beyond the specific context of knowledge production.6 I too hope to 
 
6 Goodman (2008) uses examples of common discursive strategies used to justify prejudice to explore the 
notion of generalisability in qualitative research. Where across a number of diverse studies–gay 
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produce some transferable insights from my interview analysis. For example, the inadequacy 
of ‘blunt’ or binary survey measures (examined in Chapter 1) to encapsulate heterogeneous 
beliefs. 
Therefore, while a polarity between ‘natural’ and ‘contrived’ data is perhaps 
unhelpful, we must remain conscious of the contexts within which our data is produced. 
Silverman (2013: 55) suggests it is usually a good idea to begin a research project with more 
naturalistic data. My research follows this recommendation, beginning with more 
naturalistic data from media articles, and progressing to less naturalistic data in the form of 
semi-structured interviews. 
 
3.3 Media analysis 
To study newspaper representations of recent papal comments on evolution, I 
employ a version of qualitative media analysis, Ethnographic Content Analysis (ECA). ECA, 
developed by Altheide and Schneider (2013), differs from a quantitative content analysis in 
its use of textual, contextual, and narrative data and analysis, as well as (some) numerical 
data. The “ethnographic” in ECA refers to a methodological orientation, viewing documents 
as products of social interaction, which can be studied for meaning with a focus on 
immersion in the material, reflexivity, context, and discovery. While a protocol which 
 
parenting, asylum seekers, and immigrants’ rights—he found the common discursive strategy of using 
“existing prejudice to justify further prejudice.” 
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generates numerical data may be developed in the later stages of analysis, ECA is inductive 
and recursive, and therefore unlike quantitative content analysis does not solely force data 
into pre-defined categories (Altheide and Schneider, 2013: 23-37). 
The protocol serves as a basic data collection and reduction instrument, with some 
pre-coded categories such as publication, date, and headline. It can also include some 
inductively generated categories once the researcher is familiar with the data. Unlike 
quantitative content analysis, however, these basic numerical data are not the focus of the 
study. Instead, this numerical data supplements the main aim of capturing themes, 
definitions, meanings, process, and types—the qualitative analysis. Here, detailed readings 
and an inductive coding approach utilising constant comparison is used to construct themes 
from the data which have relevance to the research question (Altheide and Schneider, 2013: 
44-45). 
As stated, the aim of qualitative media analysis is to investigate the meanings, 
emphasis and themes in communicative content. Researchers conducting ECA employ a 
progressive theoretical sampling strategy to ensure the study includes all relevant content to 
answer the research question. This can mean using sources beyond one medium of 
communication, such as TV, radio, and newspapers. The appropriate scope of content to 
include may not be apparent at the beginning of the study, therefore researchers must be 
reflexive while developing an understanding of the research topic (Altheide and Schneider, 
2013: 55-56). In the present study, I initially intended to only analyse print newspaper 
articles, which covered or referred to papal comments on evolution. However, after an initial 
analysis I discovered that many articles in the latter end of the date range only appeared on 
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newspapers’ online platforms. I therefore expanded the scope of the analysis to include the 
online outputs of relevant newspapers, allowing me to access more content relevant to the 
study. 
Expanding the study to include online content, however, brought other 
considerations and limitations. While the LexisNexis database used in this study contained 
full coverage of the print versions in the date range, it only contained complete records of 
online content from certain dates within the entire range. LexisNexis has full coverage of the 
online platforms of The Times (thetimes.co.uk) from May 2011; of The Daily Telegraph 
(telegraph.co.uk) from March 2006; and of the Daily Mail (MailOnline) from March 2012. 
This represents one limitation of the study, as not all online content can be analysed across 
the period studied. However, access to some of the online content from these publications 
was deemed better than access to none. As is discussed below, the majority of coverage of 
papal statements on evolution moves online from 2010, so without including online content, 
a major period under study would have been omitted. 
3.3.1 Publications and timeframe  
This thesis focusses on England, with subsequent parts exploring the perceptions of 
Catholic individuals in England, therefore the media analysis focussed on English national 
newspapers. This geographical restriction on the publications studied also ensured that the 
total number of articles in the sample was manageable. 
I wished to study media representations of recent papal statements on evolution; 
therefore, dates were selected from October 1996 to March 2017. This included articles in 
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response to John Paull II, Benedict XVI, and Francis’s public comments about evolution. 
Extending the analysis to Pius XII’s 1950 statement was deemed unfeasible given the 
timescale and scope of this study. 
A preliminary search was conducted on English publications in the LexisNexis news 
database’s “Major World Newspapers” category using the developed search terms (see 
below). To ascertain the most relevant widely-read newspapers, the titles were then filtered 
by circulation number, removing those that had a daily circulation of less than 200,000 in 
2006 (the median year in the timeframe studied).7 The final publications included in the 
study were: The Independent, The Times, The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail, and 
The Observer. 
Sunday and daily counterparts of newspapers were both grouped under the same 
publication. As The Independent and The Guardian’s online content is indexed in LexisNexis 
together with their print content under the same publication headings, no extra searches 
were necessary for these publications. However, The Times (thetimes.co.uk), The Daily 
Telegraph (telegraph.co.uk), and the Daily Mail (MailOnline) were indexed under a separate 
online publication listing. For each of these, I applied the search terms and the appropriate 
date range, and retrieved the appropriate articles. Although, as discussed above, these 
publications only have full online coverage in the database from certain dates. 
The absence of tabloid press titles (e.g. The Sun and The Mirror) was due to the 
absence of coverage of the topic in those publications, when using the search terms, as per 
 
7 Circulation figures used from the Audit Bureau of Circulations, UK (ABC, 2006). 
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below. Restricting the number of articles to major publications by circulation in England kept 
the corpus to a manageable number (n=83), therefore no further sampling method was 
necessary. 
3.3.2 Search terms 
As the aim was to analyse media coverage of papal comments on evolution, be this 
during the initial news coverage or where references had been made in other articles, the 
search term “pope” was used rather than the broader term “Catholic”. 
The word “evolution” is used in many non-biological contexts (e.g. institutional 
development or progress), therefore I initially trialled various modifiers to allow the capture 
of only relevant articles, without needing to manually filter an excessively large corpus. 
However, after trialling several modifiers—“Darwin!”, “theory”, and “biolog!”8—to more 
specifically capture the relevant articles, I deemed these to be too restrictive as they 
excluded some articles which were known to be relevant to the study. 
I then combined the “pope” and “evolution” terms with a “w/n” indicator, meaning 
the words appeared within n amount of words from each other in the text, rather than 
“AND” which means the two terms can appear anywhere in the article. I chose the “w/n” 
indicator rather than “AND” as I wished to capture those articles which referenced popes’ 
views on evolution, and the relevant articles keep the statement and the author of the 
 
8 LexisNexis Academic uses Boolean indicators (OR, AND, etc.) and wildcard characters to refine searches. 
An asterisk (*) replaces one letter in a word, and an exclamation mark (!) is a truncation to allow the 
searches of multiple endings to a word. (E.g. The term ‘Darwin!’ could search for Darwin, Darwinian, or 
Darwin’s.) (LexisNexis, 2019) 
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statement in close proximity. Using a “w/n” modifier reduced a large amount of manual 
filtering. 
After piloting several numbers, “w/100” was chosen as the most appropriate 
connector for selecting the relevant content, with “w/100” signifying the two terms (“pope” 
and “evolution”) would appear within 100 words of each other in the article. Even though 
this combination still returned some irrelevant articles (i.e. evolution used non-biologically) 
these instances were manually filtered using the criterion: does the article refer to a pope’s 
views about evolution? 
Therefore, the search terms: “pope w/100 evolution!” were used on the LexisNexis 
database, returning n=384 results from the relevant publications. Following manually 
filtering for articles specifically citing popes’ comments on evolution, the final sample was 
n=83. 
3.3.3 Process of analysis 
Before I conducted the analysis, I read the history of papal statements on evolution 
and science more generally, and other events which may have influenced media reporting. 
These included other high-level Vatican official public comments. This allowed me to situate 
the media articles in their proper context during the analysis, and to explain this context in 
the write-up. 
I then began familiarising myself with the dataset; through reading and re-reading 
whilst noting interesting commonalities, and coding common emergent themes (Braun and 
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Clarke, 2013). As per ECA, I constructed an initial protocol to collect basic classificatory 
information for display in a spreadsheet (Altheide and Schneider, 2013), this included: 
publication (daily and Sunday editions grouped into a single category), date, author (where 
available), page (where available/appropriate), word count, article type, online/print, and 
whether the pope’s comments were the focus of the article. With this data, I could then 
separate the initial news reporting on the popes’ statements (Article type: news; Pope focus: 
yes), from other subsequent articles which make reference to these popes’ statements. 
The unit of analysis was the entire article. However, as there was a clear difference 
between the focus of initial news articles covering a papal comment on evolution, and 
subsequent reporting which makes reference to these earlier comments, I had to analyse 
subsequent articles differently. For these articles, while the unit of analysis remained the 
entire article, I focussed the analysis on how a reference to a popes’ views was used in the 
article to contextualise other issues or to forward other arguments. 
While not explicitly a framing study, I do utilise the notion of framing in part of the 
analysis. In a meta-content analysis of framing studies, Matthes (2009: 354) concludes that 
Entman’s (1993, 2004) definition of framing is the most influential in mass communications 
literature:  
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating context, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. 
(Entman, 1993: 52, emphasis in original) 
Multiple other definitions of framing exist. Another well-cited example is Gitlin’s 
definition of frames as “principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of 
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little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters” (Gitlin, 1980: 6).  In 
the analysis, I used the concept of framing to aid in the analysis of the representation of 
papal statements on evolution. Frames were developed inductively with reference to Gitlin’s 
(1980) and Entman’s (1993) definitions of what constitutes a frame. 
 
3.4 Interview analysis 
3.4.1 Developing and piloting the interview schedule 
The interviews in this study were ‘semi-structured’, meaning the researcher asks 
participants a series of predetermined, but open-ended questions (Given, 2008: 810). The 
interview schedule—the set of questions used in the interview—acts as a guide to topics to 
be discussed, but the interview is flexible and can cover new areas of relevant discussion if 
they arise.  
The schedule was adapted from previous work conducted by Catto, Jones and Kaden 
on the Science and Religion: Exploring the Spectrum project. This more general schedule was 
tailored to the topic of Catholicism and evolution, using insights from both the literature 
review and the media analysis. Beyond this tailoring, stimulus materials were also added—
excerpts from Pope Francis’s 2014 statement and a media response to it from my media 
analysis data set—to stimulate discussion on the role of the Pope, the Church, and the 
media (Edwards and Holland, 2013: 37). Once designed, the schedule was piloted in a focus 
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group to assess how participants understood the questions, and necessary amendments 
were made. The final schedule can be found in the Appendix I. 
3.4.2 Ethics  
As my research began at Newman University, before transferring to the University of 
Birmingham, the Newman University Research Ethics Committee approved the research on 
27th September, 2017. While the ethics proposal included information on both the media 
and interview analyses, the main ethical countermeasures relate to the interviews and 
safeguarding interview participants. I therefore discuss these practices here. 
Outlined in the ethics approval submission was the concept of informed consent; 
whereby participants must have enough information to make an informed decision when 
giving their consent to take part in the research. Informed consent was achieved through the 
inclusion of detailed information in the participant information sheet, which was sent prior 
to each interview, so the participant could understand the aims of the research and how the 
data generated in the interviews would be used. The participants were also given the 
opportunity to ask questions both before and after the interview. Participants were 
informed they could withdraw from the interview at any time before or during the 
interview, or within up to 30 days after the interview had taken place, without giving a 
reason. Before each interview began, participants were given time to re-read the participant 
information sheet, were informed of the ethics process, and were asked to sign the consent 
form if they still wished to take part.  
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Confidentiality and anonymity are also two important parts of research ethics (Braun 
and Clarke, 2013). Participants were informed that excerpts from the interview may be 
reproduced in the final thesis, future publications and presentations, but that these excerpts 
would appear anonymised. Furthermore, the audio and text transcripts would be kept under 
password protection and only myself and a professional transcriber would have access to 
the raw data. The Appendices contain full reproductions of all ethics-related forms, including 
Ethics Approval Proposal Form (Appendix II), Ethics Certificate (Appendix III), Participant 
Information Sheet (Appendix IV), and Consent Form (Appendix V). 
3.4.3 Sampling and saturation 
Due to the lack of existing research on Catholic attitudes towards evolution, this 
study is necessarily exploratory in nature. As I aimed to explore a diverse range of 
perceptions, the sole requirement for a participant to take part in an interview was that the 
individual identified as Catholic. However, beyond this, I purposively sampled to ensure 
generational, educational, gender and geographical variation among participants (Patton, 
2002: 230).  
In quantitative research, random sampling is used to produce generalizable results, 
which apply to the wider population (Braun and Clarke, 2013: 56). However, in qualitative 
research sampling is purposive, focussed on generating insight and in-depth understanding 
of the topic studied (Patton, 2002: 230). Therefore, by ensuring generational, educational, 
gender and geographic variation, I did not seek to use these variables to generalise my 
results to other individuals of those categories. Instead, the aim of purposively sampling 
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people from a range of demographic variables is to increase the types of information 
collected (Sandelowski, 1995: 180). 
I initially planned to continue interviewing until I reached saturation—when new 
data collection reveals no new information (Sandelowski, 1995). However, it became clear 
that due to the great diversity of opinions and the exploratory nature of the study, 
saturation would not be possible in the timeframe of a thesis. The final number of 
interviewees was n=31. Braun and Clarke (2013: 55) suggest sample sizes in research that 
seeks patterns across interview data normally consist of between 15-30 interviews, 
therefore the present study represents an adequate sample for this type of research. 
3.4.4 Recruitment 
For the initial pilot focus group to test the interview schedule, a mass email was sent 
to all students and staff at Newman University (where this project began) asking for focus 
group participants on the topic of science and religion. I purposefully did not use the term 
“evolution” in any initial recruitment emails, rather I used the broader “science and religion” 
so that I avoided attracting only people for whom evolution was a salient subject. The initial 
focus group participants were offered a £20 gift voucher incentive for their participation. 
However, no incentives were offered for participation in the main interviews, due to 
concerns over ethics, coercion, and the impact on the data generated.9 
 
9 The ethics and impacts of incentives in qualitative research have been discussed by authors such as 
Head (2009). 
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For the main interview sample, I initially contacted individuals who had expressed 
interest in the Science and Religion: Exploring the Spectrum (SRES) project by completing a 
pre-screen questionnaire, and who had consented to being included in the project’s 
participant pool. I identified individuals who had not participated in previous SRES studies, 
were based in England, and who identified as Catholic. These individuals were then invited 
to participate in the research by email. If interested, I asked individuals to reply for more 
information. If an individual replied to the initial recruitment email, my second email 
included the Participant Information Sheet (Appendix IV) giving more information on the 
study, I also asked if the individual had any questions relating to the research, and (if they 
were happy to proceed) began organising a date and time for the interview. If recruitment 
was successful, and once interview had been conducted, the individual was then asked if 
they knew further qualifying individuals who may like to participate. In this way, the sample 
snowballed from initial participants to a larger group.  
As the SRES participant pool only generated a few participants, and wanting to 
recruit as diverse a sample as possible, I also identified various Catholic groups and 
gatekeepers to Catholic communities. Beyond gatekeepers sharing the information in their 
personal networks, I researched email addresses for parishes and other Catholic community 
groups around the country. Once identified, a message with accompanying recruitment 
email was sent to these groups for distribution among their members. Similarly to the 
process laid out about when an individual responded expressing interest in participating in 
the study, I emailed out the Participant Information Sheet and organised a date for the 
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interview. Once an interview was conducted, I asked if the participants knew any other 
people who may be interested in taking part. 
3.4.5 Transcription 
The interviews were transcribed using the orthographic (verbatim) method, which 
focusses on the spoken words and other sounds in the interview (Braun and Clarke, 2013: 
162). Jeffersonian style, a method common in discursive and conversational analysis, was 
not used, as the linguistic detail was not needed for the aims of this study. The orthographic 
transcription method includes: the identity of the speaker, non-verbal sounds such as laughs 
and ‘errs’, pausing, overlapping and inaudible speech (Braun and Clarke, 2013: 165). Line 
numbers were also included in the transcripts for ease of orientation in analysis. 
3.4.6 Thematic analysis 
Thematic analysis is a foundational method for identifying, analysing and reporting 
patterns within data. An initial conception of thematic analysis can be found in the historian 
of science Gerald Holton’s work (see Merton, 1975). Though widely used in qualitative 
research, it is often not acknowledged as an explicit method. In 2006, Braun and Clarke 
sought to clarify this by writing a methods paper explicitly detailing the process by which 
thematic analysis is usually carried out (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 4-6). 
In Braun and Clarke’s (2006: 80) foundational review of thematic analysis (TA), they 
suggest qualitative methods can be divided among two groups—one tied to epistemological 
or theoretical backgrounds, and one independent of them. As Braun and Clarke  outline, in 
the first group are studies in conversation analysis (e.g., Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998), 
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interpretive phenomenological analysis (e.g., Smith and Osborn, 2003), grounded theory 
(e.g. Strauss and Corbin, 1998), discourse analysis (e.g. Willig, 2003), and narrative analysis 
(e.g. Murray, 2003). In the second group of qualitative studies, are methods which are 
essentially independent of specific theory and epistemology (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 80-81). 
TA falls into this camp, with one of its benefits being its theoretical flexibility, and its 
compatibility with both essentialist and constructivist paradigms. 
TA can be applied to almost any type of qualitative data, from researcher led 
interviews to secondary media sources (Clarke and Braun, 2006: 4). Summarizing the 
flexibility and wide applicability of TA to various research interests, Clarke and Braun  
explain:  
(a) it works with a wide range of research questions, from those about people’s experiences or 
understandings to those about the representation and construction of particular phenomena in 
particular contexts; b) it can be used to analyse different types of data, from secondary sources 
such as media to transcripts of focus groups or interviews; c) it works with large or small data-
sets; and d) it can be applied to produce data-driven or theory-driven analyses. (Clarke and 
Braun, 2013: 121) 
Table 3.1 describes the six-step process, which I have used to carry out the TA for my 
thesis. Here, the focus is on reading, coding using constant comparison, collating codes, 
developing themes, and finally analysing these themes in reference to the research 
question. 
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Table 3.1 Phases of Thematic Analysis (adapted from Braun and Clarke, 2006) 
Steps of TA Description of the process  
1. 
Familiarising yourself 
with your data:  
Transcribing data (if necessary), reading and re- reading the 
data, noting down initial ideas.  
2. 
Generating initial 
codes:  
Coding interesting features of the data in a systematic fashion 
across the entire data set, collating data relevant to each code.  
3. Searching 
for themes:  
Collating codes into potential themes, gathering all data 
relevant to each potential theme.  
4. 
Reviewing themes:  
Checking the themes work in relation to the coded extracts 
(Level 1) and the entire data set (Level 2), generating a thematic map of 
the analysis.  
5. Defining 
and naming themes:  
Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each theme, and the 
overall story the analysis tells; generating clear definitions and names for 
each theme.  
6. Producing 
the report: 
The final opportunity for analysis. Selection of vivid, compelling 
extract examples, final analysis of selected extracts, relating back of the 
analysis to the research question and literature, producing a scholarly 
report of the analysis.  
 
Though this six-step plan acts as a guide, it should not be seen as a prescriptive or 
linear procedure. TA is a recursive process, moving back and forth between the phases as 
the analysis develops, with the aim of exploring patterns across the data (Braun and Clarke, 
2006: 16). 
3.4.7 Boundaries 
For part of my argument in the interview analysis, I draw upon the theoretical 
concept of boundaries. Boundaries have served as a major theoretical framework in social 
sciences over the last few decades, and can be defined in many ways (Lamont, 2001; Bryson, 
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2016). In the present thesis, I refer to symbolic boundaries as described by Lamont and 
Molnar (2002: 168):  
Symbolic boundaries are conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, 
people, practices, and even time and space. They are tools by which individuals and groups 
struggle over and come to agree upon definitions of reality. Examining them allows us to capture 
the dynamic dimensions of social relations, as groups compete in the production, diffusion, and 
institutionalization of alternative systems and principles of classifications. Symbolic boundaries 
also separate people into groups and generate feelings of similarity and group membership. 
(Lamont and Molnar, 2002: 168) 
 
3.4.8 Overview of participants 
The interview data in this thesis comes from 31 semi-structured interviews with self-
identifying Catholics, conducted between October 2017 and April 2018. The shortest 
interview lasted 31:30 and the longest lasted 2:40:13. The mean interview duration was 
1:03:29, which is in line with other similar studies in this field (e.g. Ecklund and Scheitle, 
2018). In this section, I give an overview of the participants in the study. 
3.4.8.1 Catholic population of England (Scotland, and Wales) 
 Before outlining my study’s sample, it is necessary to outline the makeup of 
England’s Catholic population. Here I take primarily from the 36th British Social Attitudes 
(BSA) survey report (Curtice et al., 2019), and Stephen Bullivant’s (2016) report on British 
Catholicism. It should be noted, however, that the BSA survey covers England, Wales, and 
Scotland, and Bullivant’s report, both England and Wales. Although some of these statistics 
contain Welsh and Scottish Catholics, I aim to sketch a broad profile of Catholicism in Britain, 
in which to situate my own sample of English Catholics. 
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 According to the BSA survey sample (England, Scotland, and Wales) self-identification 
as ‘Roman Catholic’ has declined proportionally by around 30% in total from 10% in 1983 to 
7% of the total population in 2018. While this shows a decline in those identifying as 
Catholic, the magnitude is not as drastic as for the Church of England, who have dropped 
proportionally by 70% in total from 40% to 12% of the total population over the same period 
(Curtice et al., 2019: 21). Bullivant (2016: 9) estimates that as 8.3% of people surveyed in 
England and Wales identified as Catholic, the total figure of adult (18+) Catholics in England 
and Wales in 2014 was around 3.8 million. This is not a small population of individuals, so 
again, it is surprising that their views of evolution have thus far not received dedicated 
academic study. 
 Regarding the demographics of the Catholic population, of English and Welsh 
Catholics in 2014, 40.9% identified as male and 59.1% identified as female (compared with 
48.2% and 51.8% respectively for the general population). However, Catholic gender 
disparities mirror the broader Christian population of which 41.4% are males and 58.6% 
females (Bullivant, 2016: 9). As for age, Bullivant observes that:  
Roughly speaking, around a quarter of adult Catholics are between the ages of 18 to 35; around 
half between the ages of 35 to 64; and around a quarter aged 65 or over. Viewed next to the 
population as a whole, the Catholic numbers for the youngest two age categories are 
comparatively low. That said, 35 to 44 year olds are overrepresented within the Catholic 
community. From the age of 45 upwards, the Catholic percentages broadly mirror those of the 
general population. (Bullivant, 2016: 9) 
While the gender split of the English and Welsh Catholic population mirrors the 
broader Christian population, Catholics are notably younger than the broader Christian 
population in Britain. According to Bullivant (2016: 9), half of all Christians are over 55, while 
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for Catholics only a third are over 55. Finally, on the race/ethnicity profile of English and 
Welsh Catholics, 6.3% of the sample identified as black and 3.3% as Asian, compared with 
3.5% and 7.2% respectively for the general population. Furthermore, 87.4% of Catholics 
identify as white, compared with 87% of the general population. However, as Bullivant 
(2016: 10) explains, the categories used in the survey masks the diversity “of national and 
ethnic background within the White Catholic population: Irish, Polish, Italian, Spanish, 
Lithuanian etc.”, all which may show differences between the white Catholic and white 
general population (Bullivant, 2016: 10). 
 Every 10 years (1998, 2008, 2018), the BSA survey includes a module of questions on 
religious beliefs. Unfortunately, however, the 2018 dataset at time of writing has not yet 
been released. So here I sketch a short overview of British Catholic beliefs using the 2008 
data,10 acknowledging that over the last 11 years these percentages may well have changed. 
According to 2008 BSA data of those identifying as ‘Roman Catholics’ (n=211), 59.3% were 
absolutely sure they believed in God, 25.5% were somewhat sure, 11.5% were not quite 
sure, 2% were not sure at all, and 1.8% were sure they did not believe in God. In regard to 
God’s involvement with humans—“There is a God who concerns Himself with every human 
being personally”—56% agreed and 14.2% disagreed (n=147). More personally, in response 
to the statement “Do you think that God is directly involved in your affairs?” 56.6% 
answered yes and 42.9% answered no (n=204; percentages don’t add up to 100 due to other 
options being available). Finally, when asked “Do you believe in heaven?”, 77.3% answered 
yes and 22.7% answered no (n=149). While these findings are from 2008 they still highlight 
 
10 British Social Attitudes datasets are available at: http://www.britsocat.com. 
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that within Catholicism in Britain there is a clear diversity of religious beliefs, again warning 
us against treating Catholicism, or any religion, monolithically. 
 Self-reported religious service attendance measures on surveys are known to be 
problematic, as the results are not supported by observations of actual religious service 
attendance (Marler and Hadaway, 1999). Still, self-reported religious service attendance 
measures on surveys can inform us of the strength of religious identity among respondents, 
or the social desirability of being perceived as observant, as those who hold a strong self-
image of being religious tend to report attending services more often. Thus, despite 
concerns of the utility of self-reported attendance questions for informing us on actual 
attendance, these measures can be a good measure of religiosity (Brenner, 2011). Of the 
BSA’s 2019 sample, 23% of Catholics reported weekly religious service attendance, this being 
lower than non-Christian religious individuals (40%), yet higher than Anglicans (9%) (Curtice 
et al., 2019: 25). 
 Moving from specific religious beliefs and practice to social views, again to warn 
against seeing Catholics as solely a traditional, conservative, homogeneous  population, it is 
interesting that 59% of British Catholics in the BSA sample agree with same-sex civil 
partnerships. Whilst, this is lower than the figure for those who profess no religion (73%), it 
is notably higher than acceptance of same-sex civil partnerships among those who belong to 
non-Christian religions (34%) (Curtice et al., 2019: 118). To counter another common 
stereotype, 82% of Catholics think pre-marital sex is “rarely wrong” or “not wrong at all”, the 
exact same figure as Anglicans, although less than those with no religion (93%) (Curtice et 
al., 2019: 121). 
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3.4.8.2 Age, gender and location of participants 
 Above I have provided a short overview of the Catholic population of Britain, I now 
turn to the composition of my own sample of Catholics. To ensure the anonymity of 
participants in this study, throughout the analysis I refer to participants’ ages in their decade 
brackets (Table 3.2).  
Table 3.2 Age and gender of participants. 
 Age bracket  
Gender 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 Total 
Female 4 0 4 4 2 1 1 16 
Male 2 0 0 7 2 2 2 15 
Grand Total 6 0 4 11 4 3 3 31 
 
As can be seen in Table 3.2, there was a near even split between female (n=16) and 
male (n=15) participants, and the most common age bracket was 50-59 (n=11). While 
representative sampling is not a focus of this type of qualitative study, I aimed to include 
participants from all age groups and an even distribution of genders. Comparing the age of 
my sample to Bullivant’s (2016: 9) report on the age profiles of Catholics in England and 
Wales, shows that while I do have a skew to an older age group (21 out of 30 participants 
being over 50), the lack of younger representation somewhat mirrors the broader Catholic 
population, of whom only 24% of are under 35 (Bullivant, 2016: 9). Lastly, as can be seen in 
Table 3.2, I was not able to recruit any participants from the 30-39 age range. This omission 
is perhaps somewhat related to the broader demographics of Catholicism in England, 
however it does represent a limitation of the sample. 
My sampling strategy did not focus on one location, instead I aimed to interview 
Catholic individuals from around the country. However, snowball sampling proved more 
 157 
effective in some locations than in others. Table 3.3 displays the locations of participants in 
the study, with the most common area for participants to live being Birmingham (n=16). This 
is unsurprising, given it was the location of my university, and the location of many of the 
religious networks to which I had access. Nonetheless, I also recruited participants from the 
South West, the North West, and South East of England. A complete breakdown of 
participant demographics can be found in Appendix VI. 
Table 3.3 Number of participants by location. 
Row Labels Participants 
Birmingham 16 
Cheltenham 7 
Hereford 2 
London 2 
Bristol 2 
Sheffield 1 
Crewe 1 
Grand Total 31 
 
While my sample represents a range of demographics, we must be aware that the 
relatively older age of participants may affect the data generated. For example, participants 
who went through secondary education before 1988 may not have been taught evolution at 
school, as evolution only became compulsory with the introduction of the National 
Curriculum in 1988 (Mead et al., 2017: 3). Thus, a younger sample of Catholics may well have 
had more to say on the matter, given they certainly received formal education on the topic. 
That being said, all but three of my sample had been through, or were currently going 
through, higher education. With the majority of participants having or currently completing 
a university degree, my sample represents those of higher educational attainment, and this 
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may also impact on the data generated. Though, as stated previously, this does not diminish 
the results in this type of exploratory, qualitative research, rather one must be aware of the 
effects of the sample on the data generated, and thus the claims which can be made from it. 
3.4.8.3 Religiosity of participants 
 Above I have shown the Catholic population of Britain is not a monolith, with varying 
beliefs, Church attendance and social views. My own sample is no different. While I do not 
have space here to detail all the varying ways one can be Catholic (this would be for another 
project entirely), in this section I give an overview of the diversity of religiosity in my sample.  
 All of my participants expressed a belief in God, however, mirroring the broader 
British Catholic population above, there were differing certainties of belief conceptions of 
God among my participants. For example, Rebecca (60s, retired education management) 
expressed a very personal view of a God who answers individuals’ prayers and intervenes in 
the world. However, Malcolm (80s, retired scientist) held a view of a more distant God, as he 
was unable to believe in an intervening God due to the problem of evil and natural disasters. 
Similarly, there were diverse views on the nature of the soul, with some (Wilfred, 50s, 
university lecturer) arguing it is impossible to know what a soul is, and others (e.g. Gregory, 
70s, retired engineer) arguing all living things have souls, yet humans have a particularly 
special version. 
 There was a diversity in self-reported religious services attendance, from those 
saying they do attend, though not as much as they would like, to those who attended 
Church multiple days a week. Again, showing the diversity of opinions, there were 
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individuals who thought that the introduction of English language Mass post-Vatican II 
represented a positive direction for the Church, whilst others viewed this linguistic shift 
away from Latin as the exemplar of contemporary Catholicism’s betrayal of tradition. 
Somewhat mirroring attitudes to the language of Mass, there were differing views on 
Francis’s papacy. Some, more liberal individuals viewed Francis as a much needed modern 
figurehead of the Church, whose progressive views more aligned with their own. However, 
others thought the reign of Francis was bringing about a great time of upheaval and 
potential existential threat to Catholicism. As one participant (John, 70s, retired engineer) 
ominously remarked to me on finishing the interview: “There’s a schism coming….” 
 This short overview is clearly not exhaustive, and is solely intended to demonstrate 
that the data in this study did not come from a religiously or theologically homogeneous 
sample of Catholics. Like the broader Catholic population of Britain, my sample of English 
Catholics show a diversity of religiosity. Furthermore, my sample included a broad range of 
age and gender demographics, however as discussed above, the sample tended to be more 
highly educated than the general population, which it must be acknowledged may have 
some impact on the data collected. 
 
3.5 Positionality and reflexivity 
As has been discussed above, reflexivity plays an important role in qualitative 
research, aiding the researcher in positioning themselves towards their work. Indeed, the 
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practice of reflexivity is a major strategy for quality control in qualitative research (Berger, 
2013). Reflexivity allows the researcher to acknowledge how their history, experiences, 
identities, and attitudes, influence the research process and the co-construction of accounts 
in the interview interaction (Stenner, 1993; Finlay, 2002). It is appropriate, then, to include a 
reflexive practice section about my position within and towards my work, and how this may 
have affected this thesis’s constitution. 
A common mode of thinking about this position is the seemingly rigid duality 
between insider and outsider researcher. However, this binary masks the multiple positions 
a researcher can occupy regarding the subject matter, and the participants through which 
they aim to access it. As Dwyer and Buckle (2009) have argued, it is more productive to think 
of the “space between”, rather than a false dualism of insider or outsider researcher. To 
illuminate this point, it is necessary to give a short autobiography. 
3.5.1 The researcher and the research 
To understand my position within and towards the work, I will explore my own 
identities which may bear on its constitution. First, to discuss my (non)religious identity. My 
mother is an Italian Catholic, and my father identifies as an atheist, although he was raised in 
a culturally Anglican home. As most people raised in a demi-Italian household know, Italian 
is the culturally dominant allele of the gene. Therefore, I attended Catholic Church with the 
family (tailing off into my teens), attended Roman Catholic primary and secondary schools, 
was baptised, and willingly completed my First Holy Communion and Confirmation. 
Sometime, around 17, after decreasing service attendance, I stopped identifying as religious 
and thus became a Catholic disaffiliate. Here I joined the ranks of just over a third of all 
 161 
English and Welsh cradle Catholics who now identify as having no religion (Bullivant, 2016: 
11). Though, not all non-religious identities are the same, and at this time I started reading 
New Atheist literature—the works of Dawkins, Harris, Hitchens, and Dennett—and strongly 
identified with science. Nowadays, my atheist identity is far less fervent than it once was, 
indeed the research process itself has to some extent moderated this. I currently identify as 
an agnostic atheist, choosing either word or a combination depending on who’s present. To 
clarify what I mean by ‘agnostic atheist’, I am an agnostic epistemologically, regarding the 
question of the possibility of knowledge of God. I believe that it cannot be known if there is 
or is not a God, therefore I am agnostic to it. I am an atheist ontologically, as I choose to 
reject theistic ontological assumptions—I.e. I do not believe a God exists. I do not know 
there is no God, I do not assert there is no God, as I don’t think it is possible to know, 
however, I reject a theistic ontological conception of the universe. I find my position to align 
with the philosopher John Gray’s general definition: “an atheist is anyone with no use for the 
idea of a divine mind that has fashioned the world” (Gray, 2018: 2). 
My non-religious identity is not the only salient identity in this research. As Elsdon-
Baker and Mason-Wilkes (2019: 15-16) argue, in this area we are involved not only in the 
study of religion, but of science as well. It is therefore important to expand on my current 
and past positionings towards science. I don’t have much memory of science classes from 
primary school, but certainly by the time I was in secondary school I was considered a 
“science-y” type. It was the subject I enjoyed the most and enjoyed the most success at. At 
this point I knew I wanted a future working in science, the question was only which area to 
choose? I went on to do science and technology based A-Levels and finally settled on 
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studying biological sciences, specialising in genetics, for my undergraduate. Fearing life on 
the lab bench (and pipette-itive strain injury) I decided to study a science communication 
master’s degree. At this point I began practicing science communication, editing the science 
and technology section of the student newspaper, and for a while I was a science presenter, 
at primary school assemblies, local festivals and afterschool clubs. This is all to say, I have a 
strong identification with science. However, as time has passed, and I have studied more 
PUS and STS literature, I do not hold an uncritically positive attitude towards science. This 
critical aspect of my views has particularly developed during the PhD process itself, 
especially through working as part of the SRES11 team at Newman University and the 
University of Birmingham. Nonetheless, it must be said, that I still retain the self-image of a 
(somewhat) science-y person. 
In relation to evolution, I believe some form of evolution has happened, probably 
some unknown mixture of Darwinian natural selection and Lamarckian acquisition. I have no 
solid preference on the ‘levels of selection’ question.12 My evolutionism and my atheism are 
also entwined. Evolution gives me a narrative for how, in the absence of a God, endless 
forms most beautiful and wonderful emerged from so simple beginnings—I think there truly 
is grandeur in this view of life. I do not, however, believe that because evolution is, God is 
 
11 The Science and Religion: Exploring the Spectrum project (SRES) ran from Feb 2015 – December 2017 
and was funded by Templeton Religion Trust (grant number: TRT0082; Principal Investigator: Professor 
Fern Elsdon-Baker). The project investigated perceptions of religious belief and evolution in the UK and 
Canada. I worked as a part-time Research Associate on the project between 2016 – 2018. 
12 The ‘levels of selection’ question relates to debates about at which level of the biological hierarchy 
natural selection acts. It could act at the level of the gene, the individual, the group, the community, the 
species etc. While the debate can be traced back to Darwin himself, the modern debate began in the 
1960s (Okasha, 2010). For a quick introduction to the levels of selection question, see Okasha, 2010. For a 
book length study of the scientific and philosophical dimensions to the levels of selection question, see 
Okasha, 2006. 
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not. Such an argument is reductive, one does not negate the other. Hence I can see why and 
how theistic individuals can subscribe to an evolutionary model of life’s development.  
The question becomes, then, how to reflect as an insider or outsider? Traditionally 
this would be done along the boundary lines of the community one is investigating—here, 
Catholics. As I now identify as an agnostic atheist, I would be an outsider. Though as a 
former Catholic, perhaps I have a residual foot in the conclave. Though surely we cannot 
draw so rigidly the salient identities in this study, and across the 31 interviews I conducted. 
My liking of science, and evolution specifically, was shared by some participants. Therefore, 
I, as a self-avowed evolutionist, also had insider status with other fellow evolutionists I 
interviewed. For those who opposed evolution, my outsider identity is doubled, as I am 
neither a Catholic, nor sceptical of evolutionary change. What of my demographics, being a 
young(er) male, this is also an identity that may play a role in insider/outsider discussions. 
It may also be that the perception of me as a researcher, associated with the 
scientific pursuit, in some way affected the accounts in the interviews. When tentatively 
describing what they thought evolution was, some participants flipped the question, instead 
asking me what it was. I tried to minimise this perception of me as “expert” in these matters 
and reassured participants that they were the only true expert of their own lives. I further 
used self-disclosure, reciprocity and open-mindedness to mitigate perceived power 
differentials. For all participants, I did not initially disclose my non-religious identity and 
biography, but if participants asked if I was Catholic then I gave the same response: “I was 
brought up Catholic, I went to Catholic schools, but I don’t Identify as Catholic now.” I chose 
not to use the label of “atheist” as I believed it had the potential to negatively impact our 
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relationships, as it is a contested, messy, and politically charged term. If I were to use it, I 
would have had to engage in lengthy qualifications, introducing concepts to distinguish what 
I meant by the term, and this would have distracted from the task at hand: discussing the 
participant’s views. 
3.5.2 Untangling epistemological and ontological concerns 
While above I have reflected on my position in and towards the work, it is now worth 
exploring epistemological and ontological questions related to this thesis. The potential 
audiences for this kind of work are numerous—STS and PUS scholars, historians and 
philosophers of science, sociologists of religion, theologians, natural scientists, priests, and 
science communication scholars and practitioners. Depending where you are situated as a 
reader, the following reflection may seem either convoluted, unnecessary, obvious, or 
useful. As this is an area where vocal scientists are critical of this type of research, labelling it 
“accommodationist” for asking people what they believe (Coyne, 2018), it is even more 
necessary to engage in some philosophical reflections. Evolutionary biologist and popular 
atheist, Jerry Coyne wrote: “accommodationists like those supporting the SRES project start 
with the premise that science and religion are compatible, and then confect ways to justify 
that conclusion” (Coyne, 2018). This could not be further from the truth. I do not think 
science and religion are necessarily compatible, nor do I think they are necessarily 
incompatible. I think it depends on where, when, what, to whom and when we are asking 
the question. The relationships between science and religion are multiple, depend on social 
and historical contexts, and frames of reference. Here, Coyne is arguing from an 
epistemological frame, but we could equally investigate the relationship social-
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institutionally. This way he himself becomes an actor engaged in stern (and contested) 
boundary work, proclaiming what true science and true religion are, and therefore 
constructing the one and true relationship between them. The obvious result of his 
boundary work, is not solving the issue, but selling more books. 
There is, however, a real danger of work in this area taking a fully relativistic position 
in regard to the products of scientific knowledge. As Elsdon-Baker and Mason-Wilkes (2019: 
15-16) reflect, sociologists of religion normally don’t have to subscribe to the worldview of 
their participants, but as someone empirically studying science and perceptions of science it 
is uncomfortable to so drastically level the epistemological playing field. In the disciplinary 
forerunner to STS, sociology of scientific knowledge, scholars adopted the approaches of 
symmetry and methodological relativism (Pinch, 2008: 35-48). This meant not appealing to 
absolute standards of ‘truth’ or rationality for explanation of the recognition and 
differentiation of science and non-science. Instead, perceptions of science and non-science 
were assessed for their social explanations, and not in correspondence to, or weighted by, 
their perceived truth claims. Nonetheless, various schools of thought within STS saw things 
differently, with some arguing that just because STS has shown the social elements of 
scientific knowledge, it did not mean the knowledge was ‘wrong’ (Collins and Yearley, 1992). 
These debates continue today, where STS scholars reflect on how their perspectives have 
influenced the apparent “post-truth” age (Sismondo, 2017). 
I would argue that in social studies of science and religion we must distinguish 
epistemology and ontology on multiple levels. We are dealing with the natural world of 
evolution, and the social world of religious attitudes towards it. In regard to natural scientific 
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conception of evolution itself, I hold it to be epistemologically sound, which informs my 
ontology, concluding evolution exists (though I believe that knowledge of evolution, and all 
science, is to some extent socially constructed). However, my work is not dealing with the 
natural scientific ‘truth’ of evolution, it is dealing with a complex web of social relationships 
around religion and science, Catholic attitudes towards evolution being a small subset of this 
broader web. In this thesis, I take a relativistic position on this attitudinal relationship 
between Catholicism and evolution, rejecting one true relationship between Catholicism and 
evolution therefore believing there to be multiple realities on the issue. This must then be 
further separated from how I constitute these relationships in the analysis and write-up of 
my study. Again, I suggest there are multiple realities here, and researcher decisions are 
paramount to which gets salience. I could, if I wished, present the reality of Catholicism-
evolution relations along a (classical) axis of “Accept-Reject”. But this by no means 
represents the sole truth of the matter, I could represent differing knowledge levels of 
evolution among Catholics, or indeed along a totally new conceptualisation of this 
relationship. There is no one way to conceive of the relationship between Catholicism and 
evolution. Therefore, there are multiple realities of Catholicism-science relations, the worth 
of each must be evaluated alongside the aims of the research. 
Furthermore, the relationship between Catholicism and evolution, is largely separate 
from epistemological and ontological questions relating to natural scientific evolution. These 
are two separate questions. One, the validity of evolution, is a natural scientific question, 
which must be assessed and evaluated with the corresponding methodological, 
epistemological and ontological frameworks. The second, this thesis, is a social research 
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question best assessed and evaluated with the corresponding methodology, epistemology 
and ontological frameworks. 
Additionally, as PUS scholars have argued over the years, an epistemic deficit is a 
poor way of understanding attitudes, therefore the epistemology of evolutionary science, 
likely has little bearing on Catholic attitudes. These Catholics are not reading expert 
literature and drawing conclusions. They are drawing from a web of popular 
communications and representations, influenced by values, identities, and apathy. 
As I have argued above, I situate this thesis in the qualitative research paradigm, which 
rejects the methods of natural science for investigating social worlds. In this paradigm, I 
make use of social constructionism. Social construction is a term which can be applied at 
many different levels; it has multiple meanings and therefore the possibility of multiple 
misinterpretations. Thus, it is important to fully define the way I am using a notion of social 
construction in this thesis. 
In The Social Construction of What? the philosopher of science Ian Hacking (1999) 
outlines three levels of theses relating to the depth of a social constructionists’ argument:  
(1) X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. X, or X as it is at present, is not 
determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable.  
Very often [researchers] go further, and urge that:  
(2) X is quite bad as it is. 
(3) We would be much better off if X were done away with, or at least radically transformed. 
(Hacking, 1999: 6-7) 
 
In the present thesis, as well as conceiving the interview itself as an “active” site of 
co-construction of knowledge (Holstein and Gubrium, 2004), the relationship between 
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science and religion is seen as socially constructed in the sense of Hacking’s thesis (1). That 
is, perceptions of the relationship are not inevitable, they were “brought into existence or 
shaped by social events, forces, history, all of which could have been different” (Hacking, 
1999: 7). In this way, Catholics are not seen as having an essential attitude towards 
evolution; rather various attitudes are formed based on contingent events, experiences, and 
social forces. Hacking  goes on to say that often studies slide easily from a thesis type (1) to 
(3), but they need not do so. The present research does not make this transition. It is fully 
situated in Hacking’s type (1) thesis of social construction (Hacking, 1999: 6-7). 
In another study of public perceptions of the relationship between science and 
religion, Baker (2012) also aligns with this position, noting the socially constructed nature of 
the perceptions of the relationship. According to Baker (2012: 341) these perceptions are 
“pragmatic, heuristic, and vary depending on how individuals engage both institutions, 
rather than being indicative of an inherent relationship between the two”. It is this notion of 
the differing constructions of science and religion, which this thesis aims to investigate. 
What forms of evolution are religious individuals accepting or rejecting? What is the 
relationship between these constructions and their wider beliefs? As Glennan asks: “Whose 
science and whose religion?” (Glennan, 2009: 797). 
In my research I also follow Baker’s theoretical approach, bracketing the 
philosophical concerns of conflict and compatibility from the study, and investigating 
perceived relationships as an empirical issue (Baker, 2012: 341). Furthermore, I align with 
Evans and Evans’ suggestion that where conflict is found, we should not assume it is solely 
based on epistemology, instead: “sociologists who examine the relationship between 
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science and religion [should] not assume the epistemological conflict model, but rather leave 
the source of contestation as an empirical question” (Evans and Evans, 2008: 101). 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
This thesis aims to empirically investigate the relationship between Catholicism and 
evolution in England. In this chapter I have outlined the aims, research questions, and 
research rationale of the study. I have also outlined the methods of the two analyses in this 
thesis. The first is an ECA of English newspaper representations of papal statements on 
evolution from 1996 to 2017. This analysis of public discourse will explore how English 
newspapers have represented John Paul II, Benedict XVI, and Francis’ statements on 
evolution. The second is a thematic analysis of 31 semi-structured interviews with Catholics 
in England. This analysis of public attitudes will explore how individual Catholic’s perceptions 
and attitudes towards evolution, and the relationship between evolution and their faith. 
Finally, I have reflected on my own position within and toward the research, and have 
attempted to untangle some epistemological and ontological concerns in this area of SSSR. 
In the next chapter I detail the results of my ECA of English newspaper 
representations of recent papal statements on evolution. Throughout the analysis I 
contextualise the newspaper coverage with reviews of the papal comments themselves, and 
other important events which may have influenced the reporting.
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Chapter 4: English newspaper representations of papal 
statements on evolution (1996-2017) 
4.1 Introduction 
On 27th October 2014, Pope Francis addressed the Pontifical Academy of Sciences 
(PAS) on the topic of evolution, declaring: “The evolution of nature does not contrast with 
the notion of creation, as evolution presupposes the creation of beings that evolve” (Francis, 
2014). His speech triggered worldwide media reaction with many commentators hailing the 
Pope’s modern outlook. The next day The Independent ran with the headline: “Pope Francis 
declares evolution and Big Bang theory are right and God isn't 'a magician with a magic 
wand'; Francis goes against Benedict XVI's apparent support for 'intelligent design'” 
(Withnall, 2014). Writers at America’s NBC News reflected that the remarks “appeared to be 
a theological break from his predecessor Benedict XVI, a strong exponent of creationism.” 
(Jamieson et al., 2014). The amount of media coverage in response to Francis’ speech 
suggests that some outlets perceived the pre-Francis Church to be anti-science, anti-
evolution, or even pro-Intelligent Design (ID). 
A purported vacillation between popes’ positions has also appeared in academic 
literature on science and religion, with sociologist John H. Evans observing that: 
There has been some ambiguity about evolution, with the Church seeming at times towards 
agreeing with intelligent design theory, then moving back to agreement with neo-Darwinism that 
has been more typical of twentieth-century Catholicism.  Reflecting this somewhat ambiguous 
history, in February of 2009 a Vatican analyst wrote that the Vatican had just “dealt the final blow 
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to speculation that Pope Benedict XVI might be prepared to endorse the theory of Intelligent 
Design.” (Evans, 2018: 89) 
Here, as will be discussed in this chapter, Evans references two English newspaper 
articles to make his point, demonstrating how media representations of science and religion 
can and do influence academic discourse on the matter. 
Highlighting the contested nature of press reporting, some journalists did admonish 
the more sensational media coverage around Francis’s comments, and maintained that the 
Church had accepted evolution for some time. Two days after Francis’s comments, Time’s 
religion and politics correspondent, Elizabeth Dias, argued that “a statement like this is 
nothing new” for the Church and criticised the general media reaction, complaining how 
“site after site after site ramped up the Pope’s words and took them out of context” (Dias, 
2014). As there were multiple media interpretations of Francis’s comments, with some of 
these very likely to be acting as an influence on academic writing on this matter, it is 
important to carefully investigate the varying media representations of papal comments on 
evolution. 
To achieve this aim, in this chapter, I explore how large circulation English 
newspapers have represented papal statements about evolution from 1996 to 2017. To 
better understand how press coverage developed, throughout I contextualize the media 
analysis with events, articles, and speeches concerning the Catholic Church and evolution 
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that have directly impacted on reporting of papal comments on evolution in English 
newspapers across the period.1 
In this analysis, I do not seek to hypothesise on causal audience effects resulting from 
papal statements about evolution, instead I focus on the content and themes in the articles 
themselves. In this way, I seek to explore the role of the press in constructing certain 
versions of reality in an episode of public contact between religion and science. I will discuss 
three instances where popes’ statements on evolution received English newspaper 
attention. The first instance is John Paul II’s, 1996, address to the PAS, where he affirmed 
evolution as “more than a hypothesis”. I show that Galileo is used as a historical example in 
many of these articles, giving an overly simplified impression of historical conflict. I also 
show that John Paul’s views are repeatedly used as a rhetorical device by some authors 
when arguing against Creationism. In the second instance, 11 years later, the media 
reporting on Benedict XVI came in response to his statements in a 2007 book, Creation and 
Evolution. I detail how the media built a narrative before Benedict’s comments, which set an 
expectation for him to shift the Vatican’s position on evolution. I demonstrate that there are 
two representations of Benedict XVI’s comments, one which sees him as endorsing ID and 
one rejecting it. However, beyond his papacy, as other outlets stop referencing his views, 
the non-endorsement narrative ceases, and The Independent continues to stress Benedict’s 
“apparent support” for ID—despite Benedict never explicitly backing the position. In the 
third instance, on 27th October, 2014, Francis also addressed the PAS and stressed the 
 
1 It should be noted that this is not an exhaustive list of all Vatican, or broader Catholic, events concerning 
evolution since 1996. For example, I have not mentioned several conferences that have been held by the 
PAS, where members have discussed topics related to evolution. 
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compatibility between creation and evolution. I argue that in one newspaper, The 
Independent, because Benedict is claimed as an apparent supporter of ID, Francis’s 
comments are represented as more progressive in The Independent than in other 
publications.  
 
4.2 Overview of dataset 
The final number of articles in the dataset was n=83. Table 4.1 displays the online, 
print, and total articles from each publication in the study.  
Table 4.1 Number of articles by publications.: Online, print, and total. 
 
These were split between print (n=60) and online (n=23). The distribution of print 
and online articles can be seen in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1 Number of articles in selected English newspapers which mention papal comments on 
evolution. 
 
 
It is clear from the above graph that over the period considered, coverage shifts from 
print to online reflecting larger media trends towards online content. Although, as discussed 
in Chapter 3, the LexisNexis database only has full coverage of online articles from The Times 
from May 2011, The Daily Telegraph from March 2006, and Daily Mail from March 2012. 
Nonetheless, a clear decline in print articles over the period is evident, as discussed below, 
this brings with it format changes which are important for my analysis. 
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Further, I split the dataset between those initial news articles focussed on immediate 
reporting of popes’ statements about evolution, and subsequent articles which reference 
one or more of these statements. Figure 4.2 displays the split between initial news (n=12) 
and the subsequent articles (n=71); with the initial news reporting coinciding with the 
instances of papal comment on evolution which received media attention by John Paul II in 
1996, Benedict XVI in 2007, and Francis in 2014. 
Figure 4.2 Initial news coverage and subsequent articles referring to papal comments on evolution. 
 
Table 4.2 displays a further breakdown of the initial news coverage of each papal 
statement on evolution, including the publication, date, article type, and headline. The 
‘newsbites’ article type refers to snippet articles that often use one simple quote, sometimes 
among other newsworthy quotes, from the same week’s news. 
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 Table 4.2 Articles comprising initial news reporting on papal statements. 
Table 4.2 shows that the news reporting on Francis’ 2014 pronouncements took place 
exclusively online. This further justifies my decision to include online content in the study, as 
without online content the study would overlook reporting on Francis’ comments.  
Interesting and arresting headlines have always been a fundamental part of news 
reporting, however, the shift to online content has introduced new challenges for journalists 
and editors. Reading down Table 4.2’s headline column it is clear that the online headlines 
are longer (in part because they are also indexed with brief article summaries). With the 
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competition for top places in search listings a major challenge in online journalism, search 
engine optimisation (SEO) has become an integral part of companies’ marketing strategies. 
Classic newspaper headlines might have been creative, funny or cryptic, but online headlines 
must be straightforward, state simple key terms, and use the proper names of protagonists 
(BBC, 2018). For example, we can see in Table 4.2 that in coverage of John Paul and 
Benedict’s statements the word ‘Darwin’ was used in headlines as shorthand for ‘evolution’. 
Whereas ‘Darwin’ is absent in the more pragmatic online headlines covering Francis’ 
comments, which focus on the most important searchable keywords. We might attribute 
these differences to Francis’ comments covering the Big Bang as well as evolution, but we 
can see that even in The Guardian, whose headline focusses solely on evolution, the 
euphemisms ‘Darwin’ or ‘Genesis’ are not used in place of ‘evolution’ and ‘creation’. The 
Independent’s headline also has an allusion to Benedict being a supporter of intelligent 
design, a point discussed in more detail later in this chapter.   
Optimising SEO can also mean using ‘internal links’ to related content on the same 
publication’s website. This serves two functions, to retain and direct a website user to other 
content on the same website, and to increase the ranking of a website in search engines 
(Whalley, 2017). As will be explored, some websites use internal links more than others, with 
The Independent using internal references about Francis and evolution more than the any 
other publication in my study. 
The dataset can be further split into articles types, including news, book reviews, 
comments & features, and collection (Table 4.3). The ‘collection’ article being an online 
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format, that outlines ‘best quotes’ with links to original articles where the quotes were first 
published. 
 Table 4.3 Article types in the dataset. 
 
The Independent (n=26) published the most content across all publications studied, 
although as stated previously, some earlier online content may be missing for other 
publications. The most common article type was news (n=37) followed by features & 
comment (n=35). Interestingly, while the Daily Mail published seven news articles which 
contained a reference to a pope’s views on evolution, it produced no comment or feature 
articles, reflecting the publication’s focus on entertainment. 
After introducing this simple quantitative description of the dataset, I now proceed 
onto the qualitative analysis of the narratives and themes in the corpus. Here I focus on the 
reporting of initial news representations of popes’ statements, and themes in subsequent 
reporting. I also contextualise the reporting with summaries of the popes’ original 
statements, and other events and articles outside the corpus which influenced the coverage. 
A more detailed account of these events can be found in Chapter 2. 
 
 
179 
4.3 John Paul II (1996-2005) 
On 22nd October, 1996, Pope John Paul II publicly addressed the topic of evolution, 
describing it as “more than a hypothesis.” He recalled the words of Pius XII’s 1950 encyclical, 
Humani generis, which had stated the Church did not forbid discussion of the evolution of 
the human body, but deemed it a “hypothesis” with “some sort of scientific foundation.” 
John Paul II’s speech, however, published in French on 22nd October, 1996, recognised 
evolution as “more than a hypothesis,” noting that scientific evidence in many fields had 
converged on the theory (John Paul II, 1996).  
John Paul stressed that there are various philosophical foundations on which 
evolution is based: “Hence the existence of materialist, reductionist, spiritualist 
interpretations” (John Paul II, 1996). This recognition of the diversity of philosophical 
formations of evolution is an important conceptual point. John Paul, Benedict, and Francis, 
in their own way all state a belief in some form of evolution, while setting out certain 
provisos. These are related to a special conception of humanity, but also relate to the 
separation of evolution as a scientific theory from evolution as part of an all-encompassing 
atheistic/materialistic worldview. Popes, when speaking on evolution, have argued in these 
broader philosophical and theological terms. However, as I discuss below, some press 
reporting has tended to focus on the popes’ comments on evolution’s natural scientific 
validity—mirroring a simplistic notion of evolution as something one can ‘accept’ or ‘reject’. I 
will further explore the problems with this kind of dualistic thinking in subsequent chapters. 
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For John Paul, the special status of humans is linked to these broader philosophical 
and theological conceptions of evolution. John Paul argued that for humans there is an 
“ontological leap”, a discontinuity due to humanity’s intellect and eternal soul. He warned 
that theories of evolution which regard the soul as emerging from living matter “are 
incompatible with the truth about man” (John Paul II, 1996). Furthermore, John Paul argued 
that science and its observations and experiments cannot assess the experience of 
metaphysical knowledge, self-consciousness, moral conscience, liberty, or aesthetic and 
religious experience. 
4.3.1 News coverage of John Paul II’s comments 
Three articles in my dataset of English newspapers report on John Paul II’s 1996 
address (Table 4.4). All three articles represent the topic of evolution as not just a matter of 
scientific validity (i.e. is it true or not), but also present some of the philosophical and 
theological points made in John Paul’s address. 
In the first article, in The Independent, under the headline: “Vatican’s slow evolution 
as it discovers Darwin”, religious affairs correspondent, Andrew Brown, highlighted the long 
time it’s taken for the Vatican to present a statement on evolution. He noted that it had 
taken 138 years after Darwin published On the Origin of Species, and 6000 years after 
Archbishop Ussher’s calculated date for the creation of the world, for the Catholic Church to 
acknowledge evolution as true. Brown stressed how John Paul “continues to resist the 
doctrine” that the human spirit arose from unaided natural processes. Furthermore, Brown 
situated John Paul’s comments in the historical context of Pius’s Humani generis, 
highlighting Pius’ comments on a literal Adam and original sin: 
 
 
181 
The Pope's acknowledgement of the truth of the evolutionary, scientific view of the world's 
history ends a long rearguard action fought by the Roman Catholic Church to maintain some 
literal sense for the book of Genesis. In 1950, Pope Pius XII allowed Catholics to believe in the 
truth of evolution, although he insisted that it was not proven, and that full weight should be 
given to the arguments against it. (Brown, 1996) 
Unlike some later comment and feature articles, Brown’s news article did not 
attempt to situate the episode in a larger narrative of science-religion warfare. Although it 
became apparent during the analysis that a conflict narrative was prevalent in much of the 
press reporting of papal comments on evolution.  
 Table 4.4 Initial news reporting on John Paul II. 
 
On the same day as The Independent article, The Times’s Rome correspondent 
Richard Owen wrote that the Pope had “risked the wrath of the religious Right” by claiming 
evolution and Christianity were compatible. He recounted that Darwin’s theories had led to 
“bitter controversy” in the 19th century, with “leading churchmen denouncing them as 
incompatible with the account given in Genesis.” The phrase “leading churchmen” is not 
further defined, the implication being that the Catholic Church had denounced evolution. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 2 evolution was never denounced nor condemned by the 
Catholic Church, although sceptical attitudes did exist in the late 19th and early 20th century. 
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In the article, Owen also referenced Humani generis and noted how John Paul’s 
comments “went further” than Pius’, and referenced John Paul’s comments on the soul 
being immediately created by God. Owen also raised a point of epistemic conflict, along 
similar lines as Dawkins’ aforementioned contention, suggesting that: “The Pope appeared 
to side step the vexed theological question of whether, if the theory of evolution from apes 
and Australopithecus afarensis through Neanderthal man to Homo sapiens is correct, 
creatures before modern man had souls.” In the article, Owen proceeded to quote a 
philosopher who claimed that “after Galileo's rehabilitation, acceptance of evolutionary 
theory was the latest in a series of steps which were ‘mending the tears’ in the Church's 
relationship with science.” (Owen, 1996). This is the first reference to Galileo in the dataset; 
as discussed below, Galileo is repeatedly used as a historical example of the Catholic 
Church’s relationship with science, and often used as an exemplar of conflictual science-
religion relations more broadly. 
 
In the final news article covering John Paul’s 1996 comments The Guardian’s science 
editor, Tim Radford, included a snippet on the Pope’s comments among other stories about 
science from the week, including nanotubes, the world’s oldest astronaut, and cattle’s 
greenhouse gas emissions. The relevant snippet reads: 
 
Pope okays Darwin  
John Paul II cleared Galileo of episcopal charges in 1992. Last week he told the Pontifical 
Academy of Sciences that evolution was now 'more than a hypothesis'. But Creation itself was the 
work of God. Human beings also transcended the materialistic order. So, theories of evolution 
which considered the spirit as emerging from the forces of living material were, he said 
'incompatible with the truth of man. What is more, they are incapable of establishing the dignity 
of man.' (Radford, 1996) 
 
 
 
183 
Here again we see the linking of Galileo to John Paul’s comments on evolution, 
suggesting similarities between the two episodes. Although, assessing the initial news 
coverage of John Paul’s comments, we may conclude that the newspaper reporting focusses 
not only on the scientific questions at hand, but also on the philosophical and theological 
questions raised in John Paul’s address. 
 
In Chapter 2 I highlighted that the “more than a hypothesis” phrase became the 
centre of a small controversy, with some American news outlets contending that a 
translation error meant that what the pope was in fact claiming was there was “more than 
one hypothesis in the theory of evolution” not that he thought evolution to be true. With 
the translation dispute, eventually being settled on 19th November 1996, when the editor of 
the English version of L'Osservatore Romano, Father Robert Dempsey, said the “more than a 
hypothesis” translation was the more accurate version of the Pope’s words (Scott, 1997). Of 
the three news articles from my corpus which cover John Paul II’s address, none used the 
phrasing of the (incorrect) “more than one hypothesis” translation. Indeed, two of the three 
were published before 30th October, the date of the incorrect English translation. 
Furthermore, all reported on the “more than a hypothesis” phrasing which was verified as 
the accurate translation. Neither does the “more than one hypothesis” phrase feature in any 
of the subsequent reporting in my corpus which reference John Paul’s remarks. That there 
were no mentions of this translation error in English national newspapers after the incorrect 
English translation was published, while North American newspapers hosted arguments on 
the matter, highlights the different cultural orientations towards evolution, and indeed 
science and religion, in the US and England. 
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4.3.2 Conflict and Galileo 
A broader narrative of conflict beyond the Catholic Church, at the more general level 
of religion and science, is evident in the first three comment and feature articles in the 
dataset, which followed initial news reporting. Here, various writers identify an overarching 
religion-science conflict. Science writer and broadcaster, Colin Tudge, wrote an article in The 
Independent titled: “If the Pope can find Darwin why can't Dawkins find God?” Tudge 
forwarded a similar argument to Stephen J. Gould’s NOMA hypothesis—science being 
concerned with facts and religion with teaching values. Tudge concluded the piece by 
stressing the importance of resolving the ongoing conflict he sees between science and 
religion: 
Nothing could be more important than the reconciliation of science and religion. Putting the 
matter crudely, science gives people power, and religion, in its broadest sense, decides what they 
do with it. We need more than the Pope's piecemeal acknowledgement of evolutionary theory; 
and a great deal more than the Goebbels-esque response of some scientists, who reach for their 
revolvers when they hear the word "religion". (Tudge, 1996) 
For Tudge, reconciliation between science and religion is important, and the way to 
do this is not to destroy religion but to “devise one appropriate to our age.” A reference to 
John Paul’s words on evolution was included, but only to show that the Pope did not go far 
enough for Tudge’s grand vision. Yet Tudge also chastised scientists, such as Dawkins, who 
he sees as having a role in the ongoing science-religion conflict. 
In the second article, novelist and columnist Lucy Ellmann, in a comment piece in The 
Independent, also reflected negatively on the Pope’s words, suggesting that accepting 
evolution detracts from the aesthetics of a religious worldview: 
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[T]he Pope, who has decided to bow to science on the tricky issue of evolution. His concession: "If 
the human body has its origins in pre-existing living matter, the soul was created directly from 
God." Pre-existing living matter? Makes Eden sound like a slaughterhouse. All the poetry's gone 
out of religion. (Ellmann, 1997) 
Writing in The Sunday Times, ethics writer and former editor of the Catholic Herald 
(1988 - 1992), Peter Stanford, saw John Paul’s views as a “peace settlement” between 
religion and science. However, he went on to say that:  
The Vatican then is caught offering a compromise that is too little, too late. Yet in moving as far 
as he has, John Paul is getting himself into dangerous doctrinal territory. As recently as 1950 Pope 
Pius XII instructed Catholics that the Garden of Eden account of creation "pertained to history in a 
true sense". Belief in Adam in the literal sense was vital, Pius said, because it preserved the 
doctrine of original sin - that taint carried by all humanity because of Adam's rejection of God in 
his exercise of free will. If John Paul does away with the story of the serpent and the golden 
apple, he risks uncharacteristically damaging a central tenet of the faith. (Stanford, 1996) 
Here again we see a representation of the Pope’s views as insufficient, or “too little 
too late”. However, interestingly, Stanford also raised the issue of the acceptance of 
evolution being damaging to the Catholic faith. In the next chapter analysing interviews, I 
will explore how Catholic individuals understand evolution to interact with their religious 
faith, and whether they too share the concerns of Stanford. 
The main historical context used in press coverage of John Paul II’s statements was 
that of the Galileo affair. Across the entire dataset, Galileo is mentioned twelve times, seven 
of these being in The Independent. Some authors, such as Owen (1996) and Radford (1996), 
used Galileo to illustrate historical conflict specifically between the Catholic Church and 
science, situating John Paul as a reformer in these turbulent relations. Others, however, 
extrapolated and used Galileo to represent a narrative of historical conflict between science 
and religion in general, within which this new episode of apparent harmony is placed. For 
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example, the following excerpt from Peter Stanford’s aforementioned article in The Sunday 
Times: 
A strange rapprochement is under way between the forces of religion and science.  
The prophets of religion and science have scarcely been on speaking terms since the 17th century 
when the Inquisition forced Galileo to recant his unholy views about the Earth moving round the 
sun […] As part of this rapprochement, first Galileo - in 1992 - and last week Charles Darwin have 
officially been absolved of their sins by Pope John Paul II. Darwin's theory of evolution, for almost 
140 years the ultimate heresy in Catholic eyes, has been wrongly dismissed, writes the Pope. 
(Stanford, 1996) 
 
The same allusions appear four years later in The Independent, where Catholic Priest, 
Chris Moss (2006), writing about the Church, homosexuality, and evolution observed that 
John Paul had “striven harder than any of his predecessors to reconcile science and religion.” 
Moss continued that under John Paul the: “Vatican has issued an apology for its disastrous 
condemnation of Galileo, and declared the theory of evolution compatible with Catholic 
doctrine, a position which one of his predecessors, Pius XII, had denied.” 
By linking John Paul’s pro-evolution comments to Galileo’s pardoning, these articles 
draw parallels between the two episodes. While some similarities exist, there are however 
clear differences. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Galileo affair cannot be seen solely through 
the lens of a conflict between science and religion, with some scholars noting how the affair 
had more to do with the contests of power over who had the authority to properly interpret 
the Bible, rather than scientific claims (McGrath, 1999: 12). Furthermore, Stanford’s (1996) 
claim that evolution was “for almost 140 years the ultimate heresy in Catholic eyes” is 
historically misguided, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, Darwin’s conception of evolution was 
never publicly condemned by the Church, though sceptical attitudes certainly existed within 
the Vatican. The phrasing of the unitary “Catholic eyes” also suggests a united view of 
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Catholicism amongst Catholics. As we shall explore in the next chapter discussing interviews 
with Catholics in England, considering there to be a single essential view that Catholics hold 
is a misguided assumption. While we cannot give too much weight to one small phrase, it is 
a clear example of how simplification in press discourse relating to science and religion can 
lead to the overall appearance of necessary conflict. Although difficult to quantify, this sort 
of press discourse undoubtedly informs and reinforces public attitudes on science and 
religion. With such inaccurate claims repeatedly appearing in popular discourse on science 
and religion, should we be surprised that such claims are reproduced in studies of public 
attitudes on the matter? While there was a general scepticism within the Vatican regarding 
evolution after 1859, this is a different thing entirely than regarding the whole Church, or 
indeed all religion, as anti-science. By setting John Paul II’s comments within the context of 
the Galileo controversy, writers in English newspapers draw on a larger narrative of conflict, 
which represents the Catholic Church as anti-science. Here we see the lack of the type of 
complexity which has been called for by historians of science and religion over the past few 
decades. 
By placing the pope’s pro-evolution statements in a historical conflict narrative, using 
Galileo as an exemplar, this type of reporting misses the nuanced past relationships of the 
Church with science—its major funding of medieval astronomy, for example, or that Belgian 
Catholic priest Georges Lemaître laid the conceptual work of the Big Bang theory. There is no 
mention of the Catholic friar Gregor Mendel who is often represented as the founding figure 
of the science of genetics. Instead, the only historical context given is that of the Galileo 
affair. I highlight this not as Christian apologia, but only to show that with use of different 
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contextual examples, the framing of the Pope and the Church’s relationship with evolution 
and science in general could have been different. However, a simple conflict narrative linking 
Galileo, the Pope and conflict between the Church and science is the dominant framing 
used. In many ways the very format of newspaper reporting, the inevitability of framing, and 
a focus on entertainment, forces simplification and a reduction in complexity of discussions 
of science and religion (Entman, 1993). Nevertheless, it is easy to see how simplistic science-
religion conflict myths dispelled by historians (e.g. Numbers, 2009), can continue to be 
reproduced in popular discourse. 
The use of Galileo as an example of a simplified historical conflict extended well 
beyond John Paul’s papacy. For example, The Guardian’s religious affairs correspondent, 
Riazat Butt, wrote in 2011: 
In the past, Roman Catholicism has hardly covered itself in glory when it comes to science. It took 
the Vatican more than 350 years to admit it was wrong about Galileo, cementing its contrition by 
erecting a statue of him in 2009. Its pronouncements over the years on life issues have often put 
it at odds with the scientific community, not to mention its historical vacillation over the theory 
of evolution. (Butt, 2011) 
It seems that a science-religion conflict is an easy dichotomous discourse for 
journalists to draw upon when situating their stories. Although, we must remember the 
constraints of format, expertise, and of the time a journalist can dedicate to each story. It is 
perhaps unsurprising, then, that journalists place John Paul II’s comments in the context of 
conflict, calling upon the looming shadow of Galileo to situate their stories. However, we 
must remain cognizant of the fact that these simplistic conflict myths are a constant feature 
of public discourse on science and religion, and further investigate how this may affect 
public attitudes on the matter. 
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4.3.3 “Even the Pope” and creationism 
Following initial reporting which represented John Paul as a reformer of Catholicism 
and science relations, with some articles situating this in a broader conflict narrative 
between religion and science, it is interesting to see how subsequent references to John 
Paul’s pro-evolutionary views were used to contextualize other issues. One surprisingly 
common phrase adopted was “even the Pope [accepts evolution]”, which appeared in 8 
English newspaper articles between 1997 and 2004 (Table 4.5). This was usually to further 
arguments both in favour of evolution, and against a perceived rise of creationism. 
Table 4.5 Articles containing “even the Pope” phrase. 
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The “even the Pope” phrase first appeared in two articles commenting on an 
Australian court case in 1997. The case, in which Prof. Ian Plimer, a geologist from the 
University of Melbourne, attempted to sue Dr. Allen Roberts, for “misleading backers” of an 
expedition to Turkey to uncover Noah’s Ark, was thrown out, with the court ruling: “Some 
issues - no matter how great the passions they arouse - are more appropriately dealt with 
outside the courtroom.” (David Fasold & Anor v Allen Roberts & Anor, 1997). One article was 
published at the beginning of the case, written by religious writer and subsequent 
biographer of Pope Francis, Paul Vallely, in The Independent. Vallely is himself a Catholic, 
who has written for both the Christian and secular press. The second article appeared at the 
case’s conclusion in early June in The Observer, written by geneticist Prof. Steve Jones. Both 
authors tie the case to a purported rising tide of creationism. The phrase “even the Pope” 
appears in both articles to suggest that the real fight is now over, and that those still clinging 
to any hope for literal creationism to win over evolution are living in an intellectual past. As 
Vallely argued: 
The Evolution versus Creationist battle is one which was fought and won decisively decades ago. 
There may have been controversy in 1863 when T H Huxley published his popularisation of 
Darwin, with its now-famous frontispiece of a skeletonised human loping ahead of a procession 
of ape ancestors. But today most educated people take for granted that evolution is the most 
plausible explanation of life and accept our descent from the apes with equanimity. Even the 
Pope last year accepted that Darwinian evolutionary theory is "more than a hypothesis". (Vallely, 
1997) 
Interestingly, Vallely is the only author in the entire dataset to mention Georges 
Lemaître. He does so to stress that religion and science can be compatible:  
To Christians who see the divine revealed in nature, reason and tradition there is no inevitable 
conflict between evolutionary theory and the belief that God created the universe - indeed it was 
a Belgian priest, Georges-Henri Lemaître, who, basing his ideas on Einstein's theory of gravity, 
first proposed the theory of the Big Bang as the origin of the universe. (Vallely, 1997) 
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Geneticist, Steve Jones, writing in The Observer later used the “even the Pope” 
phrase in a similar way to Vallely: 
In Europe the creation controversy is dead. Last year even the Pope gave up, grudgingly he 
asserted only that 'new knowledge leads us to recognise in the theory of evolution more than a 
hypothesis'. I have taught evolution to thousands of students: but not until a week ago did I get 
an exam script insisting that life began in 4004 BC (a six-millennial anniversary oddly ignored by 
the newspapers). (Jones, 1997) 
Here we see how the image of a pro-evolutionary pope was used as a rhetorical 
device for those wishing to stress that the creationism debate is long settled. In a sense, 
there is a drawing of boundaries by these writers, a demarcation between an acceptable and 
progressive modern form of religion, and an unacceptable fundamentalist version. The 
image of a pro-evolution pope is used as a device as if to say: if even the Pope, the head of 
this large conservative religious institution can now accept evolution, how absurd must 
these ‘others’ who deny it be? 
We can see this process at play again in three articles, which discuss a widely 
reported incident of creationism being taught in the UK education system in 2004. In The 
Sunday Times political writer and broadcaster, Francis Wheen, stated: 
Creationism returns: would you Adam and Eve it? 
It's doubly easy for us to sneer at America's pre-modern zealots. In Britain, as elsewhere in 
Europe, creationism has little appeal. Both the Anglican and Roman Catholic hierarchies have 
long since accepted Darwin's theory: even Pope John Paul II has said that it is ‘more than just a 
hypothesis’.  
Yet in March 2002 The Guardian revealed that Christian fundamentalists had taken control of a 
state-funded secondary school in northeast England and were striving to ‘show the superiority’ of 
creationist beliefs in their classes. (Wheen, 2004) 
This demarcation mirrors John Paul’s pronouncement itself. Though we cannot 
ultimately know why the popes spoke out about evolution when they did, the timings of 
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their statements give us a sense that they may be doing their own boundary work. By 
explicitly acknowledging evolutionary science’s veracity, thus bringing the Catholic Church 
in-line with perceived modernity, the popes’ pronouncements demarcate Catholicism from 
more fundamentalist versions of religion which were becoming increasingly vocal 
throughout these periods (Blancke et al., 2014). 
So, while it is impossible to say, at least from this study, if John Paul’s positive 
statements about evolution had a positive effect on public attitudes toward evolution, we 
can see that an image of a pro-evolution pope became part of the rhetorical repertoire for 
writers who were critical of more fundamentalist, creationist movements in the period. 
“Even the Pope [has accepted evolution]” became a phrase which could be used to argue 
how uncontroversial evolution was, or indeed how uncontroversial it should be. The last 
occurrence of the “even the Pope” phrase coincided with the end of John Paul’s papacy. 
After John Paul II was no longer Pope, it would seem, that the phrase ceased to carry much 
currency; however, events occurred from 2005 onwards which led the press to speculate on 
whether the new pope would also be pro-evolution, or if in fact he might endorse the 
growing ID movement. 
 
4.4 Benedict XVI (2005-2013) 
4.4.1 Preparing for a shift? 
Following the death of John Paul II on 2nd April 2005 and the inauguration of Benedict 
XVI on 24th April 2005, events occurred which set the scene for newspaper coverage of 
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Benedict’s comments on evolution. This in-turn influenced press reporting on Francis’ 
subsequent comments. 
 
On 7th July, 2005, a close friend of Pope Benedict, Cardinal Christoph Schönborn, 
wrote an op-ed in The New York Times titled “Finding Design in Nature.” In it he claimed 
John Paul II’s 1996 comments were “vague and unimportant”, going on to argue that any 
system of thought which “denies or seeks to explain away the overwhelming evidence for 
design in biology is ideology, not science” (Schönborn, 2005). 
In response to Schönborn’s op-ed, Father George Coyne, then head of the Vatican 
Observatory, published an article in The Tablet (the UK published Catholic international 
weekly review), describing John Paul’s 1996 comment as “epoch-making”. In his response, 
Coyne also detailed how a neo-Darwinian conception of evolution was in fact compatible 
with Catholic theology (Coyne, 2005). Coyne stressed that in his opinion science was 
completely neutral with respect to the theological and philosophical implications which may 
be drawn from its conclusion. 
The episode between Schönborn and Coyne is referred to in two articles in my 
dataset. However, given the restrictive nature of my search terms (which focussed on popes’ 
statements) and the partial nature of online coverage in LexisNexis, the episode and further 
speculation on an impending shift in position likely appeared in more English newspaper 
articles at the time. 
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In one of the articles in the dataset, entitled: “Now row over evolution splits top 
Catholics”, environmental writer and journalist, Michael McCarthy, stated: “The conflict at 
the highest level of the Catholic Church about the truth of Darwin's theory of evolution 
breaks out publicly today.” Recounting the spat between Coyne and Schönborn, McCarthy 
opined that: “The key question behind the debate is the opinion of the new Pope. Some fear 
that the cardinal would never have published such a controversial article, in such a 
prominent medium, without his personal approval. But nothing will be known for certain 
until the Pope speaks for himself” (McCarthy, 2005). 
An example of an article which was omitted from my dataset, due to the incomplete 
LexisNexis archive of online newspaper material, is a piece by Simon Caldwell in the Daily 
Mail (online) from the 23rd August 2006. In the article, titled “Pope sacks astronomer over 
evolution debate,” Caldwell claimed Benedict favours ID. Caldwell goes on to argue Benedict 
had removed Coyne from his directorship of the Vatican Observatory because Coyne 
“repeatedly contradicted the Holy See's endorsement of ‘intelligent design’ theory, which 
essentially backs the ‘Adam and Eve’ theory of creation.” This assertion that Coyne’s 
retirement from the Vatican Observatory was linked to his views on evolution became so 
widely circulated that Coyne had to make a public statement, saying it was “simply not true” 
(CNS, 2006). Despite Coyne’s reassurances that he was not sacked, and that his retirement 
had nothing to do with his comments on ID, later newspaper coverage still perpetuated this 
idea, as I will return to. 
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In the other article in my dataset to mention this dispute, Rome correspondent John 
Hooper suggested that the Pope was preparing to “shift the Vatican’s view of evolution”, as 
Benedict was set to host a conference on evolution and creation.2 Hooper claimed that there 
had been “growing signs” that the Pope was considering aligning his church more closely 
with ID (Hooper, 2006). Hooper used Benedict’s close relationship with the author of the The 
New York Times piece, Cardinal Schönborn as evidence that the new pope was going to back 
moves to teach ID. Hooper further evidenced the perception of a coming shift of the 
Vatican’s view by quoting an interview with a prominent anti-evolutionary Catholic scientist, 
Dominique Tassot, who had told the (US) National Catholic Reporter that the upcoming 
conference would: "give a broader extension to the debate. Even if (the Pope) knows where 
he wants to go, and I believe he does, it will take time. Most Catholic intellectuals today are 
convinced that evolution is obviously true because most scientists say so" (Tassot as quoted 
in Hooper, 2006). 
 
Days after Hooper’s article in The Guardian , Allen (2006) responded to Hooper’s 
usage of the Tassot interview, labelling Hooper’s claim that Benedict was preparing a 
fundamental shift in the Vatican’s view of evolution as “over-hyped”. In Allen’s view, it was 
unlikely that Tassot knew the mind of the Pope, and furthermore Tassot himself had said 
that it was “too early” to expect a statement from Benedict. Nonetheless, following 
Schönborn’s op-ed, press speculation on the possibility of a shift in the Vatican’s position 
had set the stage for Benedict’s comments. The question had become: will Benedict back ID? 
 
2 Evans (2019: 89) later used a decontextualized reference to this article by Hooper to claim: “There has 
been some ambiguity about evolution, with the Church seeming at times towards agreeing with 
intelligent design theory.” 
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4.4.2 Creation and Evolution: “We cannot bring 10,000 generations into the laboratory” 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Benedict had in fact discussed evolution many times 
before his papacy, though the first media coverage of his comments only came in response 
to the 2007 book Creation and Evolution. The book consists of transcripts of the conference 
Benedict held with his former doctoral and postgraduate students after Schönborn’s New 
York Times article caused a large media reaction. Benedict’s former students presented 
papers in the fields of natural science, philosophy and theology, after which there was a 
discussion in which Benedict participated. 
 
As will be discussed, in the English press, reporting focussed on one quote from the 
book where Benedict remarks on the experimental verifiability of evolution. However, first it 
is worth briefly exploring the broader passage. In the discussion, Benedict  begins by 
stressing: “that it is not a question of deciding either for a creationism that is closed off from 
science as a matter of principle, or else a theory of evolution that has its own gaps yet 
overplays its hand and is unwilling to look at the questions that go beyond the 
methodological possibilities of the natural sciences” (Benedict, 2008: 161- 162).3 Rather, for 
Benedict, the real issue was the interplay and conversation between these various ways of 
knowing. He argued that the theory of evolution implied questions which must be assigned 
to philosophy, as they are beyond the scope of the natural sciences. Benedict then 
continued to the passage which most prominently featured in media reporting: 
 
3 Taken here from the official English translation, published in 2008, although it is worth noting that the 
journalists who originally covered the conference were working from the original German 2007 edition. 
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In particular, to me it is important, first of all, that to a great extent the theory of evolution 
cannot be proved experimentally, quite simply because we cannot bring 10,000 generations into 
the laboratory. That means that there are considerable gaps in its experimental verifiability and 
falsifiability due to the enormous span of time to which the theory has reference. 
A second thing that was important to me was your statement that the probability is not zero, but 
not one, either. And so the question arises: How high is the probability now? This is important 
especially if we want to interpret correctly the remark of Pope John Paul II: “The theory of 
evolution is more than a hypothesis.” When the Pope said that, he had his reasons. But at the 
same time it is true that the theory of evolution is still not a complete, scientifically verified 
theory. (Benedict, 2008: 161- 162) 
Benedict’s remarks do seem to suggest he misunderstands exactly what a scientific 
theory is, not many scientists would argue that any theory could be “complete” and fully 
verified, as is the nature of science.4 In the context of the discussion, Professor Peter 
Schuster, President of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, had given a talk on the current 
state of knowledge of evolution in the natural sciences. In response to Benedict’s comment, 
Schuster replied that evolution was a science in progress, and it could only be in progress if 
there were unanswered questions. Schuster commented that the Pope correctly noted that 
we cannot carry out experiments that last eons, however suggested that the interpretation 
of genetic material opened another approach (Benedict, 2008: 164-165). Benedict also 
claimed that science’s findings can lead to great perennial questions, which go beyond the 
methodological principals of science itself, but that they cannot be left to religious feeling 
either—they must be dealt with by reason. These are the questions of where man and the 
world came from, and where they are going (Benedict, 2008: 163). 
 
4 This might also be an allusion to the early work of philosopher of science, Karl Raimund Popper, who 
claimed: “I have come to the conclusion that Darwinism is not a testable scientific theory, but 
a metaphysical research programme—a possible framework for testable scientific theories.” (Popper, 
1976: 168). However, Popper later reversed his view on Darwinian natural selection, stating: “I have 
changed my mind about the testability and logical status of the theory of natural selection; and I am glad 
to have an opportunity to make a recantation.” (Popper, 1978: 345). For an overview of Popper’s 
statements on evolution in the context of creationist discourse, see Sonleitner (1986). 
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Finally, it is worth recounting the quote from Benedict chosen for the back cover of 
the book, which perhaps pertains to the central issue in these debates: 
Ultimately it comes down to the alternative: What came first? Creative Reason, the Creator Spirit 
who makes all things and gives them growth, or Unreason, which, lacking any meaning, strangely 
enough brings forth a mathematically ordered cosmos, as well as man and his reason. The latter, 
however, would then be nothing more than a chance result of evolution and thus, in the end, 
equally meaningless. As Christians, we say: I believe in God the Father, the Creator of heaven and 
earth. I believe in the Creator Spirit. We believe that at the beginning of everything is the eternal 
Word, with Reason and not Unreason. (Benedict, 2008) 
This quote mirrors Benedict’s broader theology, which has a strong focus on creation, 
and the Creative Reason, or Logos, which stands before all things (e.g. Ratzinger, 1990; 
2003). Here the argument isn’t if evolution is true or not true, but whether the universe is 
made by God. 
As this is the book on which the following reporting is based, it is worth considering 
how the information in this book may be framed. There are numerous discussions in the 
book, scientific, philosophical, and theological. Therefore, there are numerous ways in which 
the book could be presented in the press. For example, frames could invariably focus on, 
Benedict’s views on the experimental evidence for evolution, his views on varying 
philosophical conceptions of evolution, and his beliefs on these varying philosophical 
conceptions of evolution’s compatibility with Catholicism. We have then, three 
(hypothetical) framing possibilities: experimental scientific validity, philosophical 
conceptions, and theological compatibility. Though others undoubtedly exist, I use these 
three frames to argue the conceptual point— that the debate in the book is not solely about 
the scientific validity of evolution, nor is it solely about ID vs evolution. Nonetheless, despite 
this availability of framing options, we see that the press run with one dominant frame to 
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make sense of the book: ID vs evolution. I postulate that this framing was used as there was 
a previous press narrative suggesting Benedict might shift the Vatican’s view of evolution 
towards ID after Schönborn’s op-ed, and it is this frame that dominates both initial and 
subsequent reporting on Benedict’s views. In many ways this framing is similar to the binary 
thinking discussed in Chapter 1 when investigating public attitudes. It is the result of a focus 
on discerning fixed positions, rather than reflexive assessment of possible orientations. 
4.4.3 News coverage of Benedict XVI’s comments 
All three initial news articles covering Benedict’s Creation and Evolution statements 
featured sensational headlines, however, the main text of the articles was more nuanced. 
Each of the articles (Table 4.6) conclude that the Pope had backed evolution in one form or 
another, however, they differed in their evaluations of the Pope’s comments in relation to 
ID. The Daily Mail piece, “Where I differ with Darwin, by the Pope”, represented the book as 
an: “essay which will disappoint Christian fundamentalists” and stated the Pope “refused to 
endorse creationism or 'intelligent design'.” Referring to the ongoing expectation for the 
Church to shift positions, the author explained: “Speculation about Benedict's views on 
evolution have been rife ever since one of his former students, Cardinal Christoph 
Schönborn, published an article in 2005 that seemed to align the Church with the 'intelligent 
design' view.” However, the evaluation in the Daily Mail’s news report was that the Pope 
had not endorsed ID in his book. The article recounted that the Pope had praised scientific 
progress, but had noted evolution wasn’t finally provable because it could not be replicated 
in the laboratory. The Pope’s views on the broader meaning of the evolution debate were 
reported on, with the article stating the: “evolution debate was actually about 'the great 
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fundamental questions of philosophy where man and the world came from and where they 
are going'” (Daily Mail, 2007). 
Table 4.6  Initial news reporting on Benedict XVI with ID evaluation. 
 
The next day, Rome foreign correspondent, Malcolm Moore (2006) wrote in The 
Daily Telegraph, that the Pope’s comments had run: “counter to suggestions that the Pope 
had rejected John Paul II's recognition that Darwinism was ‘more than a hypothesis'’ and he 
had not backed the theory of intelligent design which insists that living organisms are so 
complex and varied that they must have been created by a higher ‘designer’” (Moore, 2006). 
Again, the Pope’s comments were not represented as an endorsement of ID. And once 
again, Moore also included the quote about the experimental verifiability of evolution, but 
claimed the Pope had defended creationism and said evolution was part of that process. 
Here we can see a broader use of the term creationism in the press. One not bound by an 
American, evangelical definition of young earth or instantaneous creation. This usage 
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mirrors the definition of the word creationism as used in much of Benedict’s theology (e.g. 
Ratzinger, 1990). 
The Times, however, covered the story differently. Under the title, “Pope puts his 
faith in the Book of Genesis, not Darwin”, Rome Correspondent Richard Owen wrote: 
*Evolution 'not a provable theory'  
* Remarks endorse 'intelligent design'  
His predecessor appeared, on balance, to favour the scientists. But the present Pope may have 
tipped the scales the other way in the argument over which is the truer account of the Creation: 
On the Origin of Species or the Book of Genesis. Pope Benedict XVI has stepped into the debate 
over Darwinism with remarks that will be seen as an endorsement of "intelligent design". The 
Pope did not explicitly back intelligent design or creationism. He praised scientific progress but 
said that the Darwinian theory of evolution was "not finally provable" because: "We cannot haul 
10,000 generations into the laboratory.” (Owen, 2007) 
Here we can see that even though Owen’s simple bullet point lead indicated the 
Pope endorsed intelligent design, and the article claimed Benedict’s comments “will be 
seen” as an endorsement of ID, there is a caveat stating the Pope did not “explicitly back” ID, 
with the question left open for the interpretation of the reader. For context, Owen recalled 
that: “Last summer Father George Coyne, the Vatican's chief astronomer, was removed after 
he lambasted intelligent design, saying that it was not science.” Here Owen connects 
Coyne’s departure from the Vatican Observatory, to his support of evolution. This was 
widely claimed in the media, however, as previously stated, in a letter to the Catholic News 
Service Coyne himself said that his leaving the observatory was not linked to evolution in any 
way (CNS, 2006).  
While much of Owen’s article in The Times discussed ID, he concluded the article, in 
contradiction to the headline, by stating that Benedict did accept evolution, and the Creation 
and Evolution book had “advanced the view that God created life through evolution, with 
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the creation in Genesis explained as an allegory.” Although editors and sub-editors rather 
than article authors often write headlines, the juxtaposition of discussions of ID and the 
Pope’s views may have led the reader to interpret the Pope’s comments as an endorsement 
of ID. Indeed, the summary lead text for the article explicitly stated “Remarks endorse 
'intelligent design'.” This raises a conceptual point about the terms ID and theistic evolution 
and the media’s use of them. Is ID an evolutionary process directed by God (essentially 
theistic evolution), or is ID a position which states evolution insufficiently explains the 
complexity of life on earth? If we take the words of the well-known ID textbook, Of Pandas 
and People, then ID and theistic evolution are different, as: “Intelligent design means that 
various forms of life began abruptly through an intelligent agency, with their distinctive 
features intact – fish with fins and scales, birds with feathers, beaks, and wings, etc.” (Davis 
and Kenyon, 1989: 99-100). It does appear that by labelling Benedict as a supporter of ID, 
media outlets may well be inadvertently doing the work of invested organisations, which 
seek to promote such positions. Kaden et al. (2019) similarly critique this process, though 
not in relation to public discourse, but in assessments of public opinion where public 
attitudes are categorised utilising labels of professional discourse. In the present example, 
however, it is media contributors who may well be bolstering the positions of invested 
groups, such as the Discovery Institute, by claiming Benedict as a supporter of ID. 
As may be expected, the coverage as part of Saturday newspapers’ newsbites articles 
was simpler. The Guardian’s “This week” section included the “10,000 generations” quote 
from the Pope: “‘The theory of evolution is not completely provable because mutations over 
hundreds of thousands of years cannot be reproduced in a laboratory.’ Pope Benedict XVI 
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weighs in on Darwinism”. With The Times “The Week” section, including: “Theorist of the 
week: We cannot haul 10,000 generations into the laboratory. Pope Benedict XVI says that 
the theory of evolution is ‘not yet a complete, scientifically verified theory’.” By focussing on 
the “10,000 generations” quotes the reader’s frame of reference is restricted to thinking 
about the issue of evolution purely in relation to its experimental verifiability. Arguably, as 
stated on the back leaf of Creation and Evolution, and in Benedict’s previous statements 
about evolution, Benedict does not have an issue with evolution per se, but does have an 
issue with it becoming a philosophia universalis, a first philosophy, which necessarily 
excludes or replaces religion. By concentrating solely on the experimental scientific validity 
of evolution, a point addressed in the Creation and Evolution book by Professor Schuster, 
this press coverage omitted these philosophical dimensions of the discussion completely. 
This is a clear example of selection and simplification leading to a representation of 
conflict between religion and science. From all of the many words Benedict had written on 
the subject, one book was selected to be covered in the press. Indeed, this book, and the 
conference it was based on, were prompted by prominent discussions of ID in the press at 
the time—discussions not exclusively focussed on the Catholic Church. As introduced earlier, 
reports in English newspapers on this episode begin on 12 April 2007, while the English 
language version of Creation and Evolution was not published until 2008.Therefore, it is 
likely that English newspapers were receiving information about the conference proceedings 
from newswire services such as Associated Press and Reuters. If we turn to these newswire 
services we can see different framings of the information already embedded within their 
coverage. The Associated Press newswire covering this episode was titled: “Pope says 
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evolution can't be proven” (Eddy, 2007), while the more nuanced Reuters newswire was 
titled “Pope says science too narrow to explain creation” (Heneghan, 2007). The initial 
English news articles themselves, while having sensational headlines, did have some 
discussion of the broader philosophical and theological points in the book, beyond the 
natural scientific validity of evolution, although they differed in their evaluation of how 
these comments related to ID. 
The last step in the process of media simplification is the total reduction of the 
debate to single quotes in the newsbites articles of the “10,000 generations” comment. 
Clearly the form of a newsbites piece restricts what can be said, and this is precisely the 
point. The chain of simplification leads from nuanced scientific, philosophical, and 
theological discussion (the initial Creation and Evolution book, among others), and reduces 
in complexity, until we end up with a single quote, which focusses on the natural scientific 
experimental verifiability of evolution. 
I will further explore the point I believe Benedict was trying to make with the 
Creation and Evolution book in the following chapters on Catholic individuals’ views on 
evolution in England. Here, echoing Benedict, I also find that the main concern for the 
majority of the Catholics interviewed is not whether evolution is true, rather their concern 
instead focusses on maintaining a role for God in creation more broadly.  
4.4.4 Meeting with the Clergy of Belluno-Feltre and Treviso: “This antithesis is absurd” 
Two months after Creation and Evolution was published Benedict made a further 
statement about evolution, which seems to have been prompted by the initial media 
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reporting of his remarks in Creation and Evolution. On 24th July, 2007, at a meeting with the 
Clergy of the Dioceses of Belluno-Feltre and Treviso, Benedict was posed a question which 
sought his advice for educators dealing with young people’s questions about happiness, 
difficulty and meaning in their lives. Benedict replied: 
But the big problem is that were God not to exist and were he not also the Creator of my life, life 
would actually be a mere cog in evolution, nothing more; it would have no meaning in 
itself. Instead, I must seek to give meaning to this component of being. Currently, I see in 
Germany, but also in the United States, a somewhat fierce debate raging between so-called 
"creationism" and evolutionism, presented as though they were mutually exclusive 
alternatives: those who believe in the Creator would not be able to conceive of evolution, and 
those who instead support evolution would have to exclude God. This antithesis is absurd 
because, on the one hand, there are so many scientific proofs in favour of evolution which 
appears to be a reality we can see and which enriches our knowledge of life and being as 
such. But on the other, the doctrine of evolution does not answer every query, especially the 
great philosophical question: where does everything come from? And how did everything start 
which ultimately led to man? I believe this is of the utmost importance. (Benedict, 2007) 
These remarks, stressing the absurdity of an antithesis between creation and 
evolution, only appear in one article in my dataset. In a short section of an article on the 
then newly founded Creation Museum in Kentucky in The Independent (2007), the author 
posed a quote from the address to famous Australian-American creationist Ken Ham, who 
replied: “If you believe in millions of years of evolution and you didn't get it from the Bible, 
then you really do have to reinterpret Genesis, which means you are upending biblical 
authority.” 
It is interesting that Benedict’s shorter and more direct statement of compatibility 
between evolution and religion did not make it into mainstream English reporting. This may 
be because it was a less high profile comment, to an Archdiocese in Germany, therefore 
more easily missed. However, that one article references the quote, and no other articles 
do, suggests it was not completely off the radar of English journalists. This illuminates the 
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contingent nature of narratives on Catholicism and evolution, and even science and religion, 
in press discourse. The practice of selection is important here for press representations. The 
selection of this quote, rather than the 10,000 generations one, by a wider range of 
newspapers would have led to different impressions of Benedict’s positions. In short, press 
representation of the matter are contingent on what is being reported. Therefore, scholars 
investigating science and religion should be cautious when accepting media narratives 
uncritically. 
4.4.5 Subsequent references to Benedict XVI’s views 
In a later online comment piece for The Daily Telegraph, Catholic author and 
journalist, Damian Thompson, also evaluated Benedict’s statements as a rejection of ID, 
stating: “So now we know: Pope Benedict supports evolution. Thank God. If he had backed 
‘Intelligent Design’ I would have become a Scientologist” (Thompson, 2007). 
The unease about the Vatican’s position on evolution in the media, however, 
continued. In 2007, science editor and popular science writer, Mark Henderson mentioned 
Benedict in a feature article in The Times about a stem cell treatment for male infertility. 
Henderson implied causality between the “10,000 generations” quote, and Benedict almost 
backing intelligent design: 
The Vatican is growing uneasy about evolution. Although his predecessor endorsed it as "more 
than a hypothesis", Pope Benedict XVI thinks it is "not a complete, scientifically proven theory" 
and has come close to backing creationism in its new guise of intelligent design. His reason: "We 
cannot haul 10,000 generations into the laboratory.” (Henderson, 2007) 
In 2009, Richard Owen, who previously wrote the only initial news story which 
suggested that Benedict’s comments “endorsed intelligent design” wrote another article for 
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The Times. In the piece, entitled “Vatican buries the hatchet with Darwin; Pope will not be 
endorsing Intelligent Design”, Owen wrote that the “Vatican also dealt the final blow to 
speculation that Pope Benedict XVI might be prepared to endorse the theory of Intelligent 
Design” (Owen, 2009: 5). This was after a leading Vatican official, Archbishop Gianfranco 
Ravasi, head of the Pontifical Council for Culture, had commented on their compatibility and 
stressed Darwin’s theories had never been condemned by the Church. Ravasi’s remarks 
were made during an announcement that the Vatican would be hosting a conference to 
mark the 150th anniversary of the publication of On the Origin of Species. However, it was 
this article by Owen, covering Ravasi’s remarks, that sociologist John Evans used in a recent 
book on science and religion to evidence the claim that: “the Church seeming at times 
towards agreeing with intelligent design theory, then moving back to agreement with neo-
Darwinism that has been more typical of twentieth-century Catholicism” (Evans, 2018: 89). 
Not only do I hope the above context has shown this claim to be oversimplified, but that it 
also highlights that we must be careful about confusing individual actors and “the Church” in 
general. There are many actors who make up the institution of the Church, conflating 
Schönborn’s op-ed and the Church’s position, or indeed Ravasi’s comments and the Church’s 
position, is to conflate individuals with an institution. 
Interestingly, on the same page as Owen’s article, religious affairs correspondent, 
Ruth Gledhill, wrote a piece titled: “The Church has been relaxed about evolution for 50 
years”. Claiming: “[m]any observers of the religion versus science battleground are surprised 
to learn that the Roman Catholic Church has been relatively positive about the theory of 
evolution for more than half a century.” She went on to claim that the real battle isn’t 
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between religion and science, but instead between different sets of Christians (Gledhill, 
2009: 5). Again, this highlights the various competing voices in the media, which further 
stresses the importance for scholars of science and religion to not take media 
representations of science-religion matters as unbiased pieces of information. 
I argued in Chapter 2 that in historical studies we should not conflate the voices of 
individual churchmen with that of the position of the Church as an institution. Similarly, in 
public discourse we cannot treat publications as homogenous entities, nor conflate 
individual writers’ views with that of the publication. As we see from the examples in The 
Times above, even in a publication with a set editorial position, multiple voices can be heard. 
This resisting of essentialism also applies to religious publics attitudes on science and 
religion. As I argue in Chapters 5 and 6, among people who all fall under the umbrella term 
‘Catholic’ there are a variety of opinions about evolution. Therefore, we cannot treat the 
Church, media publications, nor Catholic individuals homogenously, if we are seeking to 
carry out detailed and contextual analyses of historical relations, public discourse, and public 
attitudes on science and religion. 
4.4.6 Schönborn and Coyne revisited 
Following his explosive 2005 New York Times op-ed, subsequently in 2009, Cardinal 
Schönborn published a book detailing his exploration of evolution. In Chance or Purpose, 
Schönborn’s position on evolution, or at least how he communicated it, had shifted since his 
New York Times piece. His title, Chance or Purpose, self-consciously references Jacques 
Monod’s (1971) Chance and Necessity, which forwarded a materialistic non-teleological 
conception of evolution, and argued life is the result of pure chance processes. Schönborn 
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(2009) now argued that evolution itself is not the issue, but rather the issue is a 
philosophical conception of evolution which excludes God, and therefore holds evolution of 
humans to be unguided. On the question of “pure chance” Schönborn argued that God can 
create through either necessities or contingencies, and therefore even a contingent 
evolutionary process is compatible with God’s guidance. 
In an interview for the television documentary The Genius of Charles Darwin 
(Channel 4, 2008), Richard Dawkins interviewed Father George Coyne, who had originally 
attacked what he perceived to be Schönborn’s backing of ID in The New York Times. In the 
interview with Dawkins, Coyne commented that if Schönborn had forwarded the argument 
as laid out in his later book Chance or Purpose in his original 2005 piece, then he would have 
had no issue with it. 
 
4.5 Francis (2013-2017) 
Like John Paul II, Francis’s (2014) comments on evolution were made to the Pontifical 
Academy of Sciences. During a speech inaugurating a bust of Benedict, Francis praised his 
predecessor’s life and work, commenting how Benedict’s love of the truth extended beyond 
philosophy and theology into science. Francis, after stating that God and Christ are present 
in nature, warned that when reading Genesis, there is the risk of seeing God as a magician 
with a magic wand. However, Francis argued, this was not the case; instead God created 
beings and let them develop according to internal laws. He went on to stress that evolution 
and creation are compatible viewpoints: 
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And thus Creation has been progressing for centuries and centuries, millennia and millennia, until 
becoming as we know it today, precisely because God is not a demiurge or a magician, but the 
Creator who gives life to all beings. The beginning of the world was not a work of chaos that owes 
its origin to another, but derives directly from a supreme Principle who creates out of love. The 
Big Bang theory, which is proposed today as the origin of the world, does not contradict the 
intervention of a divine creator but depends on it. Evolution in nature does not conflict with the 
notion of Creation, because evolution presupposes the creation of beings who evolve. (Francis, 
2014) 
Francis also emphasised the specialness of man, explaining for man there is a 
“change and a novelty.” This novelty is the freedom bestowed upon mankind, which is an 
autonomy beyond that of nature. 
4.5.1 News coverage of Francis’s comments 
It was the above remarks by Francis which, as mentioned in the introduction of this 
chapter, American journalist Elizabeth Dias (2014) in Time magazine suggested were ramped 
up and taken out of context by worldwide media. English newspapers, in fact, had mixed 
reporting on Francis’ comments. The initial news reporting in my dataset (Table 4.7) can be 
split into two groups of articles: those which claimed Francis’s comments were in line with 
past Catholic teaching (The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph) and those which didn’t (Daily 
Mail and The Independent). Of those which did not claim continuity, the Daily Mail included 
no historical context to Francis’s comments, while The Independent represented Francis’s 
comments as a change from Benedict’s “apparent support” for intelligent design. I now 
explore some of the content from each of these articles, before further elaborating on The 
Independent’s claims and their subsequent use. 
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 Table 4.7 Initial news reporting on Francis. 
In her article on Francis, Hannah Roberts, a freelance journalist based in Rome, 
writing for the Daily Mail, did not mention Benedict, John Paul, or Pius’ comments on 
evolution. However, Benedict’s attempts to reform the Church’s relations with science were 
alluded to. Roberts also included a reference to Galileo, however this time incorrectly 
claiming that Galileo had been sentenced to death by the Church.5 Roberts claimed that: 
“Francis praised his predecessor, Benedict, who initiated attempts to shed the Catholic 
 
5 See Finocchiaro (2009) for a detailed discussion of the Galileo affair. Including his sentencing to house 
arrest, not death. 
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Church's image of being anti-science, a label that stuck when it condemned the astronomer 
Galileo to death for teaching that the earth revolves around the sun” (Roberts, 2014). 
Lizzie Davies, Rome correspondent for The Guardian, also stressed that popes before 
Francis had commented on the compatibility of Catholicism and evolution: 
Although Francis was packaging the ideas with his trademark eye for a soundbite, the content of 
what he was saying does not mark a break with Catholic teaching, which has modified 
considerably since Charles Darwin published On the Origin of Species in 1859. Popes before him 
have also said that- with certain provisos - there is no incompatibility between evolution and God 
as divine creator. (Davies, 2014) 
In The Daily Telegraph, Rome correspondent Nick Squires, also gave historical 
context. Although, while mentioning Pius XII and John Paul II, he did not mention Benedict 
XVI’s comments: 
The Pope's remarks were in line with Catholic Church teaching of the last few decades. As far 
back as 1950, Pope Pius XII said that there was no intrinsic conflict between Catholic doctrine 
and the theory of evolution, provided that Catholics believed that the human soul was 
created by God and not the result of random evolutionary forces. That stance was affirmed 
in 1996 by Pope John Paul II. (Squires, 2014) 
In The Independent, however, the context and interpretation was different. Adam 
Withnall, deputy international editor, wrote: “Speaking at the Pontifical Academy of 
Sciences, the Pope made comments which experts said put an end to the "pseudo theories" 
of creationism and intelligent design that some argue were encouraged by his predecessor, 
Benedict XVI.” Withnall offered more historical context, claiming that the Church: “has long 
had a reputation for being anti-science - most famously when Galileo faced the inquisition 
and was forced to retract his "heretic" theory that the Earth revolved around the Sun” 
(Withnall, 2014). Withnall went on to argue that: 
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But Pope Francis's comments were more in keeping with the progressive work of Pope Pius XII, 
who opened the door to the idea of evolution and actively welcomed the Big Bang theory. In 
1996, John Paul II went further and suggested evolution was "more than a hypothesis" and 
"effectively proven fact".  
Yet more recently, Benedict XVI and his close advisors have apparently endorsed the idea that 
intelligent design underpins evolution - the idea that natural selection on its own is insufficient to 
explain the complexity of the world. In 2005, his close associate Cardinal Schoenborn wrote an 
article saying "evolution in the sense of common ancestry might be true, but evolution in the 
neo-Darwinian sense - an unguided, unplanned process - is not". (Withnall, 2014) 
Here, again in The Independent, we see another example of Galileo used for context 
when forwarding a representation of the Catholic Church as anti-science. Benedict also 
features as a regressive past figure, against which Francis’s new statements are placed. 
Unlike the previous three authors of the other initial news articles, Withnall was not a 
specialist Rome correspondent. Here we can see that journalistic expertise is important 
when covering stories on science and religion, with Withnall, a non-specialist in Catholic 
affairs, presenting Francis’ views as more radical, because of the claim that: “Benedict XVI 
and his close advisors have apparently endorsed the idea that intelligent design underpins 
evolution” (Withnall, 2014). The casual reader is unlikely to take note of which author is 
writing a simple news piece, therefore this questioning of expertise likely does not feature in 
everyday interactions with the press on the matter. As I return to below, The Independent 
continues to reference Withnall’s article well into Francis’ papacy, as evidence of Benedict’s 
support of ID. 
Nevertheless, Benedict’s “apparent” support for ID in the UK press, gets a somewhat 
harder edge in some American news outlets, with NBC reporting: “The Pope’s remarks on 
Monday to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences appeared to be a theological break from his 
predecessor Benedict XVI, a strong exponent of creationism.” (NBC News, 2014). The 
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commentaries in the UK are more constrained, but here Benedict as an “apparent” 
supporter of ID is further reiterated in The Independent. 
4.5.2 The Independent’s positioning of Francis vs. Benedict 
From 2014 onwards, The Independent adopts Francis as a progressive figurehead. 
They use a reference to his pro-evolution views in a variety of pieces, all linked to the 
paper’s socially progressive editorial stance; with three of these articles also referring to his 
predecessor Benedict’s “apparent support” for intelligent design, with an internal link back 
to Withnall’s aforementioned article. Interestingly, these three articles are the only ones in 
my dataset which refer to Benedict’s views beyond initial news coverage of Francis in 2014. 
The six article titles read (italics denotes those that mention Benedict): 
• Elton John brands Pope Francis 'my hero' 
• Pope Francis: 'Caring for the poor does not make you a communist' 
• Pope Francis Thug Life is probably the finest Thug Life video yet 
• Pope Francis calls the gender pay gap a 'pure scandal' 
• Pope Francis eats with the homeless as he turns 80 
• Pope Francis' best quotes: Pontiff celebrates four years as head of Roman Catholic 
Church; The 80-year-old has declared evolution and the Big Bang are real and said it is 
'better to be an atheist than hypocritical Catholic' 
In each of these articles, a scarcely relevant reference to Francis’ comments on 
evolution is made, in what seems like an attempt to show how progressive he is. 
Interestingly no other newspapers do this. This may well be because Francis’ views align 
more with the editorial stance of The Independent than those of the more traditional and 
often conservative Benedict. 
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In a January, 2015, article: “Pope Francis Thug Life is probably the finest Thug Life 
video yet; Damn, it feels good to be a pontiff” the author, Hooton, says: “The Pope's 
comment was set to Dr. Dre's Rat-Tat-Tat-Tat, and is the latest in a long list of chill remarks, 
including permitting women to breast feed in church and accepting that the Big Bang and 
evolution are real” (Hooton, 2015a). 
Coinciding with Francis’ 80th birthday, on 18th December 2016, The Independent 
published an article reflecting on his papacy, again stressing his apparent difference from 
Benedict, hyperlinking their own earlier article by Withnall: 
Pope Francis has been credited with overhauling the Catholic Church's dogmatic image into a 
more inclusive one, with his more progressive take on divorce and same-sex relationships. He 
went against his predecessor Benedict XVI's apparent support for "intelligent design" and has 
said the theories of evolution and the Big Bang are real. God is not "a magician with a magic 
wand", he said in 2014. (Saul, 2016) 
For writers at The Independent, the pope’s pro-evolution views appear to be 
inseparably tied to his progressive social values, championing social issues and political 
positions that the paper cares about and wants to forward. In an April 2015 article covering 
Francis’s critical comments about the gender pay gap, the same author who wrote the “Thug 
Life” piece above, concluded by stating how: “Last October, Pope Francis stunned the world 
by acknowledging the existence of the Big Bang theory and evolution” (Hooton, 2015b).  
In March, 2017, The Independent also published an article celebrating four years of 
Francis’ pontificates, by listing the Pope’s “best quotes”. Among other passages, the article 
refers to his views on evolution, again stressing his progressive nature compared to 
Benedict: 
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"Evolution in nature is not inconsistent with the notion of creation, because evolution 
requires the creation of beings that evolve."  
Experts interpreted his comments as an attack on the "pseudo theories" of creationism and 
intelligent design which some argued his predecessor, Benedict XVI, had espoused.  
But Pope Francis' comments followed those of Pope Pius XII who actively welcomed the Big 
Bang theory and Pope John Paul II who suggested evolution is "more than a hypothesis" and 
is an "effectively proven fact". (Osborne, 2017) 
These articles all appear online, which means we must consider the different format 
of online publishing. As introduced earlier, some online publishers make use of internal links 
to redirect users to other aspects of their websites. In the above articles, these references to 
Francis’ views which are embedded in the story are hyperlinked to the original news article 
on Francis’ views on evolution. This is an attempt to drive traffic towards that article. If we 
were to cynically interpret these references to Francis and evolution, it would seem that the 
sensational representation of Francis as progressive vs Benedict as an “apparent supporter 
of intelligent design”, may have been repeatedly made to force traffic around the website, 
and thus increase the ad revenue generated. Or indeed, given the ‘click-bait’ nature of the 
titles of these pieces, The Independent may well have been seeking to attract a younger and 
more casual demographic, as they venture into the online media space. 
In contrast to The Independent’s generally positive reporting on Francis, papers with 
a different editorial stance reported on Francis less favourably. In a piece responding to 
Francis’ comments on the dangers of ignoring climate change, The Daily Telegraph, offer the 
reader an alternative interpretation of events. Here, the author suggested climate change 
might not be that detrimental, and that Francis’ progressive views might get him in trouble. 
The paper used a historically inaccurate image of science and religion conflict to argue that 
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the Pope may be embarrassed in the future, by getting the science wrong on climate change, 
this time by accepting scientific consensus too soon: 
Papal advisers may feel that, by associating himself with environmentalism, the Pope is reading 
the signs of the times. The opposite could be true. He could be painting himself into a corner, as 
some in the Church did in the past when they denounced the theory of evolution. (Moore, 2015)  
As introduced in Chapter 2, we must remember that although sceptical attitudes 
have existed in the past, the Vatican has never denounced or condemned evolution. This 
claim doesn’t feature prominently and thus isn’t being used to sell the newspaper, instead a 
claimed past conflict between the Church and science is used rhetorically, to warn off the 
pope, and the reader, from getting the science wrong about climate change; though not 
through a rash rejection, but rather through a too hasty acceptance of climate science. Here, 
we see how beyond specific religion and science contestations, references to the religion 
and science debate can be used to forward particular agendas, arguments, and positions, 
which sometimes may seem counterintuitive. In this case, arguing against accepting a 
mainstream scientific idea—that climate change is real and will have dire consequences.   
We must remember that reporting is intricately bound to the political and social 
stances of each newspaper and the journalists who write for them. Beyond solely reporting 
on what has been said by popes, or past interactions of the church and science, these 
instances, historically valid or not, can be used in numerous ways to forward various 
positions and ideas, which certain newspapers, or certain journalists, wish to champion. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have analysed English newspaper representations of papal 
statements on evolution from 1996 to 2017. News reports of John Paul’s 1996 comments 
were nuanced, with newspapers not only framing the story in natural scientific terms, but 
also including philosophical and theological arguments on the matter. In subsequent 
reporting, a reference to John Paul’s positive remarks about evolution became a useful 
rhetorical device for writers challenging Creationism up to 2004. 
Reporting on Benedict’s 2007 comments cannot be understood without reference to 
a press narrative which anticipated that he may shift the Vatican’s view of evolution. This 
narrative was influenced by Cardinal Schönborn’s 2005 op-ed in The New York Times, rather 
than anything Benedict himself had said on the topic. The English newspaper reporting of 
Benedict’s 2007 comments in Creation and Evolution was mixed, with three publications 
claiming Benedict had not endorsed ID and The Times claiming his comments would be seen 
as an endorsement. Over time, coverage of Benedict’s views simplified, with newsbites 
articles solely focussing on his “10,000 generations” quote about evolution’s experimental 
verifiability. Furthermore, Benedict’s later comments on evolution-creation compatibility, 
and the apparent reality of evolution, did not feature in newspaper reporting. This highlights 
the contingent nature of media realities on the subject, and the processes of selection and 
simplification which are inherent in media practice. 
Subsequent reporting from The Independent, however, persistently labelled Benedict 
as an apparent supporter of ID. Because of this evaluation of Benedict, it is unsurprising that 
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while other papers situated Francis’s 2014 comments in a longer historical context of 
acceptance of evolution in the Church, The Independent stressed how his views contradicted 
Benedict’s purported ID position. This led Francis’ comments to appear more radical then 
they in fact were. However, claims of Benedict’s support for ID or creationism were not as 
pronounced in the English press, as they were in the USA (e.g. Berger, 2014; Jamieson et al., 
2014). 
What of Evan’s (2018: 89) claim that the Church, under Benedict, seemingly 
supported ID? Hopefully I have shown that this is a misguided understanding of the 
situation. The ‘seeming support for ID’ was a press narrative built around Benedict, mainly 
influenced by Schönborn’s op-ed rather than anything Benedict himself had said. This raises 
an important point concerning the media in the social study of science and religion. We must 
remember that as scholars of science and religion, media discourse is an object of study, not 
an unbiased source of primary information. It is perhaps the main forum where contentious 
debates on the matter happen. If we uncritically reproduce media claims on questions of 
science and religion, we may well be forwarding the positions of individuals who have stakes 
in the very subject we seek to understand. These stakes may not even be directly related to 
science and religion, but may be the political positions which undergird various publications. 
This is evident in The Independent’s subsequent reporting on Francis, where his pro-
evolution views were presented alongside other issues, which the paper agreed with. Here, 
political positions may lead to differing interpretations and representations of the events in 
question. 
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It is worth considering for a moment why the press reporting on Benedict was 
somewhat messier than for John Paul and Francis’s comments. If we look at the source of 
the comments which instigated coverage, both John Paul and Francis made their remarks in 
addresses to the PAS. The total length of John Paul’s address was ~1600 words, and Francis’s 
around ~1000 words. Furthermore, both contained easy to understand ‘soundbites’ 
regarding their positions. For John Paul (1996), this was: “new findings lead us toward the 
recognition of evolution as more than a hypothesis.” While for Francis (2014), the soundbite 
was: “The evolution of nature does not contrast with the notion of creation.” Not only are 
addresses themselves short in words, but the phrasing and these two popes’ evaluations of 
evolution are concisely articulated. 
Compare this to Benedict. I argued in Chapter 2, that it is in fact difficult to concisely 
summarise what Benedict believes on evolution. He has produced many words on the 
subject, which are discursive, with his position shifting over time. His comments often take 
the form of philosophical and theological ruminations on the topic, not simple press 
soundbites. Furthermore, his comments on evolution that did receive press attention did not 
come from a short address to the PAS, but instead in the form of a book with 210 pages. 
While the majority Creation and Evolution does not contain Benedict’s comments—instead 
the detailed scientific, philosophical, and theological presentations of his students on the 
topic—without having read the presentations themselves, one cannot understand the 
context of Benedict’s remarks. This is because his comments were made in a discussion of 
the presentations he had just heard. With the discursive nature of the content, and the 
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length of the medium, perhaps it is unsurprising that this led to more ambiguous media 
interpretations of Benedict’s position, both in England and abroad. 
We must also consider the effect of the languages of the comments themselves, and 
the language of the publications analysed. John Paul’s 1996 address was made in French, 
and while English publications did not become embroiled in the translation dispute about 
the ‘more than a/one hypothesis’ dispute, some USA outlets certainly did (See Chapter 2; 
Scott, 1997). The Creation and Evolution book containing Benedict’s comments was first 
published in German. This indeed may have exacerbated the multiple interpretations in 
English publications. Finally, Francis’s comments to the PAS were made in Italian, although 
were also officially released in English, French, German, Portuguese and Spanish. Compared 
with John Paul’s French comments on the official Vatican website (Vatican.va) which are 
only translated into Italian and Spanish. Perhaps this shift in the availability of official 
language translations released by the Vatican has been a conscious effort to counteract 
language barrier difficulties, not just on the reporting on the topic of evolution, but on 
messages from popes more broadly. Nevertheless, language certainly played a factor in 
conversations about John Paul’s comments in the US, but not in the UK. This translation 
dispute centred on one line of text, the very soundbite itself: “more than a hypothesis.” 
Therefore, the German language of Benedict’s remarks may also have led to some 
difficulties in the English-language press understanding his comments. Especially when 
coupling the press narrative around Schönborn’s op-ed, the length of the Creation and 
Evolution book, the high-level discursive content, and the fact it was published in German, 
perhaps it is unsurprising and understandable that the press reporting on the matter is 
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contradictory. This may explain why some outlets decided to focus on the “10,000 
generations” quote, the closest thing to a soundbite which can be found. 
Across my dataset, there were also multiple examples of the Catholic Church being 
represented as anti-science, again reinforcing my contention that in the study of science and 
religion, the Catholic Church is held in a paradoxical position. On the one hand, for scholars 
investigating public attitudes, Catholics aren’t seen to be a problematic group regarding 
evolution; but on the other, in public discourse, the Church itself is held as anti-science. 
Further evidencing this, Galileo featured prominently in the dataset, mainly as a simple 
marker of a historical science-religion conflict discourse. If one wants to argue about 
necessary or historical conflict between science and religion, it seems all one needs to do is 
mention Galileo. This also reflects historical studies in the area, discussed in Chapter 2, 
which have demonstrated the ubiquity of the Galileo Affair, when forwarding notions of 
conflict between science and religion. 
Finally, we must be aware that evolution is not something that is simply accepted or 
rejected. What does acceptance of evolution look like? There are legitimate scientific 
divergences in opinion about the mechanisms driving evolution, and the extent of its 
explanatory power. However, more importantly here for the popes is that a person’s view of 
evolution is embedded within a wider set of philosophical assumptions. Two people may 
‘accept’ evolution, but what is their conception of it? Materialistic or theological, unguided 
or teleological, both or indeed many more. In the next two chapters I aim to elaborate on 
how Catholic publics in England conceive of evolution, and how they see it interacting with 
their religious beliefs, beyond simple categorisations of acceptance or rejection.
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Chapter 5: Catholic publics’ (non-)opposition to evolution 
5.1 Introduction 
While since 1996 every successive pope has stressed the compatibility of some form 
of evolution with Catholicism, to date there have been no dedicated, qualitative studies of 
Catholic publics’ attitudes towards evolution, in England or elsewhere in the world.1 The 
present and following chapter, then, present the first qualitative data on the topic. As 
argued in Chapter 1, previous studies have tended to focus on creationist groups, mainly 
Evangelical Christians in the US (e.g. Long, 2011), and more recently Muslims in the US and 
elsewhere (e.g. Guhin, 2016; Moran, 2019). Members of the public with presumed conflict 
positions are overrepresented in the literature, and without looking outside these perceived 
problem groups, we risk perpetuating a skewed image of how science and religion can relate 
in societies. 
Beyond which religious publics we study, how we study them must also be 
considered. Most survey research on public attitudes towards evolution has either been 
conducted by: (1) measuring participant’s belief in human evolution (using true and false 
responses); or (2) self-classification into various researcher-defined belief positions (e.g. 
evolution, theistic evolution, ID, creationism, etc.) (Hill, 2019: 31). Approach (1) reflects 
some newspaper coverage of papal statements on evolution, which have focussed on 
 
1 Although, as discussed in Chapter 1, there are quantitative studies such as Unsworth and Voas (2017), 
which include Catholics as a subsample.  
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evolution as something which can be either ‘accepted’ or ‘rejected’, rather than reflexively 
considering how evolution may be variously conceptualised. Beyond my own media sample, 
there are numerous other media reports on the prevalence and problem of the rejection of 
evolution and the calls for the need to increase public acceptance, accompanied by 
proposed effective strategies to do so (Wilson, 2005; Gjersoe, 2016). Recent qualitative work 
has also critiqued approach (2): self-classification into various belief positions denoted by 
fixed evolution-related labels. Kaden et al (2019) have shown that unless people are directly 
involved in organisations which deal with science-religion questions, individuals tend not to 
simply and directly identify with labels such as ‘creationism’, ‘intelligent design’, ‘theistic 
evolution’ etc. 
Furthermore, as I argued in Chapter 1, academic measurement of attitudes towards 
evolution, and indeed media discourse on the matter, are disproportionately shaped by the 
US cultural context. This context is radically different to England, therefore importing 
research framings from the US may not be the best way to understand the present context. 
Qualitative studies present the opportunity to have participant-led framing of the issue at 
hand. As outlined in Chapter 3, in this thesis I seek to assess the bottom-up push of people’s 
experiences (Hacking, 1986). Using this inductive qualitative approach can challenge the 
problematic researcher-led framing of investigations into evolution and religion critiqued by 
Elsdon-Baker (2015a). 
In this endeavour to give voice to how our participants are conceptualising the topic, 
we are presented with an issue: just how should we categorise people’s perceptions? In a 
recent thesis, Moran (2019: 127) also articulates this categorisation problem in qualitative 
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studies of attitudes towards evolution. Untethered from the pre-defined categories of the 
researcher in quantitative studies, the open-ended, discursive, sometimes contradictory 
nature of interviews makes categorisation difficult. There are potentially as many 
conceptions of evolution, and attitudes towards it, as there are participants in a study. 
Furthermore, attitudes can shift and change within a single interview, depending on the 
discursive work being done. To say anything analytically useful about the data, some 
categorisation is required, but how do we categorise participants’ attitudes without falling 
foul of the issue framing and restrictive categories utilised in some quantitative work? 
Contending with this very issue is perhaps the most difficult, but also most important, aspect 
of qualitative research in the area.  
During my interviews, and in the following analysis, it became clear that ‘acceptance’ 
and ‘rejection’ of evolution was not how these Catholic participants were expressing 
themselves. Instead, the majority talked in terms of not being opposed to evolution, so long 
as a role for God as creator was maintained. Conversely, a small number listed various 
reasons for their opposition to evolution. It became evident that dividing participants in 
terms of opposition and non-opposition, rather than acceptance and rejection, better 
matched my participants’ lived experiences. I therefore divided my participants into two 
broad groups, those who expressed opposition to evolution (Oppositionals) and those who 
did not (Non-oppositionals). 
After critiquing the forcing of individuals’ attitudes into boxes it is important to justify 
this analytic choice. I am not saying that all Oppositionals occupy the same space, nor that all 
Non-oppositionals are happy with any conception of evolution. What I am arguing is that it 
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was clear from the interviews that an axis of non-opposition/opposition better fit these 
Catholics’ lived experience than the more traditional language of acceptance/rejection. 
Furthermore, these categorisations were developed inductively through the analysis, rather 
than being defined before it. The concepts of acceptance and non-opposition also perform 
different functions for the researcher. I cannot claim that all non-oppositionals ‘accept’ 
evolution, as some did not really know what evolution was. As I will explain in this chapter, 
some individuals conceived of evolution as a grand narrative of the Big Bang, and an 
expanding, unfolding universe, life included. In what sense do these people accept biological 
evolution? They have a conceptualisation of evolution that they are not opposed to. 
Likewise, these Non-oppositionals do reject a form of evolution, a materialistic/atheistic 
conception of it. As will be explored, Oppositionals did not say that they ‘rejected’ evolution, 
instead they listed justifications for their opposition to it. They were often in a positional 
grey area, where they knew what they did not believe, but did not have a fixed set of 
alternative beliefs. 
In this chapter I give examples of these two broad groups of attitudes, non-
opposition and opposition, analysing the differences and similarities between them. I first 
explore the ways that both groups articulated their orientation toward evolution. Then 
continuing to Oppositionals’ articulations of having no alternative view to evolution, which 
raises methodological insights for how we study religious attitudes towards evolution. I 
finish the chapter by exploring the conceptions and knowledge of evolution found in both 
Oppositional and Non-oppositional groups, discussing the evident non-relationship between 
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knowledge and attitudes. This is in line with critiques of the deficit model in PUS and science 
communication (Bauer et al., 2007). 
5.2 Overview of method and participants 
For this analysis of public attitudes, 31 semi-structured interviews (female n=16; 
male n=15) with self-identifying Catholics in England were conducted between October 2017 
and April 2018.2 The shortest interview lasted 31:30 and the longest lasted 2:40:13, with the 
mean interview duration being 1:03:29. All interviewees’ names have been pseudonymised 
to ensure anonymity. See Appendix VI for a table of all participant information, including 
age, gender, and location. 
The interviews were semi-structured. I therefore utilised a schedule of questions, but 
allowed flexibility in question order, and permitted other topics which were deemed 
relevant to emerge during the interview. The interviews were audio recorded, then 
transcribed verbatim, before being uploaded into NVivo qualitative analysis software. I then 
followed Braun and Clarke’s (2014) thematic analysis procedure, thoroughly familiarising 
myself with the data, coding and recoding relevant themes using constant comparison, 
before compiling the analysis. 
 
 
2 See Chapter 3 for an expanded version of this methods section. 
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5.3 Opposition and Non-opposition to evolution 
In this study, 26 out of 31 participants were unopposed to evolution, so long as the 
proper role for God in the universe was maintained.3 There was, however, great diversity in 
this group, not only in terms of participant’s knowledge of evolution, but also in terms of 
how they, if at all, saw their Catholic faith interacting with their views on evolution. 
Conversely, 5 of the 31 Catholics were opposed to evolution. That is, they articulated 
problems they had with evolution. Their expression of this was not in terms of an outright 
‘rejection’ of evolution, rather they listed reasons why they questioned evolution, justifying 
their opposition to it.  
In this section I discuss themes which arose in the interviews with Catholics 
considering their orientation towards evolution. First, I discuss the language of “no problem” 
most often used when stressing non-opposition to evolution. Next, I explore the mainly 
scientific justifications found for opposing evolution. Finally, I argue that while Oppositionals 
did not subscribe to evolution, they had no alternative view in its place, which has 
implications for how we measure public attitudes towards evolution 
5.3.1 No problem 
The majority of Catholic participants (n=26) in this study were unopposed to 
evolution. The most common way these Catholics expressed their orientation towards 
evolution was using some variant of the words: “no problem”. As the articulation of “no 
 
3 I outline the broad numbers here to give the reader a view of how many participants I am analysing in 
each group, not because these numbers have any representative significance at the population level. For 
this kind of data, see Unsworth and Voas (2017). 
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problem” rather than “I accept it” was the most common way of articulating their 
orientation to evolution, this is a clear example of how categorising this Catholic population 
as non-opposition/opposition, rather than accept/reject, more closely resembles how these 
Catholics conceptualised and expressed their attitudes in the interviews. This was both in 
terms of asking what participants thought about evolution itself and how they saw it 
interacting with their religious beliefs. In the following excerpt from John (South West, 
retired chemical engineer, 80-89), we see a clear example of this articulation of “no 
problem”: 
INTERVIEWER: What's your position on evolution as a science? 
JOHN: Same as John Paul II, I think, who said, "We have to accept that it's beyond a hypothesis." 
Evidence is very, very clear. Species, for example, evolving into different species. I have actually 
read The Origin of Species, which most people who get het up about it, haven’t. It seems to me 
very clear and has done since I was about-- I remember it coming up when I was taking the 11 
Plus. I have no problem with it. 
John was one of a small number of participants who had heard of any of the popes’ 
comments on evolution, suggesting a discontinuity between Catholic elites and publics on 
the matter. Although, perhaps to caution against a romanticised view of John and other 
Non-oppositionals being the ‘rational’, or ‘modern’ individuals while Oppositionals are 
‘irrational’ and ‘pre-modern’, it is important to stress that while John had ‘no problem’ with 
evolutionary science, he did have a problem with climate science: “I've yet to be convinced 
by climate change. The measured effects are not as large as the publicity screams out at it. 
Whether it is associated with man-made carbon dioxide or other things, is yet to be proven, I 
think. To me, that is still a hypothesis. The people who promote it, some of them, are 
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extremely intolerant.” As I will discuss later, attitudes to specific sciences should not be 
conflated with attitudes to science in general, or indeed on other specific topics. 
Neil, (Midlands, a maths teacher, 50-59), also stressed his position of not having a 
“particular problem” with evolution sitting alongside his religious beliefs: 
All life evolves, as I understand it, and I’m not particularly a biologist, but as I understand it there 
is an acceleration at times, due to environmental or other factors, in the evolution of the species.  
If you work backwards, to the origins of life and the planet, I don’t have any particular problem 
with the theory of evolution sitting alongside my Christian beliefs.  I wouldn’t claim to know 
enough about it, to be able to justify as far as biological evolution is concerned.  I would take it 
back to creation, and the Big Bang Theory, and when I read the account of the creation of the 
earth in Genesis, I can’t see anything between the two, that contradict each other, if you read 
them with a broad mind. 
As stressing a lack of opposition to evolution using variants on the words “no 
problem” was the most common way Catholic interviewees talked about their views on 
evolution, it is worth considering the possible origins of this phrasing. We could interpret the 
‘no problem’ response in multiple ways. It is possible that these Catholics could be so 
apathetic towards evolution that they do not feel the need to describe their position in 
positive language. However, I believe it is more likely that the expression of non-opposition 
towards, or “no problem” with, evolution is driven by cultural expectations—i.e. the conflict 
narrative, which suggests they should have a problem. Indeed, a recent poll conducted in the 
UK found that while many religious people did not feel it difficult to accept evolution in 
reference to their personal beliefs, the majority also said that it would be difficult for other 
religious people to do so (Elsdon-Baker et al., 2017b). The responses stressing “no problem” 
in the present study, may well be made in response to the expectation that religious people 
are generally thought to reject evolution.  
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In the present study, almost all of the Non-oppositionals reported that conversations 
about evolution don’t occur often, if at all, in their day to day lives, with people from within 
or beyond their faith. Indeed, many could not recall a single conversation where they had 
talked about, or disagreed about, evolution with another person. Interestingly, while 
discussing other people’s perceptions of their views, it was much more likely for Catholic 
Non-oppositionals to say they had been confronted by somebody pre-empting their stance 
on abortion and homosexuality, rather than the topic of evolution. With most participants 
unable to remember ever being prejudiced against for their views on evolution, and 
Catholics in this study anticipating a conflict narrative through the stressing of “no problem” 
around evolution and their faith, the question then arises: is there an implicit expectation of 
conflict at play here, and if so where did this expectation of conflict come from, if not from 
the direct lived experience of conflict? 
Media narratives influenced by secularisation and conflict theses dominate public 
discourse on religion and science. For some time, the media have used a conflict narrative as 
a useful and frequent point of drama (Barbour, 2000). In the present study, when discussing 
science and religion in the media, a few participants were uninterested or had not thought 
about media coverage, for example, Christine (40-50, Midlands, university lecturer): “I 
honestly haven’t thought about it.  I’ll be really honest.  I actually probably just… I probably 
just let it wash over me and don’t get into any sort of…I don’t get stressed about it at all.” 
However, a far more common response was of dissatisfaction with how the media treats the 
topic, and also a general perception that the British media ‘has it in’ for the Catholic Church 
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in general. Nick (Midlands, religious studies teacher, 20-29), gives an archetypal response of 
this view of media coverage of the Church and science specifically:  
You know, they – the media – always portrays the Church as not being forward-thinking or in line 
with science, but there are currently priests in the Vatican now who are scientists, with 
doctorates, who are spending part of their time looking for extra-terrestrial life.  We don’t shun 
science.  You know, we’re quite keen on it, to be honest. 
With media led conflict narratives we are dealing with two interrelated strands which 
require disentangling. The first, is evolution being communicated atheistically, which means 
evolution itself is expected to be necessarily an anti-religious belief. An exemplar of this is 
the polemics of Richard Dawkins, who forwards the strong version of the conflict thesis 
between science and religion more broadly, and argues that evolutionary science can explain 
religion itself (Dawkins, 2017). The second, where Catholicism is represented as being 
broadly anti-science, and therefore, Catholics themselves are expected to be anti-evolution. 
These two strands (anti-religious evolution and anti-evolution religion) interrelate, and 
indeed end up at the same point: expected conflict between Catholicism and evolution. 
Certainly, I found in my media analysis of coverage of papal statements on evolution a 
common theme of representations of the Catholic Church as anti-science, often using the 
example of Galileo to embody the conflict between religion and science at large (Chapter 4). 
Given the dearth of other studies conducted in this area, it is hard to extrapolate from my 
study to argue more generally about the role of media discourses in informing individual’s 
opinions on the subject. Nonetheless, broader communication studies have clearly shown 
the potential of media effects on audiences, though the communications field has gone 
through many paradigms of thinking on the matter, which differ in the potential magnitude 
of these effects (McQuail, 2014). Future studies should assess the relative appearance of 
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evolutionary anti-religious and religious anti-evolutionary narratives in popular media, to 
disentangle and delineate these two vectors of the conflict narrative, which may impact on 
public opinion. 
It is also possible that, given the constructed nature of the interview, my position as a 
PhD researcher influenced the way in which my participants were answering questions 
(Braun and Clarke, 2014). A researcher, somewhat associated with the scientific pursuit of 
knowledge, could be seen as an individual looking for conflict. Indeed, when potential 
participants heard about my study, some of the Non-oppositionals in my sample may well 
have responded to get their voices of non-opposition heard. Although, the obverse could 
also feasibly be true, with some Oppositionals not responding to the interview invite 
through fear of ridicule or derision. Nevertheless, almost all stated that voices such as theirs 
are not represented in wider public discourse, whatever their positions may have been. Due 
to this perception of me as a ‘scientific’ researcher, participants may have been initially 
defensive, leading them to stress their non-opposition towards evolution. If participants 
associated me with the scientific endeavour, and perhaps therefore anticipated that I was 
expecting to find conflict, or indeed hoping to find it, this is just another facet of the larger 
conflict narrative previously discussed, and indeed indicates its penetration into the lives of 
Catholic publics in England. 
5.3.2 Justifications for opposition 
It is not easy to extract a person’s motivations from interview data, therefore, 
motives for opposing evolution remain largely unclear. However, we can analyse the reasons 
and justifications given as to why these individuals oppose evolution. As the number of 
 234 
Oppositionals in this study is small (n=5), clearly the following details of their reasons and 
justifications for opposition cannot be considered exhaustive. Overwhelmingly the 
justifications given for opposing evolution were scientific in nature, however some 
Oppositionals also argued in philosophical terms. Interestingly, and returned to in Chapter 6, 
no Oppositionals cited Biblical texts or positions as a reason for opposition to evolution. 
Of the five participants in this study who opposed evolution, three had a background 
in science or engineering, though two were retired, and one was no longer working in 
engineering. Their justifications are interesting, then, as all used their expertise and 
knowledge of science and engineering to challenge the legitimacy and credibility of 
evolution. A clear example of this is in the following excerpts where Peter, a retired 
electronic engineering lecturer in his 80s, argues that probability means that evolution, in 
terms of abiogenesis, could not have happened. He also touches upon one of the vectors of 
the conflict narrative disentangled above, that evolution is seen as atheistic: 
I mean I have read a lot about evolution, Darwin, succession and so on, and … it is only a theory. 
There is a lot of flaws in it. It is taught as though its fact in school’s which is entirely wrong, it is 
not a fact. There are as many scientists of great renown who see the flaws in Darwin’s theory, as 
there are who applaud it. And unfortunately, Darwin’s theory has become the mantra of the 
atheistic humanists. That is their Bible, their religion if you like, erm whereas there are some 
enormous flaws if you like. I mean the two great pillars … I’m going off a bit now … the two great 
pillars of evolution: One is that you had biogenesis, you had the creation of life from chemicals 
coming together, in a pre… pre-biotic soup of something, right? That was one of the basics … 
tenet Neo-Darwinism. And the other thing is that you had macroevolution, that you can go from 
one species to another through this Darwin process … this Darwinian process of mutation and 
natural selection. And both of those have not been proven. And in fact you can … Sir Fred Hoyle 
has done a mathematical probab… probabilistic erm analysis, of the chances of the chemicals 
coming together in the right way to create a living cell. When you look at the probability it’s 
impossible. Right? I mean we are talking about something like 1x1040,000, right, which is a hell of a 
big number, and in fact is an impossible. 
Gregory, now retired, who has a PhD in physics, and held various industry jobs 
relating to physics and engineering, went further than Peter, and called into question the 
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entire discipline of biology. In Gregory’s view, as biology started off as natural history it was 
not a science. He goes on to state that to be a science, biology needed a theory, and Darwin 
came up with evolution. Gregory, then argues that evolution fails Popperian demarcation: 
Apart from anything else, you see, I'm also a follower of the philosopher of science Karl Raimund 
Popper, and Popper…the main claim to fame that Popper has was he asked a very simple 
question and gave it a very simple answer.  What's the difference between science and stuff that 
isn’t science?  […] Anyway.  So, you see, it's very difficult to see how you could disprove the 
theory of evolution because the theory of evolution is all about things happening over enormous 
periods of time.  So, unless you had an enormous period of time and said that over this enormous 
period of time the theory of evolution made a particular prediction and then that particular 
prediction didn’t come true you wouldn’t disprove, but the theory of evolution doesn’t make 
specific predictions of anything.  You know, it doesn’t say that if you do this then that will 
happen.  So, even if you had a time machine and could observe things over a period of time the 
theory of evolution still doesn’t produce any predictors that could be proved wrong.  If…even if it 
tried to and something else happened you'd always be able to find a reason why it hadn’t worked 
out how you'd expected because something else had cropped up that had frustrated what you 
had predicted.  It's utterly unfalsifiable from any basis. So, according to Popper’s demarcation the 
theory of evolution isn’t a scientific theory.   
As we will discuss later, some Catholics (both Oppositionals and Non-oppositionals) 
refer to evolution as ‘just a theory’, without a clear understanding how the word theory is 
defined in science (or indeed in the philosophy of science). However, Gregory above argues 
that evolution itself does not meet the requirements to be labelled a scientific theory at all. 
Without its unifying theory of evolution, for Gregory, biology is relegated from the sciences 
entirely. 
Not all Catholics who gave scientific justifications for their opposition had a science 
or engineering background. Thomas, a theological author in his 50s, suggests his opposition 
stems from the scientific method itself: 
INTERVIEWER: Has there been any particular author or any particular influence on your position 
now when it comes to ideas around evolution?  
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THOMAS: Well, on the one hand the scientific method itself. If empiricism believes in proceeding 
from the evidence then I think a strong sense of that is almost part of the empirical tradition. 
Show me the evidence. In that sense, it’s a very basic question.  
Thomas positions evolutionary science in opposition to the scientific method and 
empiricism, arguing it does not meet the criteria of good science, as it does not adhere to 
the scientific method and the empirical tradition. As other scholars have found (e.g. 
Hildering et al., 2012), this “othering” enables people to maintain a positive attitude towards 
science, while maintaining opposition to evolution as a non-science.  
Thomas was one of two Oppositionals, along with Gregory, who both detailed long 
philosophical as well as scientific critiques of evolution. These arguments centred on 
essentialism and wholeness. Throughout the conversation Thomas repeatedly referred to a 
problem with evolution being that a “wholeness” was missing. This related to a philosophical 
principle he held, by which something sophisticated could not come from something 
simpler. Having an anthropocentric, goal-oriented view of creation, i.e. that evolutionary 
processes would have to lead to human beings, he could not conceive of how this could 
happen: 
Because there’s a principle in philosophy that you can’t have something more sophisticated come 
from something simpler. That makes perfect sense. If you’ve got an inert gas how can an inert gas 
produce breathing, putting it at its extreme? You’ve got to have something within what’s inert 
that’s capable of being developed into breath. Now, obviously you’ve got oxygen, but that’s not 
breathing, that’s what is breathed. So this is one of the problems with an evolutionary goal 
process is how can what is sophisticated come from what is simple if it’s not present in what is 
simple? Now, in the wood itself you have a material. I bring the goal of the shelf to it, and 
construct the shelf...The wood doesn’t possess within itself the goal of being a shelf. It’s a 
susceptible material because of how it’s structured that I can make use of it, but I bring the goal 
to it. So who brings the goal to the evolutionary process, bearing in mind these discontinuities 
that make it possible to develop. These are the kinds of questions I think that are open and 
debatable. 
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In the above excerpt Thomas’ claim of certain questions being “open and debatable” 
brings up another important theme from Oppositionals. While all had specific justification 
for opposing evolution, none had a fixed alternative view. Instead all held that it was an 
open debate, and had no certainties regarding alternative positions. I further explore this in 
the following section. 
Whilst interviewing participants in this study, it became clear that self-professed 
positive attitudes towards science were common, and indeed were not necessarily 
connected to participants’ views on evolution. By positioning science against evolution, or 
relegating evolution and biology from the sciences, Oppositional Catholics in this study could 
maintain a positive attitude towards science in general, while specifically opposing 
evolution. This demotion to bad science, or non-science, was also found in Hildering et al.’s 
(2012) study of Dutch Protestants. This suggests the same strategies to maintain a positive 
attitude towards science are employed by those who oppose evolution across cultural, 
denominational and linguistic boundaries. However, for those concerned with anti-science 
movements, or a purported growing suspicion of science in society, this finding also suggests 
that even for those who oppose one aspect of science, they often do not reject the whole 
endeavour. This is seemingly related to findings in previous PUS studies, which find some 
connection between scientific knowledge and attitudes in general, but on specific issues 
there appears to be no direct correlations (Allum et al., 2008). In the present study, though, 
for these Oppositionals, ‘science’ has epistemological and cultural authority, that is why they 
use it to argue against a particular scientific discipline or theory that they are opposed to. 
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5.3.3 No alternative view 
During my interviews with Catholics in England, it became clear that several of my 
participants were part of an understudied group of individuals whose views, or lack thereof, 
could not adequately emerge through quantitative research. As introduced in Chapter 1, 
problems arise through efforts to categorise people into set belief positions: e.g. atheistic 
evolutionist, creationist, ID, etc. In effect, this type of work means that to measure 
opposition to evolution, the researcher relies on the participant to self-classify into an 
alternate belief position. 
In this study, however, while Oppositionals articulated various reasons for their 
opposition to evolution, none of these individuals articulated a fixed alternative view. This 
was not to say that these individuals were not deeply interested in the subject, the length of 
the interviews and their list of justifications for opposition demonstrated this was not the 
case. However, while they could talk at length about their various reasons for opposition, 
they did not offer an alternative position. In the following excerpt, Peter (Opposed, retired 
electronic engineer in his 80s), states how he sees the whole debate as an open question: 
I think the evidence is still open. Erm … I erm … I can’t … I mean I don’t have the theory that 
would say how it happened. I look at the theories, and I accept them as theories, and they have 
flaws and so on … All of them. I am open to final … we may never know... And I have read all of 
these, but I wouldn’t like to label myself as a Darwinist, Evolutionist, Creationist. I don’t see 
myself in that way. I have got an open mind still. Let’s put it that way. 
Thomas (theology author, 50-59) also explains how he isn’t committed to an 
alternative view in the following excerpt. Opposition to evolution is enough, and he does not 
see the appeal of having an alternative view: 
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INTERVIEWER: So we spoke a bit about your scepticism of the evidence as it is today to be able to 
back up evolution as an explanation of great varieties of life on Earth in a way. Did you have a 
view as to the alternative as you see it? 
THOMAS: I’m not necessarily committed to an alternative, because if the question is open to 
investigation I don’t see that I have to come up with an alternative. But if we acknowledge things 
like variety as well as local variation within variety that does itself seem to be persistent evidence. 
If you acknowledge the difference between atoms and molecules and a cellular structure that is 
persistent evidence. Now, if the evolutionary hypothesis wasn’t just a hypothesis but was in some 
way an enduring event then why aren’t we seeing in some visible way that transition from 
inorganic to organic or from one type of species to another if it’s an evolutionary process that’s 
ongoing, otherwise somehow it’s stopped? And is it stopped because it never started. 
Thomas reverts here back to justifications for his opposition towards evolution, he 
later states that one reason he is not committed to an alternative view is because: “on the 
one hand because Genesis is a literary account it appeals in its own right as an intelligent 
exposition of if you don’t know what happened but you accept there was a beginning.” He 
goes on to state that while Genesis provides a literary explanation: “Now, whether that itself 
answers the question of actually how did God do it, it’s a slightly different question because 
it’s already intelligent as it is. It’s already reasonable. It’s already recognising that things have 
an origin.” As will be picked up again in the next chapter, here Thomas isn’t arguing for 
seeing Genesis as an alternative scientific explanation, rather that it offers some symbolic 
narrative of creation. Indeed, none of the Oppositionals in this study argued for a literal 
reading of Genesis. 
Catherine (South East, public opinion researcher, 20-29), sees science itself as at fault 
for the lack of alternative positions. In her view, as evolution has become the dominant 
paradigm, no scientists can dissent without being subjected to ridicule. This has left an 
information vacuum, where the only alternative sources of information come from faith 
groups. She says: 
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But my biggest problem is that all the resources I look for are all framed very much 
within…they’re trying to defend one thing or another. So, if I try to look for anything that’s to do 
with evolution…sometimes it’s a bit more neutral, but if I try to look for anything that contradicts 
that it almost always comes from some sort of faith site that will say the reasons for this are this 
and it’s very important because of this and you must defend this. There’s just no space to say 
let’s just explore all the different options, which is what I want. So, I feel obliged almost to 
support the antievolution stuff as a way of defending my faith. 
Catherine suggests an interesting way in which identity may be playing a role in the 
answering of surveys. Catherine is opposed to evolution, and would like an alternative, but 
feels she cannot find any information on an alternative that is scientific rather than faith 
based. However, she feels the amount of anti-religious, pro-evolution literature forces her 
somewhat to oppose evolution, to protect her social group. 
So, of all the Catholic participants who opposed evolution in this study, none had a 
fixed alternative view of how life on earth developed, and they furthermore did not simply 
align with the labels of professional discourse as found by Kaden et al. (2019). As discussed 
in Chapter 1, beyond the three-part blunt measures of evolution in polls, such as War on 
Science, which gave the options of ‘creation theory’, ‘intelligent design theory’, or ‘evolution 
theory’, recent quantitative work has begun to offer a greater number of belief positions. 
Ecklund and Sheitle (2018: 74-79), for example, asked participants to choose from six 
narratives on the origin and development of life: young-earth creationism, recent human 
creation, God-guided evolution, Intelligent Design, God-initiated evolution, and naturalistic 
evolution. Interestingly, Ecklund and Sheitle (2018) found that 57.5% of respondents said 
none of the narratives were “definitely true”. Furthermore, they found that the majority of 
individuals in every religious group selected more than one narrative on the origin of life. 
Ecklund and Scheitle interpreted this selection of multiple narratives as an indicator that 
individuals are not sure enough about their position to commit to one perspective. While to 
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a degree reinforcing this finding, my results of Catholic Oppositionals having no fixed 
alternative position goes further, calling into question the very utility of self-classification 
options in general for this type of individual. Indeed, if opposition to evolution continues to 
be measured by self-classification into various alternate belief positions (creationist, ID etc.) 
then we are potentially overlooking a sub-population of interest who oppose evolution, but 
have no alternative position. This also extends to those who have no traditional religious or 
spiritual beliefs. Elsdon-Baker et al. (2017a) found that 5% of the UK non-religious/non-
spiritual population of their sample thought evolution difficult (somewhat difficult, difficult 
or very difficult) to accept evolution in reference to their own personal beliefs. It is clearly 
inadequate to measure this non-religious evolution opposition by offering religiously-
inspired alternate belief positions such as creationism or ID. 
 
5.4 Conceptions and knowledge of evolution 
A challenge when researching attitudes towards science is determining what specific 
conception of science participants hold and how this relates to the attitudes they are 
articulating. For example, a common attitudinal survey item, which participants can agree or 
disagree with, is: “science makes our way of life change too fast” (National Science Board, 
2016). While this measure may tell us about an individual’s general disposition towards the 
impact of science on society and culture, it cannot tell us how the individual is 
conceptualising science, which specific facets of science they are considering when 
answering, or indeed the numerous conceptualisations of “ways of life” and how they may 
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change. The problem here is that such measures have no “unequivocal focus”, which leads 
to idiosyncratic answers (Allum et al., 2008: 39). In qualitative studies, we have the 
opportunity to delve deeper into participant’s conceptualisations of science. It is important 
to not assume that just because an individual states that they have no opposition to 
evolution that the participant is working from the same definition of evolution as the 
researcher. Therefore, it is necessary to overview the various understandings and 
conceptions of evolution found in the dataset. 
5.4.1 Knowledge of evolution 
Catholics interviewed for this thesis displayed a wide range of knowledge about 
evolution, from those who could detail the history of the concept and the process of natural 
selection, to those who offered only abstract notions of a changing and unfolding universe. 
Nonetheless, all participants attempted to give a description of what evolution is, although 
some were given tentatively. The depth of an individual Catholic’s explanation of evolution 
in this study appeared to have no bearing on their attitudes towards evolution, with some of 
those who knew the most about evolution also showing the strongest opposition towards it. 
Likewise, the majority of those who knew little about evolution also stressed how they were 
not opposed to the concept. This is in line with well-known critiques of the deficit model, 
discussed in Chapter 1, which reject a straightforward relationship between knowledge and 
attitudes (e.g. Bauer, 2007). 
An example of a participant who had less knowledge of evolution, and who answered 
tentatively, is Dorothy (Non-oppositional, Midlands, university administrator, 50-59). When 
asked to describe what evolution is, Dorothy responded: “What from science? Erm … the Big 
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Bang theory, and man evolving from a fish, and coming out and getting legs and going up 
and turning into Ne-un-thal man whatever and modern man and that basically. Is that 
right?” Dorothy’s answer is indicative of two other themes amongst the Catholics in this 
study: the linking of evolution to the Big Bang, and the anthropocentric focus of previous 
species turning into Homo sapiens over time. I will return to both these themes in the 
following section.  
For a few participants, their faith combined with a strong interest in science had led 
them to research the topic of evolution more, leading to more knowledge on the subject. 
Paul (Non-oppositional, 50-60, ex-civil servant now working in IT) suggested his interest in 
exploring “hot potato” topics, such as the first two chapters of Genesis, had led him to 
explore many issues in more depth. He often gives talks at his Church, on theology, science 
and environmentalism, and would undoubtedly score highly on any quantitative science 
literacy scales. Paul describes how he likes to explain natural selection to others in the 
following way: 
I’ve also tried to explain natural selection, by saying, just go through the park and you’ll see an 
oak tree, for example, how many acorns do you think an oak tree is going to produce each 
season, or over its life?  It’s over 100,000 or something, maybe millions. But we’re not knee deep 
in oak trees are we?  Only some of them survive.  Look at aphids, we’re not knee deep in aphids.  
Or cats, or any of these other things.  So, they have stupid numbers of offspring, but if the 
population is stable, it’s approximately one for one on average, but averages are averages, and 
you might have one individual that might have ten offspring, and nine individuals who have no 
offspring.  So, you’re going to get that sort of selection.  And then when I explain it like that, 
people can see, yeah, I suppose, that’s natural selection, and they can understand that. 
Allum et al.’s (2014) research suggests that when religious people who have a value 
predisposition come into contact with an area of science which is opposed to their faith, the 
more they learn about the science, and the more they deliberate, the more entrenched their 
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opposition towards it becomes. This, it is suggested, manifests itself quantitatively in an 
inverse relationship between knowledge and attitudes (Allum et al., 2014). With this value 
predisposition, the more someone learns, the less they like it. What does this mean for 
oppositional Catholics, who know a lot about evolution? Has an inevitable epistemological 
conflict between religion and science manifest itself only because those who know more 
about evolution have discovered that it cannot be compatible with their faith? It would 
appear not. Unopposed Catholics, who also have more theological and scientific knowledge, 
and who have deliberated on the questions of souls and suffering have reached different 
conclusions. For example, in the following excerpt from David, a business lecturer who used 
to work in industry:  
DAVID: [O]ne of the biggest challenges to faith I think is a … for example is: if we believe that we 
have evolved from … apes is the most obvious example but we can go further and further back in 
time, we have a problem insofar as we can say… we if we believe that people go … that people 
who live the appropriate life will go to heaven and those who don’t will go to hell, let’s say, then 
what is the cut-off point in history? As to when that process started? Right? So, for example we … 
because the idea is that it’s not just that when Jesus arrived … that everyone after Jesus ya know 
will go to heaven, its not like that, everyone alive through history before Jesus, could have gone 
or could not go to heaven. And one of the challenges to our faith is well what is the cut off point 
then? In evolutionary terms, when are we going to draw the line and say, well human beings 
became what they are… from a religious perspective. […] so, for me so I think there are lots of 
mysteries about the way we came to be where we are today. Evolution being one, but I also think 
we can get you further back and talk about the big bang on the origin of the universe and how did 
it all start and yet because when I heard this argument put … it might even have been of Start the 
Week or some other such program with Richard Dawkins or somebody and I thought: no you’re 
making wrong point here because you’re getting your getting focussed in on the detail here 
about that particular logical or seemingly logical contradiction whereas I believe is not like that in 
the sense that it’s it’s not about saying when did this happen it’s a broader …. thing … if that 
makes sense? […] I think that’s the essence of my faith in that I don’t think it’s about saying well 
who’s a going to be in heaven then, is this ape going to be in heaven? Or is this human going to 
be in heaven and so therefore what point do we cross that boundary. 
David’s response here shows the subtlety of a person’s views. It shows how one can 
resist the issue framing of the evolution debate, as designated here by Dawkins. It also 
shows that thinking deeply on the topic of evolution and your faith does not necessarily lead 
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to opposition. This would suggest there is no inevitable connection between having one of 
these theological issues with evolution, and opposing evolution outright. 
5.4.2 Just a theory 
In public discourses on the rejection of evolution, one of the most common 
misunderstandings involves the word “theory”. Richard Dawkins, prominent atheist and 
science communicator, has even proposed a new word “theorum” to help with this 
misunderstanding of what exactly a theory is (Dawkins, 2002: 13). Although, to date, it has 
not gained traction. The confusion arises from the different use of the word theory in 
scientific literature and in everyday use, where theory in everyday use is more akin to a 
hypothesis in scientific language. Public (mis)understanding of the processes of science also 
plays a role, where some individuals think that over time, and with more evidence, a 
scientific theory can become a ‘scientific fact’ (e.g. Quora, 2018). 
In my dataset, the “just a theory” argument does arise, even from those who have a 
scientific or engineering background. For example, Peter (retired electronic engineer and 
lecturer), who opposed evolution, argued that evolution was a theory not a fact: “I have 
read a lot about evolution, Darwin, succession and so on, and … it is only a theory. There is a 
lot of flaws in it. It is taught as though it fact in schools which is entirely wrong, it is not a 
fact.” Later in the interview Peter commented that, while he had doubts about evolution, 
the Big Bang Theory and creation were compatible. Interested by this, I asked him about his 
views on the Big Bang also being a theory, as opposed to a fact, as he had described 
evolution: 
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INTERVIEWER: I’m interested as you said before that evolution is only a theory, and not a fact, 
erm what would you say … because the Big Bang is a theory… but do you see those two 
theoretical positions differently? 
PETER: Yeah … well I think … yes I do, I think there is more evidence for the Big Bang than there is 
for evolution … evolution is a theory in, in the Darwinian version of it… whereas the Big Bang, 
there is a lot more evidence for that. I mean the fine tuning of the universe is incredible, the four 
forces are so precisely tuned. The Big Bang itself, I was reading the other day about the sensitivity 
of the structure of our universe to the forces, I mean they are completely disparate, the gravity, 
electromagnetic, and the weak and the strong nuclear forces, I mean the different sort of levels, 
and they are all so precise, and if you change any one of them by a small amount the universe 
wouldn’t be the way it is. So … and I mean this is why they have multi-universe theories … you 
know, we are one of many, and we just happen to be here. And I can understand if you don’t 
believe in God why you would take that, as a scientist, why you would take that as a possibility. 
Because it is the only way of explaining the sensitivity of our universe to all the parameters. So, I 
think the Big Bang theory, in a way, is more supportive of design and intelligence than it is of 
randomness, personally. 
Here we find the need to maintain a role for God in creation, and a rejection of 
randomness, a point discussed in the following chapter. This time, it results from the 
discussion of the Big Bang, rather than evolution.  
Interestingly, though, it is not just those who opposed evolution who stated 
evolution was ‘just a theory’. Nick, a religious studies teacher in his late 20s, who was not 
opposed to evolution, also displays the ‘just a theory’ argument: 
I won’t say that sometimes I take great delight in my high ability classes also, debating the point 
that it’s called the theory of evolution for a reason. It is a theory. We have a lot of evidence to 
suggest that it is true, but at the moment it is still only labelled a theory. Not many people would 
– I don’t know, maybe – I suppose, quoted as saying that it is absolute scientific fact yet. Or at 
least that is my understanding of quite a few of the positions held. Purely because though – and I 
say this as well to my classes and so it’s something that can’t be observed by scientific method – 
it cannot be observed over time. We can see adaptations, but we can’t see evolution. 
Nick continues to say, however, that even though he holds the ‘just a theory’ view, 
he perceives no conflict with his beliefs, and sees sufficient evidence for evolution: “there’s 
nothing in Church doctrine or teaching that suggests that evolution is wrong. And with all 
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the scientific evidence that we have, there is nothing in my belief that challenges evolution 
and I see them working very closely together. For myself… there’s no issue with that.” 
This isn’t to say that no Catholics in the study understood the scientific distinction 
between theory and hypothesis. Paul, an ex-civil servant now working in IT who was 
unopposed to evolution, had a deep knowledge of both theology and evolution, mentioned 
how frustrating it was for him to talk to people about evolution: “Urgh… ‘Evolution’s only a 
theory.’ [mocking impression] … I get so annoyed having to explain to people, between a 
theory and a hypothesis.” 
5.4.3 Big Bang and anthropocentrism 
The notion of ‘accepting’ evolution presupposes a particular conception of evolution 
which is being accepted by a study participant. If I told you that Person X accepts evolution, 
you would probably have your own conception of what ‘evolution’ Person X was accepting. 
However, as was the experience of some Catholics in this study, a participant could express 
non-opposition towards their concept of evolution, whilst not being able to articulate a 
description of evolution that would be recognisable to an evolutionary biologist or indeed a 
PUS researcher. For example, we see this non-opposition in an excerpt from Eileen (40-50, 
Midlands, college religious support staff), who has studied theology to master’s degree level: 
INTERVIEWER: So the project's specifically looking at evolution. Are you familiar with the term 
evolutionary science, and what do you understand by that term, or what does it mean to you? 
EILEEN: Erm… I haven't read the Origin of the Species but that's probably where I'd start. (laughs) 
INTERVIEWER: (Laughs) Me neither. 
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EILEEN: But that sense that…and that… I've no problem with that sense of an evolving, unfolding 
universe really, rather than… rather than just humanity within it. 
When asked what they understood by the term evolution, it was common for 
participants to give an overarching narrative, which linked the beginning of the universe, the 
Big Bang, to the origin and subsequent development of life on Earth. This suggests that for 
some participants the word evolution resonates as more of an overarching narrative of 
science’s explanation for the universe and everything within it. There was a wide range of 
how knowledgeable people were about this grand science narrative, with the majority who 
articulated this view, like Dorothy above, simply referring to “the Big Bang theory, and man 
evolving from a fish, and coming out and getting legs and going up and turning into Ne-un-
thal man”, to a very small number who were comfortable discussing the formation of atoms 
and elements. 
Thomas (2012: 158) and Moran (2019: 211) also found this conflation of the Big Bang 
and evolution in their studies of British Muslim perceptions of evolution. That the Big Bang-
evolution conflation can be found across religious groups in the same country, suggests the 
cause of this conflation may not necessarily be a feature of individual religious traditions. 
Pursuing a line of inquiry investigating if non-religious individuals also perceive this 
conflation, would help to identify whether the linkage of the Big Bang and evolution is a 
specifically religious idiosyncrasy, or if (as I suspect ) it is a quirk of the public understanding 
of evolution at large, as perhaps influenced by educational and media practices in the UK. 
We can see an example of a simpler explanation of evolution, which may be 
described as recognition but with little understanding, in the following quote from Anna who 
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was not opposed to evolution (20-30, German undergraduate student, studying theology in 
the UK). Anna was asked how she would describe evolution: 
ANNA: There was this Big Bang and then planets moved together, and there was this heat and I 
can’t say it in English, I can’t even say it in German.  
INTERVIEWER: No, that’s all right.  
ANNA: Then the Earth was there, and somehow over time things came, dinosaurs and stones and 
water and I don’t know, yes, I don’t really know stuff about that.  
As understood by biological sciences, evolution is a process not focussed on humans, 
but on all species of life on earth. It is interesting then that when asked to give an 
explanation of evolution, without me as the interviewer mentioning human evolution, 
almost all Catholic participants, opposed or not, focussed on humanity as the subject of 
evolutionary processes. It cannot be said that this would be any different from the wider 
public’s conceptions of evolution, as there is insufficient data to make such a claim, however 
it is an interesting feature of the data in this study.  
For example, when asked to give an overview of what evolution is, Judith (Non-
oppositional, South East, local government, 50-59) explained: “It’s a study of how we grow 
and change, and where we came from and, in some way, where we are going to.” In one 
sense, it is unsurprising that these individuals conceptualise evolution as affecting humans, 
as they are humans. It would be easy to assume that these anthropocentric conceptions 
stem from a broader anthropocentrism in religious, specifically Catholic, thinking. Indeed, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, when popes have publicly commented on evolution they have 
stressed the specialness of man. In some sense, the majority of branches of Christianity 
place humanity as a special species in the world, sacred and uniquely able to commune with 
 250 
God. In short, Christianity is anthropocentric. However, there is insufficient evidence to 
suggest that this is the reason why these Catholics participants decided to offer explanations 
of evolution with humanity as the subject. Like the Big Bang-evolution conflation, 
evolutionary anthropocentrism might be another quirk of the public understanding of 
evolution at large. It may well be that humans are (inescapably) anthropocentric, rather than 
it being a specific idiosyncrasy of religious, in this case Catholic, thought. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Catholics in England can be unopposed to evolution with both high and low 
knowledge levels, suggesting lack of knowledge of evolution is not a major factor in attitude 
formation. Like previous studies, I found a great variety of knowledge of evolution, and also 
a similar conflation of evolution with the Big Bang. As has been discussed, there is a 
tendency for Catholics to use the language of “no problem” when discussing their views, 
which suggests Catholics are working from within a dominant conflict narrative of science 
and religion, where they perceive there to be an expectation for them to reject it. However, I 
find that evolution is not a salient topic for many Catholics in this study, with conversations 
rarely occurring about evolution with people within and beyond their faith group. That the 
topic of evolution rarely came up in their day-to-day lives, but respondents appeared to be 
operating within a narrative of expected conflict, suggests this narrative does not originate 
from interpersonal communication. I would argue that the media plays a large role in the 
dissemination of this conflict narrative. Certainly, from my media analysis in Chapter 4, I 
found general representations of the Church as anti-science, and the Galileo Affair used as 
an exemplar of science-religion conflict relations. Future work should focus on the relative 
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prevalence of two strands of conflict narrative pertinent to this case: evolution 
communicated as anti-Catholic, and Catholicism represented as anti-evolutionary.  
For Catholics who oppose evolution in this study, we see the main linguistic battles 
being fought on scientific and philosophical grounds, not on religious or scriptural grounds—
a topic I return to in the next chapter. Similar to previous studies, evolution was relegated to 
a contested, bad, or even a non-science. This othering of evolutionary science allows 
participants to maintain positive attitudes towards science in general.  
As I contended in the introduction to this thesis, we must go beyond perceived 
‘problem groups’ if we are to truly understand the varieties of science-religion reactions in 
societies. A clear example of an insight generated here is the Catholic Oppositionals who 
could detail explicitly what they do not believe, but offered no alternative view as to what 
they do believe. Perhaps these Oppositional non-alternatives are the most interesting 
finding of the study. As researchers in an area, we’re keen to accurately map the various 
views of the given topic we are interested in. As has been shown by other recent research 
(e.g. Ecklund and Scheitle, 2018), we can move beyond blunt three-part measures to offering 
more belief positions to participants, but this doesn’t necessarily mean we will get better 
results. If we continue to measure opposition to evolution through quantitative self-
classification into set belief positions, this population of Oppositional non-alternatives may 
well continue to elude our studies. 
It may be, however, that these Oppositional non-alternatives end up selecting one of 
the other boxes offered on a survey. This too is problematic, as it would lead to 
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overrepresentation of these set belief positions. Some researchers may argue that the “I 
don’t know” option included in surveys allows for the expression of positions which don’t 
correspond to those delimited by the researcher. However, based on the evidence laid out 
above, I argue that the “I don’t know” option is insufficient to encapsulate how religious 
individuals are conceptualising their position, or lack thereof, on evolution. In many cases 
participants do know something and would like to express it, even if what they know is their 
opposition to evolution rather than an alternative position, but are restricted by decisions 
made by the researcher. Furthermore, offering the “I don’t know” option, misses how 
identity cues impact on respondents’ answers. As Catherine explains, as someone who is 
oppositional to evolution but who has no fixed alternative: “It’s hard to defend a non-
position.” She further suggests she may align with anti-evolution arguments to defend her 
faith: “There’s just no space to say let’s just explore all the different options, which is what I 
want. So, I feel obliged almost to support the antievolution stuff as a way of defending my 
faith.” 
After introducing the broad groups of Oppositionals and Non-oppositionals in this 
chapter, I proceed in the next chapter to analyse how Catholic participants conceive of 
evolution interacting with their religious beliefs. I begin by exploring participants’ views on 
the relation, or lack thereof, between their views on evolution and the creation account in 
the Book of Genesis, before exploring the various views of God’s role in relation to 
evolution.
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Chapter 6: God, Genes and Genesis 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I introduced the distinction between Catholic Non-
oppositionals and Oppositionals, and detailed their varying knowledge and conceptions of 
evolution. In the present chapter I explore the question of how evolution interrelates with 
Catholic participants’ religious beliefs. I pay particular attention to critiquing what I term 
here the literalistic-rejection model, which presents biblical literalism as the cause of 
evolution rejection. While this model may fit some religious traditions, i.e. Evangelical 
Protestantism, it does not explain evolution opposition among Catholics. I explore how the 
notion of ‘scripture and tradition’ is an important boundary for both Catholic Non-
oppositionals and Oppositionals in my study. After exploring participants’ views of Genesis, 
for many of whom the key message being God had some role in creation, I investigate how 
Catholic Non-oppositionals perceive God’s role as specifically related to evolution. I finish by 
critiquing research approaches that expect participants to have formalised positions on this 
question. 
When thinking of the various ways that attitudes to Genesis and evolution may 
relate, it is easy to assume a simplistic epistemological model. Firstly, we might imagine that 
if a person has a literalistic view of Genesis, they must therefore oppose evolution. 
Following on from this, if a person has a symbolic or allegorical view of Genesis, then we 
might assume they will not oppose evolution. Evidently, people exist who take a literal view 
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of Genesis and because of this view therefore oppose evolution. Of the few previous 
qualitative studies available, a clear example of this can be seen in Hildering et al.’s (2012) 
study of evolution rejection among Dutch Protestant Christians, where they found that the 
rejection was based on an a priori decision to trust a literal interpretation of the Bible over 
science. For Catholics, however, literal interpretations of Genesis (or the Bible more broadly) 
are not as strong a part of the contemporary theological tradition, compared with some 
sections of Protestantism (Hayes and Gearon, 1999: 27). Some Catholic literalists exist, 
however figures for the US show the literalist view is far less prevalent among Catholics 
there compared with some Protestant groups (Hoffmann and Bartkowski, 2008).1 Although 
there is a shortage of equivalent data in the English context, given the lack of major 
doctrinal difference between American and English Catholicism, I think it fair to postulate a 
similar lack of prevalence of Biblical literalism in among English Catholics.  
In my interviews, no Catholic participant claimed to be a biblical literalist. Indeed, it 
was clear that this very difference in the practice of their theological traditions was a key 
boundary for the Catholics in my study.2 This was often articulated by stressing that while 
Protestants only have Biblical scripture as a source of theological authority, Catholics have 
both scripture and tradition. This was true of both Non-oppositionals and Oppositionals. It 
 
1 According to aggregated data from General Social Survey data from 1984-2002, 56% of US Conservative 
Protestants interpreted the Bible literally, compared with 22% of US Catholics (Hoffmann and Bartkowski, 
2008: 1256). 
2 By ‘boundary’ in this analysis, I refer to symbolic boundaries as described by Lamont and Molnar: 
“Symbolic boundaries are conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, people, 
practices, and even time and space. They are tools by which individuals and groups struggle over and 
come to agree upon definitions of reality. Examining them allows us to capture the dynamic dimensions 
of social relations, as groups compete in the production, diffusion, and institutionalization of alternative 
systems and principles of classifications. Symbolic boundaries also separate people into groups and 
generate feelings of similarity and group membership.” (Lamont and Molnar, 2002: 168). 
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became apparent in my interviews that Biblical literalism was not a factor for my Catholic 
participants in shaping their attitudes towards evolution. It was not, therefore, that symbolic 
readings of Genesis led individuals to not oppose evolution, and literalistic interpretations 
had led to opposition. All participants in this study, Non-oppositionals and Oppositionals, 
stated they read Genesis as a symbolic account. With the majority claiming that the main 
message they took from Genesis being that God had some role in creation. However, as will 
be discussed in this chapter, most did not have a specific view of God’s role, and only wished 
to maintain that he had one. 
Given the conflict narrative present in much popular discourse, it is interesting that 
the majority of participants in this study who were not opposed to evolution did not find 
evolution to be a salient issue, nor was it something they had struggled to resolve with 
respect to their religious faith. A recurrent theme of the interviews was how evolution was 
not a ‘big topic’ for them. For example, Lucy, (home tutor, 50-59, Midlands) stressed: “If you 
read the letters in The Tablet, no one is talking about evolution, it’s not a hot topic I 
wouldn’t say. I wouldn’t say I’ve ever heard anybody talk about it, I don’t think anybody 
cares … amongst Catholics.” However, while evolution was not a salient issue for the 
overwhelming majority of Catholic Non-oppositionals in this study,3 for Oppositionals 
evolution was a salient issue. Oppositionals on average would talk at a greater length than 
 
3 With the notable exception of Paul, introduced in Chapter 5, (Non-oppositional, 50-60, ex-civil servant 
now working in IT) for whom exploring “hot potato” topics, such as the first two chapters of Genesis, had 
led him to explore many issues in more depth. 
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Non-oppositionals, who would typically just stress how it was a non-issue for them, and not 
have much more to say on the topic. 
In Guhin’s (2016) US study on the comparative moral salience of evolution in 
Evangelical and Sunni Muslim creationist high schools, he argued that the theory of 
evolution is salient for American Evangelicals because it is dissonant with their key practice 
and boundary: reading the Bible literally. For American Sunni Muslim creationists, however, 
the key practice is prayer and the key boundary is gender performance, and as these factors 
are not dissonant with evolution, Guhin argues it therefore has less moral salience even 
though it is still rejected. Catholics, however, do not share the practice of Biblical literalism. 
Indeed, I found that an anti-literalistic position (in the interviews often termed ‘scripture 
and tradition’) was the key boundary among all participants in this study, used to distinguish 
their group from other Christian denominations. So, we could say that both Evangelicals and 
Catholics share the same boundary, that of biblical literalism, however they approach that 
boundary from different sides. Evangelicals through the practice of literal interpretation, and 
Catholics through the rejection of it. As scripture and tradition was a key boundary for 
Catholics, yet evolution was still a salient issue for Catholic Oppositionals in this study, it 
suggests that’s Guhin’s findings may be specific to the cultural milieu of the USA. I found 
that in England, non-literalistic Catholic Oppositionals also perceived evolution as a salient 
issue. 
I expand on the above points in this chapter, first exploring Catholic participants’ 
views of the relationship between Genesis and evolution, and secondly analysing 
participants’ views, or lack thereof, regarding God’s role in relation to evolution. Similarly to 
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the previous chapter, I then critique research approaches which seek to categorise 
individuals in fixed belief positions, and evidence why this may be inadequate for some 
populations. 
 
6.2 Genesis and evolution 
6.2.1 Scripture and tradition 
The majority of Catholics in my sample drew strict boundaries between their own 
religion and Protestantism, most often specifically Evangelical fundamentalism. The main 
justification given for the difference between their Catholic faith and Evangelical Christianity 
was that Catholicism values both scripture and tradition, whilst Evangelical Christianity has a 
sole focus on scripture. This difference was important to the Catholic interviewees, who 
used this dual theological approach to stress the non-determinate nature of their beliefs. 
Due to a perceived societal ridicule aimed at Evangelical beliefs, Catholic individuals may 
have stressed their difference in an attempt to legitimise their own faith position. For my 
participants, the difference between themselves and Evangelicals was an important one. 
This is clear from the following excerpt from Eileen (40-50, Midlands, college religious 
support staff), discussing how she sees her religious beliefs relating to her position on 
evolution:  
INTERVIEWER: I'm also interested in human origins within that kind of evolution narrative or 
creation narrative.  Do your beliefs as a Catholic relate to your position on the origin of humans, 
do you think? 
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EILEEN: I think the Catholic position is actually okay with that. I think my understanding of the 
Catholic Church and knowledge is that actually it's always seen it as a good thing and maybe it's 
because it holds the Bible and tradition as co-equals rather than some Evangelical Protestant 
traditions which is, if it's not in the Bible, it didn't happen. And, therefore, the last…almost 
believing that God's revelation stops on the last page.  So yeah, it's never been taught to me as 
having a problem. 
We can see the same demarcation at play in the following excerpt from Lucy, (50-59, 
home tutor, Midlands): 
I remember once hearing this guy on the radio saying… he obviously wasn’t a believer: “Well, you 
must believe it’s true, it’s in the Bible. You’re a Christian and it’s in the Bible.” And I thought, well 
it depends what kind of Christian, because not all Christians agree. And I think this is one of the 
big areas of disagreement amongst Christians, how you view the Bible. And this is where we have 
a cop out or a let out, because erm we have scripture and tradition, and we think that the Church 
wrote the Bible. It was … we had the Church then the Church wrote down the Gospels, after the 
Church was already up and running. So I think that is a Catholic view, whereas the Protestant 
view doesn’t seem to grasp that idea at all, and I don’t think they think about it, if they thought 
about it they’d realise that of course the Church does predate the New Testament anyway, or 
that the Jewish community predates the Bible. 
Dual importance of scripture and tradition in the Catholic Church is a recurrent 
theme in the dataset, and a key boundary for Catholic individuals. It is used discursively to 
allow both a flexibility in biblical interpretations and to differentiate the Catholic faith from 
other religious traditions, mainly Evangelicalism. Furthermore, Non-oppositional Catholics 
themselves use the literalistic-rejection model as a discursive justification of their ability to 
accept evolution. For them, they argue that the dual theological approach of scripture and 
tradition means that evolution is not an issue. Interestingly, however, as discussed below, 
this boundary is also maintained for Catholics who oppose evolution. It is not due to 
literalism that they oppose evolution.  
6.2.2 Genesis as symbolic 
The main theme when talking about interpretations of Genesis was that it used 
symbolic, metaphorical, or literary language. With these interpretations of Genesis, but not 
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necessarily because of these interpretations, some Catholics found no issue reconciling 
evolution with their faith. However, while some individuals stressed that they themselves 
found no problem with Genesis, or indeed were not that interested in it, they believed it 
would be a problem for others. This is a similar position found in other studies, which have 
evidenced this type of cultural projection surrounding religious attitudes towards evolution 
at the national level (Elsdon-Baker et al., 2017b). In the following excerpt, Christine 
(Midlands, education management, 40-49), explains that while she does not see a problem 
with evolution, those subscribing to “the Catholic view” might: 
INTERVIEWER: Yes.  And do your beliefs as a Catholic relate to or inform your position on 
evolution? 
CHRISTINE: It is a tricky one because obviously if you’re going to go with what Catholics believe - 
and obviously you’ve got the readings where God made the world in so many days – it doesn’t tie 
in with evolution, so that might be a struggle for some people.  Not so much for me, I don’t think.  
I do believe that God created the world but I don’t necessarily believe it was done in that 
timeframe and in that way.  I think that’s more symbolic. 
INTERVIEWER: Yes.  So as you say, some people don’t necessarily think Genesis’ literal account of 
creation, but they still take something from it, in a way? 
CHRISTINE: Yes.   
INTERVIEWER: Do you still take anything from that creation account? 
CHRISTINE: I suppose I take from it that God did actually make everything originally, and it 
probably took millions of years and not a week. But it was probably all created by God originally. 
Christine’s response raises another interesting theme in the interviews; that the 
main interpretation taken from Genesis was that there was a beginning, and a Creator. For 
Catholics unopposed to evolution, Genesis serves as a message that creation was the work 
of God, however many see this as totally separate from how exactly that creation took 
place. George, a retired businessman from the IT sector, stressed this succinctly. After 
stating that the Genesis accounts are “not factual, they are more parables”, I asked if there 
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was a particular message which he saw in those parables. To which George definitively 
replied: “No … only that you know there was a creation and there was a Creator. And that’s 
the only thing I draw from that….” When asked how, if at all, his positive views about 
evolution and his Catholic beliefs relate, George replied: “Well they don’t … I see no conflict 
between science and Catholicism at all. None.” Like previous examples, George stresses the 
lack of conflict when asked about how his beliefs interrelate with his views on science, but 
goes further to say they don’t relate at all. He sees them as separate, but not conflicting. 
While George succinctly explains how he sees the main message of Genesis being that there 
was a Creator, others talked through this in more detail. However, the main message taken 
from the Genesis account for non-oppositional Catholics in this study was that creation was 
an event, and that there was a Creator. This is not to say, however, that these Catholics had 
a specific view of what God’s role was in relation to creation, a point I will return to. 
6.2.3 Conflict and compatibility 
The epistemological conflict narrative posits that incompatibilities between the 
knowledge claims of religion and science lead to conflict between religion and science 
(Evans and Evans, 2008). However, throughout my data collection it became clear that Non-
oppositionals were not perceiving an incompatibility between evolution and their religious 
beliefs, that they were struggling to solve. While some, like George above, saw these two 
spheres as separate but non-conflicting, many Catholics saw these two spheres as co-
corroborating. Neil, a maths teacher, explains: 
And, the way I have explained it in the past, to children, is, if you are explaining the Big Bang 
Theory, and the creation of the universe to people who have limited scientific understanding, 
then portraying it in the way that it’s told in Genesis, would be a pretty good way to go.  It’s 
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largely the same order of events, I understand, I believe I heard at some stage, the actual words 
used in the Old Testament, so it would have been Hebrew, wouldn’t it, the word used for days is 
as equally well translated as era, or epoch.   
So, the style of writing of, not just biblical writing, but generally of thousands of years ago, wasn’t 
intended to be scientific, specific as in the way we would interpret it, it’s an account of creation.  
And, although that’s creation, as opposed to evolution, I’m fairly comfortable that evolution 
would sit in the same way.  When God created the earth, he didn’t create it static, as it was, it has 
continued to evolve, and will continue to evolve. 
It was clear in the interviews that those who were unopposed to evolution, all had 
symbolic or metaphorical interpretations of Genesis. Although it cannot be concluded that it 
is because of these interpretations of Genesis that they were not opposed to evolution. As 
will be discussed below, Catholics who opposed evolution also shared these symbolic 
readings of the Genesis account of creation. For Non-oppositionals, however, there were 
differences in how they saw their Catholic beliefs relating to evolution, broadly split in two 
groups: one viewing them as totally separate domains, and another who found a harmony 
between the creation narratives of both science and religion.  
This is not to say that all the Catholics in this study found their views on science and 
religion in general easy to reconcile. An example of this is the following excerpt from Jane 
(Non-oppositional, North West, humanities PhD student, 20-29) who talks about her 
experience of difficulty in marrying up the scientific and religious parts of her identity:  
I think it’s hard for me and others, but I think for me, it’s particularly hard because I read a lot 
about science and things, and I do feel like it’s important to be exacting and correct about stuff. 
And I feel like sometimes the Catholic side of me doesn’t marry up with that. The Catholic side of 
me is faith-based and you can’t be exacting about faith. So that’s really difficult to marry the two 
if you’re like…if I am going to live my life in mostly an evidence-based way. So, when I deal with 
medicine or going to the doctor’s, I mean, are true things evidence-based? But then one of the 
main parts of your life can’t be evidence-based. Your faith can’t really be evidence-based. It’s 
hard to marry the two. 
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Here we see, beyond the specifics of Genesis and evolution, Jane questioning the 
methodological compatibility of scientific and religious epistemologies. Later, Jane goes on 
to say that while it is hard for her to marry the two methods, she does find a solution: 
“they’re antitheses of…they reject each other almost, but…somehow you find a way in the 
middle.” This suggests we should avoid categorising people as wholly subscribing to conflict 
or harmony positions in general. Or indeed, it suggests operating with caution when using 
any other more nuanced typologies, such as Barbour’s (1997) conflict, independence, 
integration and dialogue. In the same person, on different topics, and when varying 
between specifics and the abstract, positions can shift. This finding echoes Reid’s (2018) 
recent conclusions from a study of clergy attitudes, cautioning the use of overarching 
normative typologies in science-religion research: 
Typologies, while useful in terms of creating a framework for how people might understand 
science and religion, should also be treated with caution: my own research with clergy in England 
has shown the often complex, multilayered and contradictory approaches that they take to 
understanding the relationship between science and Christianity. (Reid, 2018: 98) 
6.2.4 Literalistic-rejection model 
As previously discussed, when conducting interviews with Dutch Protestant 
Christians Hildering et al. (2012) found that main reason for rejecting evolution was an a 
priori decision to trust the Bible more than science. In the present sample of Catholics in 
England, however, trust in the biblical account of creation was not forwarded as a reason for 
opposing evolution. Gregory (Oppositional, retired engineer who now writes on theological 
subjects), notes how he does not view Genesis historically: 
The…well the…Genesis Chapter 1 with the kind of…the seven days of creation, I don’t believe 
that's historical.  I mean it's quite amusing that the order is actually not a million miles away from 
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what we think because actually the order follows complexity really.  So…and that's kind of why.  
So, the…Genesis starts with the simplest things and builds up to the more complicated things 
and, of course, that's how it happened because that's how it would happen.  So, there's a bit 
of…there's quite a bit of insight there but it…but it certainly isn’t historical in any ordinary sense 
of the word ‘historical’.  There was nobody…we weren’t there to witness it so how could it be this 
[…]  So, Genesis Chapter 1 clearly isn’t historical.  Genesis Chapter…whether there were the first 
two humans and whether there was some kind of event which is kind of captured in that story I 
don’t know.  I…it…from…I believe that Genesis Chapter 2/3 are actually profound philosophical 
tomes.  
I previously discussed the use of the term ‘scripture and tradition’ which was used by 
Non-oppositionals to differentiate themselves from Evangelical believers. For Non-
oppositionals, their non-literal reading of Genesis was also offered as a reason why they 
themselves could accept evolution, whilst other literalistic Christians rejected it. It is 
therefore interesting that Catholic Oppositionals in this study also maintained this non-
literalistic ‘scripture and tradition’ boundary. That Catholics can oppose evolution, whilst not 
justifying this via a literalistic interpretation of the Bible, reminds us that the literalistic-
rejection model is insufficient to explain all Christian opposition to evolution. An example 
here comes from Catherine, (Oppositional, South East, 20-29, public opinion researcher):  
[T]here are plenty of Catholics who don’t agree with evolution, not necessarily because they 
agree with the literal interpretation of the Genesis account but because they just don’t know, 
and then they would feel torn because their loyalty to the church and her authority…because 
Catholics believe very much that in addition to having revelation through scripture that there is 
also tradition. 
In Chapter 5 I discussed how Oppositional Catholics in this study offered no 
alternative view to evolution. Calling upon scripture and tradition, instead of literalism, as 
their key boundary and practice, may well lead to this position. So, while Hildering et al.’s 
(2012) Dutch Protestant Christians could clearly articulate an alternative view of the origin 
and development of life based on scripture, Catholics in this study did not, or could not, do 
so. By rejecting evolution, and positioning themselves against perceived Evangelical 
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fundamentalism, oppositional Catholics enter a positional grey area. There is a rejection of a 
literalistic special creation account as believed by some Evangelical Protestants, and an 
opposition to evolutionary theory, leaving them in an ineffable middle position. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, this grey area renders approaches which seek to classify belief 
positions into a typology unable to easily categorise this population of individuals opposed 
to evolution. 
Furthermore, the literalistic-rejection model is used not only as a description of 
evolution rejection in some academic studies (e.g. Hildering et al., 2012), but also by 
Catholic Non-oppositionals in the present study as a reason why evolution is not an issue for 
them. The effects of this are twofold. Firstly, academic work around religion and evolution 
has focussed on problem groups, and these have mainly been creationist fundamentalists in 
the US and elsewhere (e.g. Long, 2011; Hildering et al., 2012; Guhin, 2016). This has led to a 
masking of the varieties of opposition to evolution. While the literalistic-rejection model 
may well hold up for some faith communities, it is unlikely to explain evolution opposition 
from more diverse contexts, where literalism is not a part of faith traditions.4 Secondly, and I 
think more prominently, the literalistic-rejection model does discursive work for Catholics in 
this study (and I imagine other non-literalistic Christian traditions), who pose the literalistic-
rejection model as a reason why they themselves do not reject evolution. If, however, as is 
found in the present study, evolution opposition is not predicated on biblical literalism, we 
must look elsewhere for our reasons for evolution opposition, and indeed non-opposition, 
 
4 Though it should be noted that none of these authors have argued that literalism is the only source of 
evolution rejection. My contention is rather, that studying only these specific literalistic groups has led to 
a myopia in the varieties of evolution opposition.  
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which seem not to be only tied to theological interpretations, nor scientific knowledge. This 
seems to align with insights from Elsdon-Baker et al. (2017a), who found scepticism around 
evolution—which was more pronounced around questions relating to aspects of human 
evolution—in non-religious and non-spiritual groups, as well as religious groups. We may 
summarise this critique of the literalistic-rejection model by simply stating: religious 
literalists may oppose evolution, but not all those who oppose evolution are religious 
literalists.  
 
6.3 God and evolution 
6.3.1 God vs. chance and randomness 
I previously discussed that Catholics who were not opposed to evolution stressed 
that the main (and often only) message taken from Genesis, was that there was a Creator. 
This maintains a role for God in these Catholic individuals’ worldviews. In a recent study of 
religious attitudes towards science in the USA, sociologists Ecklund and Scheitle (2018) 
conclude that when science and religion do conflict, it stems from religious individuals 
maintaining a role for God in the world and upholding the sacredness of humanity. If these 
two conditions are not contravened, the authors conclude, there is no conflict. In my 
interviews with Catholics in England, it became clear that maintaining a role for God was an 
important condition when discussing evolution and creation. 
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What was evident in the interviews with Catholics in England, was how God playing 
the role of Creator was often positioned against the alternative, which was usually termed 
“chance” or “randomness”. We see this in the following excerpts from Julie, a retired public 
health researcher, who when asked if she identified with any labels around evolution and 
creation, Julie was quick to stress that she was not an “evolutionist”. However, what became 
clear was that in resisting this label, Julie was in fact not opposing evolution per se, but 
actually resisting a worldview of evolution in the absence of God. Julie went on to clarify, 
that she does believe things develop due to evolution, however not just because of 
evolution: 
[T]he whole thing about why I think faith is more… belief in God, and how God works is more 
important than evolution, is that this earth… we are not random, this earth is not chaotic, there is 
order. Now order just doesn’t happen. You know. If you read Lord of the Flies or something. 
Chaos would want to dominate. But we live in such an ordered society. How does an ordinary 
tiny bee make those perfect hexagonal containers for the honey? How do they work it out? This 
is why I love maths so much. There are only three ways leaves are formed on stems, 80% are 
formed in a particular way, a particular angle, the Golden angle. You know, how does that 
happen? So, nobody can convince me that God does not have a role to play.  
From this excerpt, we can see perhaps the most important feature of all the 
interviews. Perceiving, maintaining and defending a role for God in the universe, as opposed 
to an atheistic view in which existence arose through ‘chance and randomness’. Thus, for 
most of my interviewees, as long as a role for God is maintained, then evolution can be 
believed, but this point goes beyond evolutionary biology. For these participants it is down 
to whether God exists, and if he does not, then the majority questioned how our existence 
and all this complexity could have emerged out of chaos. For them God plays a role, and 
without God’s role evolution could not work. So, the stressing of God’s place as the architect 
of creation, was set against the alternative chance and randomness view. In scholarly 
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discourse we may label these positions: atheistic and theistic evolution. Though, as found in 
previous studies, participants themselves rarely identified with, or used, this type of 
language or categorisation (Kaden et al., 2019). 
6.3.2 God’s ineffable role 
When conversations moved onto the specifics of participants’ thoughts on how 
God’s role was conceived in relation to evolution, the majority of Non-oppositionals had not 
thought of the issue in much detail. Most participants, who had very little to say on the 
matter of evolution, were just happy to stress their non-opposition, so long as God’s role as 
creator was acknowledged. This can clearly be seen in the following excerpt from Dorothy 
(Midlands, university administrator, 50-59): 
INTERVIEWER: And what are your thoughts on that view of evolution?  
DOROTHY: Erm… yes… probably… but whatever happened, however it happened, God’s hand 
was in it. Whether we came as a fish out wherever out the sea … and started getting legs and 
then going in the trees and whatever and coming down … God’s hand was in all of that.  
INTERVIEWER: So God guided that process?  
DOROTHY: That just didn’t happen just by itself, God’s hand guided that  
INTERVIEWER: Yeah so I’m interested how people’s beliefs as a Catholic inform their 
understanding of evolution  
DOROTHY: As opposed to Adam and Eve do you mean?  
INTERVIEWER: Not necessarily no, like how people understand evolution, and how their beliefs 
as a Catholic relate to it  
DOROTHY: Yeah yeah yeah yeah … God’s hand was in all of that 
INTERVIEWER: So, in terms of … well bringing up Adam and Eve because that is a good 
point of discussion as well, what do you make of the Adam and Eve story and how it relates to 
the evolutionary story of creation?  
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DOROTHY: Haha oh God … I know … that’s hard that is. Erm… well it’s in the Bible so … 
hmm… (long pause) they were part of that process of … and they were like a … time … a snapshot 
… of evolution, they are part of evolution, they’re part of that evolutionary story of man erm… 
but the way it was left to us in the, in the Bible … erm … I don’t discount it, obviously, but I don’t 
discount evolution either. (pause) I don’t really have any particular views on either, but 
evolution, I do think God’s hand was in that. If science has proven that is how we evolved. 
The way Dorothy repeatedly stresses “God’s hand was in all of that” reinforces how 
important maintaining a role for God is to her. In Dorothy’s closing remarks, we also see her 
acknowledging that Adam and Eve were a “snapshot” in the evolutionary view. However, as 
is clear from the transcript, Dorothy was very unsure about answering this question. As she 
states afterwards, she doesn’t “really have a particular view” on it. However, asking 
questions on the specifics of her beliefs forced her to respond. No matter what her response 
was, again when ending the answer she further reiterated God’s role. Similarly, it is possible 
that when quantitative survey items ask for specifics on peoples’ views, especially for people 
who do not have a particularly well-defined position, that the same process may be at work. 
Rather than selecting, “I don’t know”, participants may well choose the option, which they 
see as maintaining their faith position. Above, Dorothy does this by quickly synthesising 
Adam and Eve with evolution, before admitting she does not have a view on it. It is 
impossible to know which one of these answers from Dorothy would emerge in a survey. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, categorising attitudes towards evolution has developed 
from blunt three-part questions (atheistic evolution, God-guided evolution, creationism), to 
more nuanced measures where different narratives of creation are offered to participants 
(e.g. Ecklund and Sheitle, 2018). However, it became clear during my research that most 
participants who were not opposed to evolution, also did not have a particular view on 
God’s role in relation to the process of evolution. While a few participants did see God as 
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setting initial conditions, others as God maintaining every part of the process, or more of an 
intervener, these views were not held with certainty, and indeed often articulated in the 
negative. For example, Spencer, a retired academic and industrial chemical scientist in his 
80s, stressed how he could not conceive of God as an intervener in evolution, or anywhere 
else: 
SPENCER: It happened, and yes, it’s almost…I mean, that’s why I think some people say, you 
know, God made the Big Bang and then tinkers with it when he feels like it, but that’s a stupid 
way of looking at it.  
INTERVIEWER: So you’re not in favour of that intervening idea of God?  
SPENCER: No, not intervening, no. No, I don’t think we’d have so many disasters if God was 
intervening regularly. 
However, again, while Spencer could define what his views were not (i.e. an 
intervening God due to the problem of suffering), he struggled to formulate what exactly his 
conception of God was in relation to creation and evolution, eventually concluding God is a 
spiritual force which guides evolution “but not consciously guiding it, because it can’t help 
doing it.” 
While a minority engaged in the topic, the majority of participants did not have a 
particular view of God’s role at all, with some stating they had not thought about it before. 
Tom, an undergraduate education student, when asked if he had a view of God’s role in 
relation to evolution (either initiating or intervening in the process), states that he has not 
got an answer for the question of what God’s role in evolution is and admits that he had 
never thought about it before:  
TOM: Erm … I don’t really know, you’ve stumped me … you’ve got me there … yeah you’ve got 
me there haha. 
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INTERVIEWER: No it’s alright on any of these to not have an answer 
TOM: That’s the first time I’ve not had an answer for anything, fair play haha 
Similarly, Christine (Midlands, education management, 40-49) responds to the 
question of her view of God’s role in evolution, with: “I would never have put two and two 
together really to think about what his role would have been.” John (Midlands, 80-89, 
retired engineer) goes further, stressing how that kind of knowledge is unknowable: 
INTERVIEWER: Interesting. Do you have any particular view of God's role in relation to that 
process of evolution? 
JOHN: It would be presumptuous to have a view on that. No, it's not for us to know the times and 
seasons. I'm sure he's involved. No, it would be very easy to speculate and waffle and then 
retract on second thoughts. No. 
While the original three-part blunt measures have been shown to be inadequate 
measures of religious attitudes towards evolution, perhaps these responses also show that 
our more sophisticated measures may also be an insufficient way of measuring attitudes 
towards evolution. They all presuppose people have a thought through position, which a 
survey can capture. While there is a “don’t know” option in some of these surveys, it is 
uncertain that any of the above participants would have ticked it. Even if they had, it is 
highly unlikely that the researcher would analyse their responses further. 
Maintaining a role for God in creation was the most important condition stressed by 
Catholic interviewees who were unopposed to evolution. Whatever that role may or may 
not be. However, it was clear from the interviews that expecting a thought through belief 
position on how religious and scientific knowledge interact in individuals is on the one hand 
overly optimistic, and on the other overly one-dimensional. Just because researchers are 
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interested in the specific details, does not necessarily mean that their subjects are as well. 
This helps to explain the often “confused and contradictory” attitudes found among 
quantitative surveys (Lawes, 2009). Or the uncertain and overlapping beliefs found by 
Ecklund and Scheitle (2018: 74-79), for example, when they asked participants to choose 
from six narratives including: God-guided evolution, Intelligent Design, God-initiated 
evolution, etc. While Ecklund and Scheitle interpreted participants’ selection of multiple 
narratives as an indicator that individuals are not sure enough about their position to 
commit to one perspective, it may be that most participants simply do not have a finely 
thought through perspective on the matter at all. Indeed, as was found in the 2009 Darwin 
Now survey, when asked: “Generally speaking, how much time, if any, have you spent 
thinking about the origins of species and development of life on earth?” 20% of the British 
sample (n=973) answered “None at all”, and 42% answered “Not very much”. Interestingly, 
the figure for “None at all” rose to 27% for those who chose the ‘creationist’ option in the 
blunt measure (Darwin Now, 2009). As was found in the present study, for some Non-
oppositionals, acknowledging God had a role in creation and evolution is enough. To ask 
questions about God-initiated vs God-guided may well be fine for a select few who are 
heavily invested in these debates and have dedicated time to them, but to expect the 
population at large to have such intellectualised positions is misguided and risks 
essentialising them. Perhaps the question of attitudes towards evolution need to be 
reframed once more. We have gone from the problematic three-part blunt measure to new 
measures of multiple narratives, however perhaps the problem in this research is expecting 
publics to have coherent narratives in the first place. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
All participants in this study had symbolic readings of Genesis. Furthermore, rejecting 
simplistic biblical literalism served as a key boundary drawn by Catholic participants, 
between Catholics and Protestants, most notably Evangelicals. However, while Non-
oppositionals offered this boundary as the reason why they had no issue with evolution, the 
same ‘scripture and tradition’ boundary was also maintained by those who were opposed to 
evolution. Their opposition was not based on an a priori decision to trust the Bible more 
than science, as Hildering et al. (2012) had found among Dutch Protestant communities. This 
leads us to rebuff a literalistic-rejection model for Catholics in England, and must force us to 
seek other reasons for evolution rejection. However, the present study’s sample of 
Oppositionals was too small to draw any significant conclusions on the reasons for Catholic 
evolution opposition. Nonetheless, the maintenance of this non-literalistic boundary may 
well have contributed to the lack of alternative views introduced in the previous chapter. 
Whereby opposing evolution, but having no scriptural alternative, may have led participants 
to fall into a grey space, not easily categorised on classic survey measures. 
In Chapter 2, I discussed the theological tradition of Modernism, which was being 
debated in the Church at the same time evolution was being widely debated across society. I 
find that today the labels of ‘Modernist’ or ‘Traditionalist’ are rarely used when discussing 
individual Catholics’ theological positions, and how they relate to evolution. While 
undoubtedly, we could categorise some participants’ views as more Traditionalist or 
Modernist, Catholic participants themselves did not argue in these terms, and rarely aligned 
with any fixed theological tradition. This suggests Catholic publics’ attitudes towards 
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evolution are somewhat disconnected from some of the scholarly discourse on the matter, 
at least terminologically.  
In this study, I find that maintaining a role for God is the most important condition 
for Catholics unopposed to evolution. This is often articulated in contrast to, and positioned 
against, the alternative view of ‘chance and randomness’. In many ways, Catholic individuals 
defining their position against ‘chance and randomness’ is the same boundary drawing 
found in papal statements on evolution, only using different lay language. As I have 
discussed in Chapter 2 and 4, modern popes have expressed opposition to materialistic and 
atheistic forms of evolution, which deny God’s involvement in the process. Therefore, the 
materialistic vs theistic evolution distinction, or ‘chance and randomness’ vs ‘God having a 
role’, is found in elite theological discourse and public attitudes, though different language is 
used to express this distinction. Perhaps reinforcing the above point about Modernism and 
Traditionalism, publics may well hold similar positions which are found in scholarly or 
professional discourse on science and religion, but they do not express these views in the 
same formalised terms. This has implications for how we measure people’s views in surveys, 
where researchers utilise terms such as ‘theistic evolution’. While we may see such terms as 
simple ways to group like beliefs, they may be inappropriate for much of the population, 
who may be unsure about their meaning and would not use them to describe themselves. 
Therefore, terms such as ‘theistic evolution’ are not only the language of scholarly and 
professional science and religion discourse, but when used in research they become an etic 
categorisation for some of the population studied. More work should be done to measure 
the lived experiences of specific populations’ views on evolution, and therefore the 
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production of emic categories.5 This finding and recommendation aligns with and echoes 
that of Kaden et al. (2019). 
While most Non-oppositionals counterposed their view of ‘God having a role’ against 
the ‘chance and randomness’ view, the majority of these Catholic Non-oppositionals had not 
thought about exactly how their view of evolution and the role of God in creation fit 
together. So long as God’s role as creator was maintained, and existence was not the result 
of ‘chance and randomness’, they had no issue. This finding of a lack of specific views about 
God’s role in or relating to evolution for Non-oppositionals, on top of the previous chapter’s 
exploration of those Oppositionals with no alternative view, may help explain the confused 
and contradictory, or uncertain beliefs, which emerge in some quantitative studies of 
religious attitudes towards evolution (e.g. Lawes, 2009; Ecklund and Scheitle, 2018). Even if 
we include more distinct categorisations, such as God-guided or God-initiated evolution, it 
may well be that individuals lack such formalised positions on the topic. This echoes the 
conclusions of Hill: “[T]he vast majority of what is ‘out there’ is elite dialogue about these 
topics. […] Elites often assume that the public is as invested in creating coherent and 
intellectually defensible positions as they are, but this is simply not true” (Hill, 2019: 47). 
 
5 The emic/etic distinction was first introduced by linguistic anthropologist Kenneth Pike (1954). Pike 
borrowed from linguistics the suffices of phonemics and phonetics, where phonemics refers to the 
examination of sounds for their meaning-bearing roles in a specific language, while phonetics refers to 
the study of universal sounds covering all languages (Xia, 2011). The emic/etic distinction has been used 
in very different ways in many different disciplines over the years (see Headland et al., 1990). Here, 
however, I use the distinction to represent different perspectives that take the point of view or language 
of either the insider/the people under investigation (emic), and the outsider/researcher (etic). Note, this 
is not a subjective/objective distinction. 
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In Chapter 4 I suggested that when popes spoke out about evolution, they may well 
have been doing their own boundary work by distancing the Catholic Church from vocal 
creationist movements and aligning the Church more closely with modern science. However, 
as discussed, there was another dimension to this boundary drawing, the differentiation 
between evolution as an explanation of the development of life on earth and evolution as 
part of an overarching materialistic worldview, in which God played no part. In Chapter 4 I 
demonstrated that some sections of the English press sensationalised Benedict’s comments, 
and missed the nuanced philosophical boundary work done by his pronouncements. 
Certainly, as discussed in the last chapter, Catholic individuals were generally unhappy with 
media representations of the Catholic Church, both in general and specifically concerning 
science. Given the prevalence of the conflict narrative in media coverage, and the omission 
of philosophical dimensions to the discussion, it would seem that these Catholic individuals 
are somewhat justified in their dissatisfaction with media coverage of the Church and 
evolution. 
These findings further speak to the utility of studying both public discourse and 
public attitudes relating to evolution, as well as studying groups who have not been 
traditionally seen as problematic. Such groups can offer us insights into how we may better 
measure attitudes to evolution more broadly. In the following concluding chapter, I tie 
together the results of these analysis chapters, and reflect on what studying both public 
discourse and public attitudes around Catholicism and evolution in England can contribute 
to the broader study of religion, evolution, and science in society.
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Conclusion 
Introduction 
This thesis’ primary aims were to empirically investigate the relationship between 
Catholicism and evolution in England. The studies included here had two specific top-level 
research questions, one for each of the analyses of public discourse and of public attitudes: 
1)  How have papal statements on evolution been represented in the large-
circulation English newspapers? 
2)  In what ways do Catholic individuals in England perceive evolutionary science 
in relation to their faith and worldview? 
I have attempted to answer my research questions in two ways: first, by investigating 
an instance of public discourse, through analysing how English newspapers have 
represented recent papal comments on evolution; second, by investigating public attitudes, 
through exploring how Catholic individuals perceive evolution as interacting with their 
religious beliefs. Of primary concern throughout this thesis was the importance of specifying 
which conceptions of science and religion we mean, investigating how participants of a 
specific religious group perceive the science in question, and exploring how the relationship 
between that science and that religion are represented in public discourse. 
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The preceding chapters have demonstrated the issues involved in answering 
questions around science and religion through a socially oriented research lens. As has been 
discussed in Chapter 1, the majority of social studies of science and religion (SSSR) research 
has taken place in a North-American context, focussing overwhelmingly on Evangelical 
Protestant groups. In designing this research project, I aimed to reveal new insights into the 
relationship between science and religion by looking at contexts and groups which are not 
obvious candidates of study, though are yet still subject to public debate. Given the 
multifarious, exploratory nature of this thesis, the insights generated lead to a number of 
possible future research directions. While some of these pertain specifically to the study of 
Catholicism and evolution, others apply to the study of religion and evolution, and religion 
and science more generally. 
The findings of this thesis primarily contribute to the small but growing area of SSSR, 
and the more well-established area of public understanding of science (PUS). In this 
concluding chapter I detail these contributions, by first overviewing the top-level findings of 
my analysis of public discourse, and the recommendations and future research directions. 
Then, I detail the findings, recommendations and future research directions for public 
attitudes. Finally, I conclude with a reflection on the field of SSSR. 
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Public discourse 
Top-level findings  
I have argued that it is important to study both public attitudes and public discourse 
on science and religion. In this thesis, I analysed an example of public discourse, English 
newspaper representations of recent papal statements on evolution. In this section, I detail 
the top-level findings which emerged from this analysis of public discourse. 
Benedict XVI did not support ID 
In Chapter 4, I demonstrated that Pope Benedict did not support or endorse 
Intelligent Design positions, despite the claims of some news reporters in England and 
abroad. Instead, numerous factors played into the narrative of Benedict potentially shifting 
the Church’s position on evolution in the mid-2000s. The factors cited included the New York 
Times op-ed of Cardinal Schönborn, the length and content of Benedict’s comments, and 
that his book on the subject was first published in German. It should be of concern that the 
claim “the Church seeming at times towards agreeing with intelligent design theory” has 
crept into scholarly books on the topic (Evans, 2018: 89). Furthermore, this interaction 
between public and scholarly discourse evidences my call for more attention to be paid, and 
more research conducted, into public discourse on science and religion. Under this 
approach, media narratives are an object of study, not unbiased pieces of primary 
information. They are the forum where debates take place, and ideological presuppositions 
scaffold the content. More work should be done in the analysis of the media representations 
of religious groups’ relations with science, and the ideological underpinning of various media 
producers, as this is an area where little work has been conducted to date. 
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Catholicism-science conflict narrative in English newspapers 
I have also demonstrated that in some major English media outlets there is a conflict 
narrative around communication on the Catholic Church and science. Furthermore, many 
articles which have forwarded the conflict narrative used the exemplar of Galileo to 
evidence this conflict between Catholicism and science, and even science and religion at 
large. 
This conflict narrative found in English newspapers is indicative of a larger cultural 
narrative which promotes an expectation of conflict between religion and science. These 
narratives may well shape public attitudes or expectations on science and religion in ways 
that have not been acknowledged in previous research, such as the language of “no 
problem” that I found Catholic individuals commonly used when discussing evolution. 
Although this is not to draw a causal link between the articles I analysed and the public 
attitudes I found, rather, the articles are but one expression of a more deeply embedded 
cultural narrative of conflict, to which the stressing of “no problem” by Catholic Non-
oppositionals is an implicit response. Similarly, other studies have shown a certain amount 
of ‘social projection’ when analysing public attitudes to science and religion (Elsdon-Baker, 
2017b). This means that while members of a certain religious group may not perceive 
conflict between science and religion themselves, other people perceive and project conflict 
onto them. My findings further evidence this claim, with the majority of Catholics in my 
study having no issue with evolution, yet a narrative exists in public discourse suggesting 
that for their denomination there is a conflict between their faith and science. 
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Recommendations and future research directions 
The media analysis in this thesis has demonstrated the importance of studying not 
only public attitudes, but also public discourse on science and religion. It is as important to 
investigate what is being said about religions and sciences in the public domain, as it is to 
study what those religious groups themselves are thinking, and the possible vectors and 
interactions between the two. In this section I outline the recommendations and future 
research directions into public discourse around Catholicism and evolution, and science and 
religion more broadly. 
Humani generis and the opening of Pius XII archives 
Access to the Vatican archives is integral to our understanding of the internal 
workings of the Vatican. It was the opening of the archives of the Congregations of the Holy 
Office and of the Index in 1998, which enabled Artigas et al. (2005) to produce their detailed 
study of Vatican dealings with pro-evolution Catholic authors between 1877 and 1902. Their 
study revealed the complex nature of elite Catholic dealings with evolution in the late-19th 
century. The archives relating to Pius XII’s papacy (1939-1958) are, however, still closed. 
There have been calls for many years for the opening of these wartime archives, with some 
commentators believing the Vatican to be hiding possible relations between the Church and 
Nazi Germany during World War II (Posner, 2015). While it is usual practice to wait 70 years 
after the death of a pope to open the archives, there has been considerable pressure for the 
Vatican to open the archives of Pius’ pontificate (D’Emilio, 2019). At the start of this thesis, 
there had been no sign that they would be opened, however as the project is coming to an 
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end, there has been positive news. Francis announced on 4th March, 2019, that the Vatican’s 
secret archives for Pius XII’s papacy will be opened on the 2nd March 2020 (Pullella, 2019). 
Once opened, while much academic interest will rightly turn to scrutinizing the 
relations between the Vatican and Nazi Germany during World War II, there will also be an 
opportunity to further our knowledge about the past relationship between Catholic Church 
and advocates of evolution. As Pius XII’s famous encyclical Humani generis was published in 
1950, the opening of the archives will allow researchers the opportunity to investigate the 
internal documents surrounding its publication, and the inside debates that led to the 
Vatican’s first public comment on evolution. This work will hopefully help to illuminate the 
previously unknown internal politics which led to Pius’ famous address. 
International coverage of papal statements on evolution 
In Chapter 4 I demonstrated that coverage of recent papal statements on evolution 
in English publications was more restrained than in some US outlets. However, without a 
systematic investigation of representations in US coverage, we cannot make a complete 
comparison. Future work should seek to investigate other nation’s coverage of the same 
episodes of papal statements on evolution, so a more systematic comparison of public 
discourse on the issue can be made. These are the types of comparisons we need to 
demonstrate the complexity of public discourse around science and religion, where the 
exact same events can receive differing representations in various national and cultural 
contexts. This type of work will further demonstrate the contingent nature of science-
religion representations in public discourse; acting as further caution against relying 
passively on media sources for information on science and religion, and informing research 
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which demonstrates there is no fixed essential or categorical relationship between the two 
domains. 
Untangling the ‘two vectors’ of the conflict narrative 
In Chapter 5, I argued that more attention must be paid to the main ‘two vectors’ of 
the conflict narrative in public discourse. Specifically, for this study, this would mean: (1) 
evolution being represented as atheistic, or anti-theistic in nature; (2) the Catholic Church, 
or Catholic individuals, being represented as anti-evolution, or anti-science. Both vectors of 
the conflict narrative (anti-religious evolution and anti-evolution religion) emphasise the 
same point: an a priori and expected conflict between Catholicism and evolution. Certainly, 
my media analysis of coverage of papal statements on evolution evidences a distinct theme 
of representations of the Catholic Church as anti-science, often using the example of Galileo 
to embody the conflict between religion and science at large. 
However, future work need not have Catholicism and evolution as the focus of this 
disentanglement. To understand the conflict narrative in more detail, we need to compare 
the relative responsibility attributed to ‘science ‘and to ‘religion’ for causing said conflict. 
This can be achieved by investigating how ‘science’ and ‘religion’ are being represented in 
public discourse. We can then differentiate the types of conflict narrative present: i.e. who 
or what is being represented as the problem? Religion for being anti-science, or science for 
being anti-religion? Or more specifically, a religion for being anti a particular branch of 
science, or a science for being anti a particular denomination of religion. Currently, little 
attention has been paid to disentangling these two vectors in public discourse, hopefully 
future studies will do so. 
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The use of science-religion surveys in the media 
In Chapter 1 I argued that of all the outputs from SSSR, it is almost exclusively survey 
work on science and religion which breaks through into media reporting. This is most 
evident in the repeated media citation that 40% of the US population are young earth 
creationists (YEC), a figure which has subsequently been shown to be problematic (Hill, 
2014a). Thus, more so than any other methodological approach, survey research into public 
attitudes becomes a part of public discourse on science and religion. However, following in 
the tradition of Elsdon-Baker (2015a), I have also critiqued how these surveys are 
constructed, and the contrived results which can be generated by them. In Chapters 5 and 6 
I demonstrated that there are certainly groups in society who don’t neatly fall into the 
predetermined boxes of large-scale surveys on religious attitudes and evolution. 
Not only do scholars need to develop better ways of conducting surveys, we should 
also turn our gaze to how they are used in the media. Of the existing science and religion, or 
evolution and religion surveys, which are most quoted in the media? What individuals, 
organisations or institutions conducted these prominent surveys, and for what implicit or 
explicit reasons? What arguments do media producers use these survey results to forward, 
and what are the dynamics between authorial voice, headlines and media marketing? These 
are important questions for the SSSR, first and foremost, because as academics in an area of 
study, we are producing results which feed directly back into our object of study – thus the 
results of our studies that initially set out to measure and analyse public perceptions are a 
key vector in informing and shaping public discourse on science and religion. 
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Public attitudes 
Analysis of public attitudes is perhaps the most well developed area of SSSR. 
However, in Chapter 1 I highlighted that there are shortcomings in the way which some 
studies have sought to measure public attitudes on evolution. I have also argued that the 
groups we choose to study is an important consideration, and that there has been a 
tendency to focus on ‘problematic groups’. In this section, I discuss the top-level findings of 
my public attitudes analysis of interviews with Catholics in England on the topic of evolution. 
Top-level findings 
Catholic non-opposition: “No problem” 
In Chapter 5, I detailed that the most common way for Catholics to describe their 
position on evolution was through stressing they had “no problem” with evolution. This is an 
interesting finding, as this emic language does not neatly map onto our usual etic 
categorisation of “acceptance”. This is the reason why in this study I chose to categorise my 
participants’ views mirroring language which they themselves had used, i.e. non-opposition 
and opposition. Clearly there is a difference between accepting something and not opposing 
it, for example, in one sense it could not be said that all my Non-oppositionals accepted 
‘evolution’, as some could not detail an explanation which could be recognised in a biology 
textbook. However, they had no problem with ‘evolution’, thus they weren’t opposed to it. 
Catholics unopposed to evolution rarely used the words of acceptance, instead 
choosing language of non-opposition. This may well be influenced by a dominant narrative in 
public discourse that expects opposition between Catholics, or religious people more 
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broadly, and science or evolution. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 5, there was a general 
dissatisfaction with how the media treat the Catholic Church and science among my 
interviewees. Furthermore, as I have shown in my media analysis, there is a conflict 
narrative surrounding the Catholic Church and science in some English newspaper reporting 
on papal statements between 1996 and 2017. Of course we cannot show causality between 
the two, however the experience of dissatisfaction with media coverage of the Church and 
science, and my finding of a dominant conflict narrative in English newspapers, is indicative 
of the potential influence of public discourse on public attitudes. In this case, I would posit, 
Catholic individuals using the language of having “no problem” with evolution, is made in 
response to a dominant cultural narrative of expected conflict between Catholicism and 
evolution, which can be found across many areas of public discourse in England, including 
newspapers. 
Debunking the ‘literalistic-rejection model’ 
In SSSR, there have been calls and moves in recent years to look beyond the 
epistemic when investigating supposed conflicts between science and religion (Evans and 
Evans, 2009; Long, 2011; Kaden et al., 2017). Scholars such as Hill have indeed found that 
the belief in Biblical inerrancy only predicts creationist beliefs when also coupled with 
belonging to a community that rejects evolution, highlighting the importance of social 
networks for creationist beliefs (Hill, 2014a; 2014b). The present thesis has followed this 
new direction in the field, moving away from epistemic factors of explanation. In Chapter 6, I 
critiqued what I term the ‘literalistic-rejection model’— the idea that Biblical literalism is the 
sole or only cause leading to positions opposing evolution. As the above call to move from 
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epistemic explanatory factors suggests, contemporary SSSR research does not hold literalism 
to be the sole factor in evolution rejection, though the simple linkage of literalism to 
evolution opposition can be found. For example, Miller et al. argue: 
The biblical literalist focus of fundamentalism in the United States sees Genesis as a true and 
accurate account of the creation of human life that supersedes any scientific finding or 
interpretation. In contrast, mainstream Protestant faiths in Europe (and their U.S. 
counterparts) have viewed Genesis as metaphorical and— like the Catholic Church—have 
not seen a major contradiction between their faith and the work of Darwin and other 
scientists. (Miller et al., 2006: 765) 
In this thesis, I have demonstrated that in England Catholics opposed to evolution 
and Catholics unopposed to evolution both had symbolic readings of Genesis. Therefore, 
evolution opposition was not linked to Biblical literalism in this study of Catholics in England. 
Conversely, it cannot be said that evolution non-opposition stemmed from these 
metaphorical readings of Genesis. 
Interestingly, however, those who were unopposed to evolution did use the 
literalistic-rejection model themselves as a reason why they had no problem with evolution. 
For Non-oppositional Catholics in England, the literalistic-rejection model is used as a 
linguistic resource to justify their ability to endorse evolution. However, given that 
Oppositionals also had the same metaphorical readings of Genesis as Non-oppositionals, it is 
not likely the root cause of non-opposition. Furthermore, Oppositionals in this study did not 
refer to Genesis as a reason for their opposition to evolution, rather they used scientific and 
philosophical justifications for their opposition. Therefore, in this study at least, the 
relationship between Genesis and evolution was a somewhat detached one, with no simple 
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linkage of positions (i.e. literal = reject; symbolic = accept) as would be suggested by the 
literalistic-rejection model.  
To reiterate, however, the use of the literalistic-rejection model by Catholic Non-
oppositionals to justify why they have no problem with evolution is an interesting feature of 
the data in this study, and warrants further investigation. It may well be that this use of the 
literalistic-rejection model by Non-oppositionals is another facet of the social projection 
around science and religion found by Elsdon-Baker et al. (2017b). Elsdon-Baker et al. found 
that 60% UK respondents said they think religious members of the public will find it very 
difficult, difficult or somewhat difficult to “accept information about evolutionary science, in 
reference to their own personal beliefs or way of seeing the world” (Elsdon-Baker et al, 
2017b: 3). Another question becomes, why do they think this? What percentage of this 60% 
are formulating this opinion of expected conflict because of a subscription to the literalistic-
rejection model? Could it be that holding to the literalistic-rejection model is a widespread 
opinion regarding others’ attitudes to science and religion for the public at large, thus 
contributing to this social projection of conflict? Or, is the belief in the literalistic-rejection 
model more specific to non-literalistic religious individuals, like the Catholic Non-
oppositionals in this study, for whom their belief in symbolic interpretations of Genesis 
justifies their own non-opposition to evolution? Future studies should assess the root causes 
of the social projection found by Elsdon-Baker et al. (2017b), and the prevalence of 
subscription to the literalistic-rejection model within this group. 
Aligning with calls to move beyond simple epistemic explanations of attitudes in SSSR 
(e.g. Kaden et al., 2017; Evans, 2018), and work in PUS more broadly (e.g. Bauer et al., 2007), 
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this thesis finds no direct link between knowledge and attitudes towards evolution. That 
Catholics in this study could be unopposed to evolution with both high and low knowledge 
levels, and could oppose evolution with much knowledge of it, demonstrates there is no 
simple causal link between scientific knowledge and attitudes. This finding is similar to 
recent qualitative studies of Muslim attitudes to evolution in the UK (Moran, 2019) and is in 
line with critiques of the deficit model of PUS (Bauer et al., 2007). 
Opposition with no alternative 
There has been a tendency in SSSR to investigate Evangelical Christians and self-
proclaimed creationist groups (Toumey, 1994; Hildering et al., 2012; Long, 2011). This is 
understandable, as these groups show some explicit antipathy to evolution, thus are worthy 
of study. However, I have argued that the focus on ‘problematic groups’ in the literature 
restricts our understanding of the ways in which religious beliefs and evolution may relate. 
Through the study of a group that has thus far not received dedicated study, Catholics in 
England, I find that there are a number of individuals who will also be missed by the type of 
blunt measures critiqued in Chapter 1. These individuals I term ‘Oppositional Non-
alternatives’. They oppose evolution, yet have no alternative position which they can 
articulate. For these Catholics, the ‘scripture and tradition’ boundary is used to demarcate 
themselves from other traditions, in particular Evangelical Protestantism, whilst also 
meaning that they oppose evolution with no alternative scriptural position to fall back on, 
leading to an attitudinal grey space which cannot be categorised by blunt measures. 
Recalling Hill’s (2019) two types of evolution polling questions: (1) true or false 
measures of human evolution, (2) self-categorisation into belief positions, it is clear that 
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studies attempting the second approach will not be able to capture the views of these 
Oppositional Non-alternatives. This is true even going beyond the three-part blunt measures 
found in the Gallup and War on Sciences polls critiqued by Elsdon-Baker (2015a), to the 
more sophisticated survey measures of Ecklund and Scheitle (2018). Offering even more 
belief positions for the public to choose from, will not allow the views of Oppositional Non-
alternatives to emerge through survey data. 
No fixed position on God’s role regarding evolution 
Linked to the above point is the finding that many of my participants had no formal 
position on God’s role in relation to evolution. While maintaining a role for God was a major 
condition on which non-opposition to evolution relied, most did not have a thought-through 
view on exactly what that role was. Therefore, the more sophisticated self-classification 
surveys which offer participants multiple choices, e.g. God-guided or God-initiated evolution, 
(e.g. Ecklund and Sheitle, 2018) presuppose views which many religious individuals may not 
have. Indeed, Ecklund and Scheitle themselves found that very few people chose one box 
exclusively, and they interpreted participants’ selection of multiple narratives as an indicator 
that individuals were not sure enough about their position to commit to one perspective 
(Ecklund and Scheitle, 2018: 79). Given my findings, it may well be that for some sections of 
religious populations, stressing non-opposition to evolution, so long as a role for God in 
Creation is maintained, is a detailed enough position. 
It is also interesting to consider that while many of my participants had no fixed, 
thought through view of evolution and their faith, media coverage of attitudes towards 
evolution often forwards a notion of definitive fixed positions held with certainty, such as 
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the repeated indignation at the ~40% YEC figure in the USA (e.g. Ramsey, 2014). As 
articulated earlier, this is also linked to how we as researchers measure public opinion on 
science and religion. Our surveys, which provide neatly demarcated, all-encompassing belief 
positions play into public discourse on science and religion, further creating the expectation 
that people should and do have intellectualised views on the topic, that are held with 
conviction. Yet this is not always the case. I further reflect on what my findings mean with 
regard to future survey research in the next section. 
Recommendations and future research directions 
In the Introduction to this thesis, I argued that Catholicism is in a somewhat 
paradoxical position regarding science, religion, and evolution. On the one hand, in public 
discourse, Catholicism is held to be a particularly conflictual religious tradition with regard to 
science. References to Galileo are scattered ad libitum as though they tell the entire past 
relationship between not only the Catholic Church and science, but science and religion in 
general. On the other hand, in the academic study of religious attitudes to evolution, 
Catholics are not perceived to be a ‘problematic group’, and therefore have not yet received 
much scholarly attention. Given that the present thesis is the first dedicated qualitative 
study of Catholic attitudes towards evolution, I have generated insights from this study 
which may not have arisen from studying more obvious problematic religious groups. Below, 
I list the future research directions which these insights indicate, both for the study of 
Catholics and beyond. 
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More research into non-literalistic evolution opposition 
None of the participants in this study opposed evolution because of a literal 
interpretation of the Bible. More qualitative work should be done to investigate opposition 
to evolution, particular within groups whose opposition to evolution is not linked with 
literalism. The present study’s sample of Catholic evolution opponents was too small to draw 
any significant conclusions about the reasons for opposition, although as outlined in Chapter 
6 their claimed justifications for opposition were mainly scientific and philosophical, not 
religious. While these are clearly emic justifications of the participants themselves, future 
work should look more deeply into etic accounts of non-literalistic evolution opposition. 
Recent work on Evangelicals, non-religious groups and Muslims has shown social networks 
and group identity to be promising analytic avenues in this regard (Hill 2014a; 2014b; Jones 
et al., 2018; Moran, 2019). 
Distinguishing biological evolution from cosmological in surveys  
The present thesis found a conflation of the Big Bang and biological evolution in a 
number of participants. That this conflation has also been found in research into Muslim 
perceptions of evolution (Moran, 2019), means caution must be exercised in future survey 
work. While the majority of measures used in surveys do include a short description of 
evolution, we must remain cognizant that when the word evolution is being interpreted on a 
public survey, individuals may well be conflating biological evolution with the Big Bang. Or 
indeed be thinking of an overarching narrative of science’s explanation for the creation and 
development of the universe as a whole. This is not necessarily a bad or wrong 
interpretation of the word ‘evolution’, however the problem occurs when we as researchers 
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take attitudes towards this idiosyncratic interpretation, and analyse them as if they were 
only attitudes towards a consistently defined and neatly bound conception of biological 
evolution. 
There are multiple paths forward for researchers in this regard. We may choose to 
accept that ‘evolution’ is a term interpreted in multiple ways, and therefore exercise care 
over the insights we draw from research specifically seeking to assess perceptions of 
biological evolution. Or, we may choose to be more specific when wanting to measure 
attitudes to biological evolution specifically. This could be achieved through qualifying the 
questions about evolution with the word ‘biological’, or a number of more specific questions 
including phrases about the change of animals, plants, and humans over time. Whichever 
way forward chosen, future researchers should be aware that publics interpret the term 
‘evolution’ variedly, therefore in future survey work that seeks views on biological evolution 
specifically, we must be aware of issues such as the evolution-Big Bang conflation. 
Rethinking self-classification in surveys 
Scholars such as Elsdon-Baker (2015a) and Kaden et al. (2017) have critiqued 
attempts to quantitatively measure public attitudes through simplistic blunt or binary 
either/or measures, which seek to categorise public beliefs with the formalised positions 
(such as idealised versions of YEC ) found in public discourse. Scholars have also attempted 
to disaggregate the beliefs of those who may tick the YEC option on a survey (Hill, 2014a; 
Unsworth and Voas, 2017). For example, Hill (2014a) has shown in the US that when 
disaggregated into multiple measures, such as and the earth was created in six 24-hour day, 
biological evolution is untrue; God created humans; humans are descended from a literal 
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Adam and Eve, etc., the standard figure of 40% YECs in Gallup polling falls to 8%. This 
highlights the differences between public opinion on the matter and the idealised versions 
of beliefs, as per the categorisation used in many surveys. 
That Ecklund and Sheitle (2018) find uncertain belief positions when utilising more 
sophisticated survey items rather than the traditional three-part blunt measures, 
emphasises the need for new ways to measure public attitudes to religion. My own results, 
of Oppositional Non-alternatives and Non-oppositionals with no set view of God’s role, also 
highlights the need for rethinking self-classification measures of religious individual’s 
attitudes towards science. However, to rethink how we measure public attitudes to 
evolution in surveys is a complicated task. 
It is clear that some people do hold fixed beliefs, which mirror the labels and 
positions of public discourse. This is evident from Hill’s (2014a) disaggregation study, which 
showed that 8% of the US population do align with an idealised-form of YEC. Although, again 
this is much less than the 40% usually measured though Gallup polling (Kaden et al., 2017). 
So, some sections of the population do have fixed views, and from Ecklund and Sheitle’s 
(2018) US study, we can tell that some people hold their fixed view with apparent certainty. 
Yet those who hold their views with certainty are outnumbered by those who do not, with 
57.5% of respondents saying none of the origins narratives offered by Ecklund and Sheitle 
were “definitely true” (Ecklund and Sheitle, 2018: 77). 
We are left, then, with a tricky proposition. How do we design quantitative measures 
which allow for those with fixed and certain beliefs, whilst at the same time allowing for the 
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fluid, heterogeneous, non-formalised views of other individuals to emerge in the same 
survey? More work must be done that allows the views of those who fall into a positional 
grey space to emerge through our survey designs. A fruitful research direction is in more 
qualitative work which seeks the ‘bottom-up’ push for various religious and non-religious 
publics’ lived experience regarding evolution. While it is clear that most of our survey 
measures impose etic labels onto the populations we seek to study, we must further 
develop our understandings of the emic self-categorisation actually used by publics, 
regarding evolution. This aligns with Kaden et al.’s recommendation to develop a system of 
labels which are less reliant on the terms used in public discourse and debate (Kaden et al., 
2019: 73). Indeed, as has been shown in the present study, these may not be positive belief 
positions, but instead the alignment with simple statements of opposition to evolution, or 
indeed non-opposition towards it. 
Finally, however, we may question the whole enterprise of conducting 
representative surveys of attitudes to evolution altogether. What are the agendas behind 
these efforts to survey the opinions of a population regarding evolution? As has been 
suggested by Elsdon-Baker, creationists are often painted as the “ultimate unenlightened 
monsters that threaten scientific, and by extension societal, progress” (Elsdon-Baker, 2018: 
259). Research methods which have been used in the past such as Gallup-style blunt 
measures have overinflated the prevalence of YEC, and therefore overemphasised this 
perceived ‘creationist threat’ to science and society. Consequently, perhaps we may speak in 
favour of more sophisticated surveys, and indeed more qualitative work, which seeks to 
allow the voices of individuals to speak on the topic of evolution in terms which more closely 
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resemble their own, even, and perhaps especially, if they don’t have much to say. 
Otherwise, we risk perpetuating a rigid, certain, divisive, and politically charged view of 
public perceptions of evolution and religion in society. 
Coda 
In this thesis, I have attempted to demonstrate the need to move beyond so-called 
‘problematic groups’ in SSSR. This goal echoes the words of Elsdon-Baker and Mason-Wilkes 
(2019: 19), who call for a complexity thesis, akin to the historical complexity thesis, in SSSR. I 
have argued that we must go beyond classic sites of science-religion interaction which 
receive the most attention, if we are ever to truly understand the complexity of science-
religion interactions which pervade contemporary societies. For my part, this has been in 
looking beyond the classic ‘problematic groups’, instead investigating the relationship 
between Catholicism and evolution in England. 
Whilst achieving this goal of social complexity, I have also argued that it is paramount 
to study both public attitudes and public discourse on science and religion, even if it is 
difficult to demonstrate that one directly affects the other. Without understanding public 
discourse around the science and the religion in question, we miss the cultural milieu and 
expectations in which these public attitudes are situated. Furthermore, without detailed 
investigations of media representations of events, alongside the events themselves, we may 
fall foul of the trap of taking press narratives at face value, as has occurred around 
Benedict’s comments on evolution. We must always remember that media discourse on the 
topic of science and religion is an object of study, not an unbiased source of information. 
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This thesis also fits in with the ‘myth-busting’ genre which has dominated historical 
studies of science and religion over the past few decades (e.g. Numbers, 2009). Recent work 
in SSSR has also adopted this myth-busting approach (e.g. Ecklund and Scheitle, 2018; 
Moran, 2019). On the broadest level, the very fact this thesis demonstrates complexity of 
science-religion interactions makes it a text critiquing prior essentialist accounts, as I reject 
the idea of an all-pervading conflict meta-narrative. However, on a more specific level, I help 
deconstruct two common dominant narratives about Catholicism and evolution. First, that 
Pope Benedict was a supporter of ID. Second, that evolution opposition is necessarily tied to 
Biblical literalism. 
I referred in Chapter 1, to a review of Harrison’s (2015) Territories of Science and 
Religion, in which Lightman (2016) asked if the work was in line with the historiographic 
method of the past few decades, or represented a new meta-narrative of historical science-
religion interactions. In response, Harrison (2016) argued his work was an attempt to explain 
historical complexity, which emerges in part from the projection of 21st-century categories 
of science and religion onto past events. Harrison also spoke in defence of meta-narrative, 
asking counterfactually, how would historians of science and religion have occupied 
themselves without the existence of the conflict narrative, and their work in critiquing it? 
Nevertheless, Harrison argued that myth-busting must eventually come to an end, and a 
reconstructive process of historical accounts must begin (Harrison, 2016). 
While the myth-busting process of historical studies may well come to an end, I feel 
that for SSSR, a similar process is just beginning. There is no shortage of instances of public 
discourse, which forwards a contemporary and at heart essentialist conflict narrative. With 
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every instance providing a new avenue and opportunity for more holistic social research 
which highlights the true complexity of actual lived experiences. However, revealing the 
complex tapestry of social science-religion interactions will require the concerted effort of 
social researchers. Given the preponderance of a science-religion conflict narrative in 
contemporary public discourse, and that research is beginning to show this does not 
necessarily reflect peoples’ lived experiences, it would seem that social studies of science 
and religion have a fruitful period ahead. 
What is the relationship between science and religion? Given that in one religion, 
there can be individuals both for and against a particular science such as evolution; and 
given that different popular media may represent a single individual’s views as both opposed 
to and unopposed to evolution, as happened for Benedict, perhaps we need to expand the 
question we ask. What are the possible relationships between a science and a religion, and 
who gets to define them? However, in line with the social complexity thesis, and to guide 
our future research efforts, perhaps it is better to reformulate once more: What are the 
relationships between sciences and religions? 
This thesis has demonstrated that future research endeavours which attempt to 
answer this question must move beyond solely studying ‘problematic groups’ if we are to 
build a complexity thesis in SSSR. Furthermore, we must study not only public attitudes but 
also public discourse on the topic in question. Finally, as scholars in an area of research, we 
must remain aware that the work we produce may well feedback into one of our objects of 
study—public discourse around science and religion, which indeed may feedback into public 
attitudes. Thus, we must be cognizant of the interrelationship between science and religion 
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professionals, media producers, public attitudes, and our own scholarly work. Hopefully 
future work will begin to map this web of social interaction concerning religion, science, and 
their many contingent relations.
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Appendix I: Interview Schedule 
 
Introduction and research ethics 
Explain the aims of the research and the Newman University research ethics processes, 
including: 
• The participant can choose to go into as much or as little detail as they want to 
regarding the topics discussed; 
• The participant can withdraw at any time, and can chose not to talk about any topic; 
• How the interview transcript will be anonymised/transcribed/stored, and who might 
see it; 
• Give participant information sheet and the consent form and acquire a signature, 
• Ask if they have any questions before beginning, and again at end. 
Personal biography and religious background 
Icebreaker: ‘Can you tell me a little about yourself, your background, and what you do?’ 
• Probe if necessary: Did the participant go to university? If so, to study what subject? 
• What is the participant’s current/past job(s)? 
‘If I asked you to describe yourself in terms of your identity or identities, how would you 
describe yourself?’ 
‘You identify as a Catholic, was that the religious tradition you were brought up in? How 
would you characterise the beliefs of your immediate family and close friends?’ 
‘Have your beliefs changed significantly over time? How have they altered? What have been 
the main influences that have shaped your perspective today?’ 
 
Belief and practice 
‘How would you describe your beliefs and your Catholic identity now?’ 
• Would you identify as Roman Catholic, Orthodox, or any another term?’ 
 ‘Some people use other particular terms to refer to their Catholicism: traditional, 
conservative, liberal, modernist. Do you think any apply to you?’ 
• If interviewee does use a particular term to identify themselves: ‘What do you 
understand by this term?’ 
• If the interview does not identify with a particular term: ‘What are the problems you 
see with these terms, if any? How would you describe yourself?’ 
‘Have you attended the meetings/services of any kind of Catholic community of belief in the 
last six months?’ 
• If Yes: ‘What are these meetings/services like? Can you recall an example?’ 
 
Religion 
‘What is religion, and how would you describe its role in society?’ 
‘How would you describe your trust in religious authority?’ 
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Experience of the sciences 
‘Would you say that you have an interest in the sciences? Do you have much experience of 
studying scientific themes or subjects?’ 
• Probe if necessary: Beyond academic interests do the participants engage with 
science shows, podcasts, articles, or books? Or attend any events to do with science? 
Science identity? 
Science 
‘What is science, and how would you describe its role in society?’ 
‘How would you describe your trust in scientific authority?’ 
 
Catholic belief and evolutionary science  
‘Are you familiar with the term “evolutionary science”? What do you understand by the 
term, and what does it mean to you?’  
• What are your views on the mechanism that drives evolution? 
‘How, if at all, do your beliefs as a Catholic relate to or inform your position on evolutionary 
science?’ 
• Explain and elaborate if necessary, probing on relevant themes:  
o Does the interviewee separate science and religion’s ‘magesteria’? 
o What is the relation, if any, between scientific and religious knowledge? 
o If the person believes in God, what do they see as God’s role in evolution? 
What about your position on human origins specifically, do your beliefs as a Catholic relate 
to or inform your position on evolutionary science in that regard?’ 
o What is the relation, if any, between scientific and religious knowledge? 
o If the person believes in God, what do they see as God’s role in human 
evolution? 
o How does, if at all, an evolutionary account and the Genesis account of 
human origins relate? 
 ‘What, or who, has influenced your understanding of, and perspective on, evolutionary 
science? 
o What are the sources of information about evolutionary science? Was it 
studied at school? 
o Does the interviewee refer to individuals who are seen as influential?  
‘Was evolution/science ever discussed in your Catholic community or services? What was 
the discussion about? What role did you play in these discussions? Do you see yourself as 
typical within that organisation, or different?’ 
• If not: Why not? What other issues are more important? 
‘There are a wide range of terms that are currently used to describe people’s views on 
evolution (Darwinist, Creationist, evolutionist, advocate of intelligent design). Do you think 
any apply to you?’  
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• If interviewee does identify with a particular term: ‘What do you understand by this 
term?’ 
• If the interview does not identify with a particular term: ‘What are the problems you 
see with these terms, if any? How would you describe yourself?’ 
Perceptions of others’ beliefs 
Do you think Catholics are more or less likely to accept evolution than other religious 
groups? Or do you think there is no difference? For what reasons do you think this is the 
case? 
• What other groups are mentioned? What reasons are given for any differences both 
for Catholics and other religious groups? 
‘How widely accepted would you say evolution is in this country?’ 
• Follow up by asking about the interviewees’ view on the position and social influence 
of other groups. 
‘Can you recall an occasion where you talked to, or learned about, how people with beliefs 
different from your own understand evolutionary science?’ 
• Probe to see if the interviewee regards other religious or secular beliefs as 
necessarily involving a specific stance on evolution, or if he or she believes that in 
order to believe in evolution one needs to have a particular set of beliefs. 
Experiences and perceptions of prejudice 
‘Do you think that people make [or would make] false assumptions about your position on 
evolution or on science because of your religious background? Can you recall a specific 
occasion when this has happened?’ 
• If Yes: ‘Have you ever felt the need to hide or mask your beliefs or your views about 
evolutionary science? 
• Do you think non-Catholics generally think Catholics would have a problem with 
evolution?  
• If Yes: ‘Why do you think those misperceptions have become popular?’ 
o Prompt if necessary: ‘Do you think these misperceptions are generated by the 
media, particular public figures or prominent religious movements? 
o How do you deal with those misperceptions? 
Public discourse on religion and evolution 
‘What are your thoughts on the present debate about religion and evolutionary science? Do 
you think your and other’s views are represented accurately?’ 
• Which individuals are mentioned from these debates? 
 ‘Are there any particular public figures you see as being particularly trustworthy or 
authoritative on issues to do with evolutionary science, belief and the link between the 
two?’ 
• Probe, if it is possible/relevant to do so: 
o ‘Are there any figures from the history of science you view as especially 
significant?’ 
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o ‘What about contemporary public figures?’ 
Stimulus Materials  
Popes, the Church, and Evolution 
We are now going to look at a statement from Pope Francis in 2014, about his personal view 
of evolution: 
“When we read the account of Creation in Genesis we risk imagining that God was a 
magician, complete with an all powerful magic wand. But that was not so. He created 
beings and he let them develop according to the internal laws with which He 
endowed each one, that they might develop, and reach their fullness. He gave 
autonomy to the beings of the universe at the same time in which He assured them of 
his continual presence, giving life to every reality. And thus Creation has been 
progressing for centuries and centuries, millennia and millennia, until becoming as we 
know it today, precisely because God is not a demiurge or a magician, but the Creator 
who gives life to all beings. The beginning of the world was not a work of chaos that 
owes its origin to another, but derives directly from a supreme Principle who creates 
out of love. The Big Bang theory, which is proposed today as the origin of the world, 
does not contradict the intervention of a divine creator but depends on it. Evolution in 
nature does not conflict with the notion of Creation, because evolution presupposes 
the creation of beings who evolve.” 
‘What are your thoughts about the statement from Francis?’  
• Does the participant agree or disagree with the statement?  
‘Do you think that the Church should set out a position on evolution for its followers?’ 
• If yes: What should that position be? If no, for what reasons do you think that? 
Media 
We are now going to look at a media article responding to the above statement from Francis 
in 2014: 
“Pope Francis has conceded evolution and the Big Bang theory are real, saying God 
isn't "a magician with a magic wand". He made the comments at a meeting of the 
Pontifical Academy of Sciences at the Vatican, no doubt to a scene of carnage with 
cardinals screaming as though they were in Francis Bacon portraits.  
It seems that Pope Francis is arguing that an ancient text which acts as the Christian 
rule book can accommodate proven realities that are diametrically opposed to its 
contents. Because this book tells us our world was spun out of nothingness over six 
days. Hasn't he just contradicted what is written in the Bible? Nobody would care 
were it not for that pesky doctrine of papal infallibility.” 
‘What are your thoughts about the excerpt?’ 
• What do you think of the article’s representation of the Pope’s views? 
• What do you think of the representation of the reception of the Pope’s views by the 
Church? Are they the same or do they differ from your own thoughts of how the 
comment might have been received? 
• The article talks about the relationship between scientific knowledge and the bible, 
what do you make of this representation? 
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Do you think there is an expectation for religious people, or specifically Catholics, to be anti-
science? 
‘Do you think this type of reporting is typical or not typical of newspapers in England?’ 
• Do you think the topic of science and religion is covered differently be different 
newspapers? If so, what do you think are the reasons for these differences?  
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Appendix II: Ethics Approval Proposal Form 
NEWMAN UNIVERSITY 
 
ETHICS APPROVAL PROPOSAL FORM 
 
RESEARCH PROJECT / WORK PLACEMENT 
 
Please read the documents Ethical Guidelines and Ethical Approval for Research and discuss 
the possible ethical implications of your research project/work placement with your 
supervisor. Note: for work placements this means your supervisor at Newman University, not 
at the work placement. 
 
If the research for your project/work placement raises ethical issues you must complete this 
form. The project/work placement must not be started until ethics approval has been given 
by the Subject Area or the Research Ethics Committee, and you have received the 
confirmation letter and certificate of approval. 
 
THIS FORM MUST BE COMPLETED, SIGNED IN INK AND GIVEN TO YOUR SUPERVISOR 
 
Student: James Riley  
Student No: 1504835 
Supervisor: Alexander Hall, Fern Elsdon-Baker  
Module Code: PhD  
Subject Area/Programme: Social Sciences 
Research Project/Work Placement: PhD Thesis 
Date this form submitted:  
Proposed starting date: June 2017 
 
Brief title of investigation: Catholicism and Evolution: Historical, Media and Social 
Perspectives  
 
Aims/Purpose of the study:   
On 27th October 2014, Pope Francis addressed the Pontifical Academy of Sciences on the 
topic of evolution. His statements, which affirmed his belief in biological evolution and its 
compatibility with the doctrine of creation, sparked media reaction around the world. Some 
media commentators, however, remarked that the Pope’s position was in no way a new 
direction for the Church, and criticised the general media reaction, observing how “site after 
site after site ramped up the Pope’s words and took them out of context” (Dias, 2014). The 
content of this widespread media coverage suggests that some media producers perceive 
the Catholic Church to be anti-science, anti-evolution or even pro-Creationism. 
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The broad aim of this research is to provide empirical evidence of contemporary Catholic 
attitudes toward, and the media representations of, the relationship between their religion 
and evolution. This aim will be achieved by undertaking two linked studies: 
(i) By assessing media representations of Catholic attitudes towards evolution by 
conducting a media content analysis on the framing of British newspaper articles 
covering successive Popes’ public statements on the topic of evolution; 
(ii) And by conducting a series of structured interviews investigating Catholic 
individuals’ perceptions of the relationship between evolutionary biology, official 
Catholic doctrine, media representations of their Church’s ‘science stance’, and 
their own personal religious beliefs. 
 
Proposed participants in research:  
(i) Print media articles from the LexisNexis newspaper database (for more details on 
LexisNexis Academic see: http://guides.library.oregonstate.edu/LNA); 
(ii) Public individuals who identify as Catholic. Participants will be mixed members of 
the UK public, aged 18 and over. Any participants below the age of 18 will be 
filtered out of the participant pool at the pre-screening stage.  
 
  
Brief description of procedure: 
(i) Media Analysis: The procedure will follow Hansen’s (1998: 98) ‘Key Steps’ of 
content analysis as follows:  
(1) Definition of the research problem.  
Analysing the framing of instances of Popes’ pronouncements on evolution in 
selected newspapers, and assessing how these statements have been 
represented by the print media. E.g. does the British print media’s framing of 
this subject take a normative position which presumes that the Catholic 
Church is anti-science.  
(2) Selection of media and sample.  
Selected British newspapers from the LexisNexis database. The articles will be 
selected from a representative range of major national UK newspapers. Date 
sample 1996-2015. 
(3) Defining analytical categories.  
The study will be a frame analysis, as outlined by Matthes and Kohring (2008). 
With this method, frame elements are coded and a statistical cluster analysis 
is used to reveal frames and/or analytical categories. 
(4) Constructing a coding schedule.  
(5) Piloting the coding schedule and checking reliability. 
(6) Data-preparation and analysis.  
 Analysis will assess if media framing of Catholic Church statements changed 
 during the period 1996-2015, exploring how coverage has  changed, or 
remained similar, and detailing what new elements may have emerged.  
 
(ii) Contemporary attitudes: 
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Catholic participants from the public will be recruited using the on-line pre-screening 
questionnaire which is part of the larger Science and Religion: Exploring the Spectrum (SRES) 
project, which has already received approval from the Newman University Research Ethics 
Committee. This pre-screen gathers basic information about the potential participants’ 
demographic characteristics (for example, age, gender, socio-economic classification), as 
well as more detailed data about beliefs (for example, religious identification, religious 
participation and beliefs about God, the soul, the afterlife etc.), and awareness of 
evolutionary theory. It also gathers basic contact details, such as email addresses. Additional 
participants will also be recruited through personal and institutional contacts, the 
identification of gatekeepers, and possible snowballing of recruitment. NVivo will be used to 
code and analyse the interview data. 
 
Evidence of how it has been established that the methodology proposed will produce 
sufficient data to draw meaningful conclusions: 
 
(i) Media analysis: 
Using content analysis is the primary method of analysing large-scale media data 
(Hansen, 1998; Krippendorf, 2004). Similarly, to analyse how subjects are 
represented in the media, the use of a reflexive framing analysis methodology 
(e.g. Matthes and Kohring, 2008) allows researchers to study how media frames 
change over time. Media content analysis studies have previously been deployed 
in public understanding of science (PUS) and science communication research 
(e.g. Cassidy, 2005) and, along with attitudinal studies, make up a significant 
proportion of research in the PUS field (see: Bauer et al., 2007; Smallman, 2016). 
Based on the significant amount of methodological and practice based literature 
which has developed these methods, as introduced above, the media content 
analysis as proposed, will produce sufficient data to address the research aims. 
 
(ii) Contemporary attitudes:  
Questions for structured interviews will be developed in response to a detailed 
review of the sociological literature on the relationship between religion, 
Catholicism and evolutionary science. This review enables the exploration of 
areas that have not yet been addressed, or where current research is ambiguous 
or contradictory. During the interviews, questions will be addressed both directly 
and indirectly, allowing participants to give an account of their beliefs and 
experiences following a well-established semi-structured approach (Patton, 
2002). Following the completion of the interviews all the transcripts will be 
summarised and coded, with these codes being reviewed at regular points in the 
research process.  
 
 
How will participants' informed consent be obtained for the study? 
 
Before starting the interviews, participants will be introduced to the research and ethics 
procedures, including the codes of conduct that the research project will follow (such as the 
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ESRC Framework for Research Ethics and Newman University’s Ethical Guidelines). 
Participants will be asked to confirm that they have read the participant information sheet 
and to give their informed consent for the information submitted to be stored and analysed 
for research purposes.  
 
 
Does the study involve any potential hazards or procedures which might cause distress or 
discomfort? (indicate all that apply) 
 
Questionnaires touching on sensitive issues YES  
Deception   
Experimental procedure that might cause distress – even inadvertently   
Designs involving stressful situations   
Possible breach of confidentiality YES  
Invasion of privacy   
Working with children   
Working with vulnerable people   
Work involving animals   
Other area where you think there may be ethical issues involved YES  
 
 
 What procedures will be used to address these issues? 
 
Sensitive questionnaire themes 
 
Part (ii) of the research involves asking participants about their personal religious beliefs. 
This will be necessary because the study is concerned with how religious belief may or may 
not impact upon perceptions of evolutionary theory. As in the ethics approved SRES project, 
the risks associated with this will be addressed by explaining the broad question themes, 
which we will cover in the research prior to starting the questionnaire (omitting details 
where this may present a risk of socially desired responding), and by offering participants 
the chance to withdraw at any point during the research. Interview questions will also be 
reviewed by both supervisors prior to data collection, to ensure the items are not 
unnecessarily personal or challenging. 
 
Breach of confidentiality 
 
During the project, I will be collecting significant amounts of personal data from participants. 
To ensure the security of this data, all non-anonymised sensitive personal data (as defined 
under the Data Protection Act 1998) will be stored in a password protected location on 
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Newman University’s servers. All sensitive research data will be encrypted on occasions 
when it is transported to locations outside of Newman University, for example, a personal 
laptop. Only members of the research team and transcribers will be given access to the 
research data. Where transcriptions are outsourced, transcribers will sign confidentiality 
agreements and I will use transcription services who guarantee that raw data is not saved to 
laptops or hard drives (for example by using FIPS encrypted flash drives). Interviewees will 
be allotted pseudonyms for transcription and the key linking these to their contact details 
will be stored securely and separately from interview transcripts. Data that could be used to 
directly or indirectly identify participants will be destroyed at the end of the project and only 
anonymised data retained. 
 
Informed consent 
 
In structured interviews, participants will be fully informed of why the project is being 
conducted before the research begins. Informed consent will be implemented at three 
points in the interview process: 
 
1. During the pre-screening questionnaire (online) participants will be introduced to the 
research and ethics procedures, including codes of conduct, and asked for permission 
for a member of the team to contact them for further studies. (This stage has already 
received Newman University ethical approval as part of the larger SRES project.) 
2. All interview invitations will include a participant information sheet, explaining what 
the research will be used for, and how (and for how long) data will be stored. 
3. Immediately prior to each interview the interviewer will explain the full details of the 
project, and outline the interviewee’s right to withdraw at any time, before asking 
the interviewee to sign a form giving consent to the research.  
 
 
Plan of Work 
Data Collection (Media): June 2017 – July 2017 (Pending ethics approval) 
Data Collection (Interviews): July 2017 – December 2017 
Analysis/Final Write-Up: December 2017 – January 2019 (Submit) 
 
I have read Ethical Guidelines and Ethical Approval for Research. I am satisfied that all 
ethical issues have been identified and that satisfactory procedures are in place to deal 
with those issues in this research. 
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Amendments 
 
As the aim of the research is to investigate a range of beliefs from individuals who identify as 
Catholic, I will ensure recruitment of individuals from a range of Catholic communities. This 
will go beyond solely churchgoing communities, to those who may seem less traditionally 
Catholic, or indeed use the term more as an inherited label. Furthermore, I will ensure a 
range of generations, and care will be taken to balance the genders of the sample. Lastly, I 
will focus on several locations, Bristol, Birmingham, London, Nottingham, so that all 
participants will not be from similar geographical communities. Care will be given in analysis 
as to whether the individual comes from an established Catholic community, or a newer 
own, as this may impact on their views, given the history of anti-Catholicism in the country. 
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Appendix IV: Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
Who is the researcher and what is the purpose of the research?  
I am James Riley, a PhD student at Newman University, Birmingham. My PhD is focussing on 
the relationship between science and religion—specifically the Catholic Church, Catholic 
individuals and evolutionary science. I am conducting a series of interviews to see how 
people who identify as Catholic perceive the relationship between science and religion. The 
data may be reproduced in the final thesis, future publications and presentations, but will 
appear anonymised.  
 
What type of data is being collected? 
As part of this research I am conducting semi-structured interviews with individuals who 
identify as Catholic. A semi-structured interview is a type of interview which aims to cover 
certain topics or themes, but rather than a strict script of questions which must be stuck to, 
the interview is flexible in that it can change to discuss new topics that may arise during the 
discussion. In this research the theme is science and religion, specifically Catholicism and 
evolution. I am interested in your views and opinions on the topic. It is not a test and there 
are no right or wrong answers. 
 
What will participation in the interview involve? 
The interview will last about an hour, although please allow for slightly longer in your 
planning in case we run over. During the interview, you will be asked to discuss your views 
on science, religion, Catholicism, evolution, and their relationships.  
 
When and where will the interview take place? 
I’m hoping to arrange the interviews for some time between October 2017 and March 2018, 
and they can take place on a weekday or weekend, daytime or evening, whenever is best for 
you. We can do the interview wherever is best for you, be that at work, or your home, or 
another quiet location such as a coffee shop. The location has to be quiet enough for the 
audio recording to work properly, but some background noise is ok. I can travel to you, 
although I am based at Newman University, Birmingham, so If you would prefer to have the 
interview at the university, then that is also possible. 
 
What will happen during the interview? 
On the day, I’ll first talk you through the aims of the research, the ethics process, how the 
data will be used, and then ask you to read and sign a consent form. You will have an 
opportunity to ask any questions about the research that you may have. Once you are happy 
to begin the interview, I’ll start the audio recording and ask the first question. At the end of 
the interview you will have another opportunity to ask questions about the research. 
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What are the benefits of taking part? 
While there are no monetary incentives for taking part in the interviews, the benefits are in 
taking part in the discussion itself. An interesting discussion about your beliefs, opinions and 
perceptions of science and religion. Taking part in this research means you will be 
contributing to important debates in our society. 
 
Are there any risks involved? 
There are no particular risks involved in this interview, and there is no deception. The 
general risks involved in interviews are the potential to become upset or distressed by a 
question. If you do find any topic distressing, then do let me know. You can say as much or 
as little as you wish on any topic, and have the right to withdraw from the interview at any 
time. 
 
Will I be identifiable? 
No. All the data from the interviews will be anonymised and stored under password 
protection. The only people to see the raw data will be myself and a professional transcriber. 
Once anonymised your views will be analysed and excerpts may appear in my PhD thesis and 
further publications and presentations thereafter. Although excerpts from the interview may 
appear in the text, identifying information (such as names) will be omitted. While full 
anonymity is aimed for in this type of research, there are certain limits to this. There are 
ways the data could potentially be hacked and stolen, or requested by courts. However, this 
is extremely unlikely to happen given the topics we will be discussing.  
 
Can I withdraw? 
Yes, once you have agreed to be part of the research you can still withdraw. If you wish to 
withdraw from the project after the interview, please you notify myself within 30 days of 
your interview by emailing the address below. 
 
If you have any questions, please contact: 
James Riley, PhD candidate, Newman University, Birmingham. +44(0)121 476 1181 
James.Riley@newman.ac.uk 
 
This research has been approved by the Newman University Research Ethics Committee. 
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Appendix V: Consent Form 
 
This PhD research aims to better understand the relationship between Catholicism and evolutionary 
science in England. 
 
Please initial in the box provided 
 I confirm that I am over 18, have read and understood the participant 
information sheet, have been given the opportunity to ask questions, and I give 
my consent to participate in this interview on science and religion.  
  
 I am participating in the interview on a voluntary basis, and I understand I am 
free to decline to answer any question. 
  
 I understand that I can withdraw from the research, without giving a reason, 
within 30 days of the interview taking place (up to ___________). 
  
 I understand that all information from the interview is anonymous and 
confidential.  
  
 I understand the interview will be audio recorded, and the only people who will 
hear the recording are the researcher (James Riley) and a professional 
transcriber. 
  
 I understand that the interview data will be reproduced and analysed in the 
researcher’s PhD thesis, and potentially in future publications and presentations, 
and these excerpts will appear anonymised.  
 
Name of participant   
   
Signature of participant   
   
Date   
   
Signature of researcher   
If you have any questions about the research, please contact: 
James Riley (James.Riley@newman.ac.uk) 
Centre for Science, Knowledge, and Belief in Society, Newman University, Birmingham, B32 3NT. (Tel: 
0121 476 1181) 
 
This research has been approved by the Newman University Research Ethics Committee. 
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Appendix VI: Participant demographics 
 
Alias Evolution 
orientation 
Gender Age Occupation category City Length 
Eileen Non-Oppositional Female 40-50 University - Religious 
service 
Birmingham 1:13:24 
Anna Non-Oppositional Female 20-30 University - student Birmingham 0:56:22 
Wilfred Non-Oppositional Male 50-60 University - Lecturer Birmingham 0:43:04 
Spencer Non-Oppositional Male 80-90 Retired - Engineer/scientist Sheffield 0:56:36 
Nick Non-Oppositional Male 20-30 Teacher - Secondary Birmingham 0:47:10 
Neil Non-Oppositional Male 60-70 Teacher - Secondary Birmingham 0:38:58 
Judith Non-Oppositional Female 50-60 Local Government London 0:32:39 
Kirsty Non-Oppositional Female 40-50 University - Lecturer Birmingham 1:02:34 
Christine Non-Oppositional Female 40-50 University - Lecturer Birmingham 0:31:30 
Claire Non-Oppositional Female 20-30 University - student Birmingham 0:34:27 
Penny Non-Oppositional Female 40-50 Teacher - Secondary Birmingham 0:34:59 
David Non-Oppositional Male 50-60 University - Lecturer Birmingham 1:00:24 
Tom Non-Oppositional Male 20-30 University - student Birmingham 0:49:49 
Lucy Non-Oppositional Female 50-60 Teacher - Home tutor Birmingham 0:55:03 
Julie Non-Oppositional Female 70-80 Retired - Engineer/scientist Birmingham 1:14:24 
Paul Non-Oppositional Male 50-60 University - professional 
service 
Birmingham 1:48:30 
Dorothy Non-Oppositional Female 50-60 University - Admin Birmingham 0:35:17 
Rebecca Non-Oppositional Female 60-70 Retired - Education 
management 
Hereford 1:15:53 
George Non-Oppositional Male 50-60 Retired - IT Hereford 0:44:20 
Jane Non-Oppositional Female 20-30 University - Student Crewe 0:47:18 
Victor Non-Oppositional Male 50-60 Manual labourer Cheltenham 0:54:01 
Don Non-Oppositional Male 60-70 Business owner Cheltenham 1:32:12 
Laura Non-Oppositional Female 60-70 Non-university researcher Cheltenham 1:24:17 
Rachel Non-Oppositional Female 50-60 Local Government Cheltenham 0:51:24 
John Non-Oppositional Male 70-80 Retired - Engineer/scientist Cheltenham 1:17:04 
Joan Non-Oppositional Female 80-90 Retired - Housewife Bristol 0:49:53 
Gregory Oppositional Male 70-80 Retired - Engineer/scientist Cheltenham 2:36:21 
Peter Oppositional Male 80-90 Retired - Engineer/scientist Birmingham 1:04:27 
Thomas Oppositional Male 50-60 Author Cheltenham 2:40:13 
Catherine Oppositional Female 20-30 Non-university researcher London 1:21:13 
Mark Oppositional Male 50-60 Manual labourer Bristol 1:37:49 
